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INTRODUCTION

This study examines the relations among the British
government, her provincial governors, and the American
colonists in mid-eighteenth century New York.

The subject

is worthy of intensive study because it provides insight
into the functioning of the British imperial system, the
colonial political system, and their interactions.
Studies of the first British empire have emphasized
the legislative and economic aspects of colonial adminis
tration. ^

While these approaches to the history of the Old

Empire are undoubtedly significant, they do not describe its
actual workings with complete fidelity.

Legislation and

economic theories describe a nation's conception of the
operations of its government; but they do not necessarily
depict how it performs.

In mid-eighteenth century Britain

there was a considerable gap between the theory and practice
of government.
As this study will concentrate on examining the practice
of politics in mid-eighteenth century New York, it will tend

^George Louis Beer, The Old Colonial System 1660-1754
(2 vols., New York, 1913, reprinted 1933).

1

2
to ignore laws and economic theories because they had little
effect on the actual behavior of the British government, the
colonial governors, and the New Yorkers.

This approach will

result in a picture of imperial administration which differs
somewhat from that found in traditional studies.

The Acts

of Trade and Navigation, the Secretary of State for the
Southern Department, and the Board of Trade will be reduced
to a subordinate role in the narrative because, despite the
volume of space they occupy in the records of the period,
they had little affect on the government of New York.
This emphasis on the practical aspects of colonial ad
ministration leads to a re-evaluation of the role of the
men who governed Britain's North American colonies.

Most

historians have based their evaluations of the governors
on the formal descriptions of their duties and responsibilities,

and as those formulations bore little resemblance

to the actual functions of the office, the governors have
been misunderstood by both students of the Old Empire, and
by students of the individual colonies.
Historians of the Empire have apparently regarded the
governors as primarily local, American officials, and there
fore studies of English colonial administration in the
eighteenth century have generally ignored the contribution

^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America
(New Haven, Conn., 1930, reprinted 1958).
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the governors made to the development and maintenance of the
Empire.

The monumental Cambridge History of the British

Empire^ glosses over the role of the governors; they are
almost totally ignored in Edward Raymond Turner's studies
of the Privy Council and the Cabinet (the bodies which
nominally supervised the activities of the governors),* and
in The Secretaries of State, by Mark Thomson.-*

Histories

of British colonial administration have also slighted the
governors.

For example, the governors are treated only in

cidentally in George Louis Beer's exhaustive examination of
colonial policy and practices in the century between 1660
and 1754, and in Arthur Basye's study of the Board of
Trade.®

Even the recent intensive examinations of the role

of patronage in the political system of mid-eighteenth
century England have emphasized the machinations involved in

^The Old Empire: From the Beginnings to 1783, vol. I,
The Cambridge History of the British Empire, J. Holland
Rose, A.P. Newton, E.A. Benians, eds. (New York, 1929).
^Edward Raymond Turner, The Cabinet Council of England
1622-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore Md., 1930-2), The Privy
Council of England, 1603-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, Md.,
1927-8).
^Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782
(Oxford, 1932).
®Arthur Basye, The Lords Commissioners of Trade azid
Plantations (New Haven, Conn., 1925).
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obtaining and retaining office, and ignored the actual work
of the colonial administrators.^
Although historians interested in the development of
the American colonies have not, for their part, neglected
the governors, they too have distorted the governors' role.
They have been so intent on examining the relations between
the governors and the Assemblies that they have neglected
virtually all other aspects of the governors' activities.
The "Whig" interpretation of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries which frequently presented the governors
as indigent, incompetent, dependents of British magnates who
were dispatched to America because no suitable positions
were available for them in England and Ireland® has gener
ally been superseded with the more objective assessment of
their abilities advocated by Leonard Woods Labaree.

There

is still, however, a strong tendency among students of the
colonial period to regard the governors as passive figures
whose role in the government was clearly subordinate to the

^James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N.J.,
1972), Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968).
®Edward Channing, A History of the United States, vol.
II (New York, 1908, reprinted 1937), Herbert L. Osgood, The
American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (4 vols., New
York, 1924-5, reprinted 1958) for example.
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Assembly.^

This dismal view of the governors' role may be

the product of lacunae in the evidence.
The most accurate record of political developments
is often found in the private papers of the men who engaged
in the decision making process.

Unfortunately, neither the

papers of the governors, nor the colonial politicians pro
vide insight in these areas.

The surviving records are

meager, and contain few references to political develop
ments.

Nor are the newspapers of the period of much assis

tance to the historian.

While b o t h ^ were deeply involved

in the political struggles of the colony neither engaged
in rational discussion of issues.

The editors of both

papers were content to hurl invective at their opponents.
The lack of direct evidence compels the historian
to base his examination of the politics of mid-eighteenth
century New York on inference.

While this approach is

clearly less precise than one based on direct evidence, it
can be used to create a reliable understanding of the period.
The recent interest in the political history of mid-eight
eenth century New York has generated a number of studies

^Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steel Commager, William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Growth of the American Republic, 6th ed.
(2 vols.. New York, 1969), Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious
People; Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York,
1971).

^ New York Gazette, New York Weekly Journal.

which, when combined with earlier works^l enables the
historian to make judgments of the political issues in
volved.

The alternative to this approach is to simply

ignore the period.
Neglecting the period would, however, be unwise.
The years between 1717 and 1753 were the pinnacle of the
imperial government in New York; the Royal government
reached its highest degree of success.

In 1717 Governor

Hunter had reached an accommodation with the Assembly and
the next thirty-seven years were marked by the evolution
of that agreement.

In that period the Governor and Assembly

jockeyed for dominance in the colony.

The contest ended in

1753 when James DeLancey became acting governor of New York
and surrendered his remaining authority to the Assembly.
In those years the contest was close, and the governors
faced a difficult situation.

Their objective in accepting

office was economic; they went to the New World to repair
their fortunes.

To do this, it was necessary for the

Governor to perpetuate himself in office, and for him to re
tain the good will of the Assembly which voted his emolu
ments.

The Governor had to serve two masters.

Their task, although Herculean, was not impossible

H-For example, Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", Katz,
Newcastle's New York, Bonomi, Factious People.
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only because the British government was not (despite the
language of legislation and Royal Decrees) very interested
in colonial government.

The colonial administrative

structure, composed of the Crown, Privy Council, Secretary
of State for the Southern Department, and the Board of Trade
seemed impressive and efficient but it was only a small,
very insignificant part of the British government.

Con

sequently, the men in London charged with administering
the colonies paid little attention to them.

They intruded

in provincial affairs only if there were complaints from
British merchants, a breakdown in public order, or an
obvious political breakdown in the colony.

Thus, it was

important for the Governor to satisfy London in these areas.
The New Yorkers were not so easily satisfied.

The

colonists thought of themselves as virtually self-governing,
and demanded that the governor support locally beneficial
programs regardless of British interests.

As the colonial

Assembly controlled his salary, the Governor had little
choice in the matter; he was in New York for economic
reasons, not to advance abstract principles of Empire.
This meant that to succeed, the Governor of New York
had to be an exceptionally perceptive and adroit poli
tician.

He had to identify the issues which might offend

either the English or the Americans, and then adopt policies
which would please both.

An examination of the methods

utilized by the six men who ruled New York between 1717 and

1753 to resolve this paradox will reveal the attitudes of
the British government towards New York, the limits the
British placed on the governors' authority, the nature of
the provincial political system, and the political acumen
of the governors.

CHAPTER ONE
GOVERNMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD

For most of the colonial period the British government
seems to have had absolutely no desire to control the in
ternal administration of its North American colonies.

This

lack of concern for the colonies was not as peculiar as it
might first appear to be since the British government was
almost equally disinterested in maintaining anything like
direct control over county affairs at home.

Although the

central government had been increasing its sphere of
authority since the reign of Henry VIII, the British concept
of "government" was apparently a narrow one, which did not
extend to matters of local administration, in either the
English counties or the colonies abroad.
From the late fifteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries^
the duties of the central government at home had been (with
one exception) limited to the preservation of the social
order.

The government had defended society against attacks

Ir .H. Gretton, The King1s Government (London, 1913),
pp. ix-xi.

9
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from within by attempting to prevent riots and disorders,
and had punished rioters and criminals.

It had maintained

armed forces to protect the nation from external

threats.^

Although these functions had not been expanded for
several centuries, it had of course become necessary, as
English society and the world grew more complex, to expand
the machinery of government to enable it to carry out its
tasks.

The creation of special committees and boards appar

ently had never brought the national government into direct
contact with the people.^
It seems to have been the gentry, the respected, land
owning families of England, who linked the national govern
ment to the people of England.

The gentry possessed the

Parliamentary franchise, provided many of the members of the
House of Commons, and, by virtue of a monopoly of the post
of Justice of the Peace,* dominated county government
everywhere.
The English county government normally consisted of a

2Alan G.R. Smith, The Government of Elizabethian
England (New York, 1967), p. 42.
^George Clark, The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714, second
edition, volume 10 in The Oxford History of England, editor
(Oxford, 1956), p. 13.
^Charles Austin Beard, The Office of Justice of the
Peace in England in its Origin and Development (New York,
1904), p. 54 (hereafter cited as Justice of the Peace).
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coroner, a high constable, justices of the peace, a sheriff,
a lord lieutenant, and, in counties on the sea, a viceadmiral.

These officials shared the responsibility for

maintaining order, respect for the laws, and military
security in the community.

Since the system had evolved in

response to specific necessities, the duties of each o* the
offices was never precisely defined and there were overC
lapping jurisdictions.
The coroner and high constable were
police officials, and others acted as liaison between the
Crown and people.
A man of great standing and influence in the community,
the Lord Lieutenant, was primarily a military official.

He

raised, trained, equipped, and led the county's militia, re
cruited men to serve in the King's army, and maintained the
county's defenses.6

In addition he might be asked to per

form additional, non-military chores for the central govern
ment.
The vice-admiral exercised the Crown's authority over
maritime affairs.

He was charged with suppressing piracy,

salvaging wrecks, impressing seamen, enforcing embargoes,
registering captures made at sea, and conducting a court

Sj.B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, 1558-1603, second
edition, volume 8 in The Oxford History of England, George
Clark, editor (Oxford, 1959), p. lTI

^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 214-215.
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which adjudicated maritime disputes.^
The "sherivality" which had once been onerous and ex
pensive had, by the end of the seventeenth century, become
a post with great prestige but few responsibilities.

The

sheriff's duties were limited to conducting Parliamentary
elections and opening the county courts' sessions.®
The duties of all these officials, while important,
were rather limited in scope.

It would be possible for an

English citizen to have only the most fleeting contact with
them.

Much, if not most, of the communication between the

national government and the populace was through the jus
tices of the peace, the most important local officials.

The

justices' primary duty was the preservation of public order.
This responsibility was carried out at the Quarter Session,
the short, two-to-four-day, court terms where a panel of
justices dealt with the crime, and the quarrels of the community.

Q

Since the Quarter Sessions could impose capital pun

ishment,^ it was important for the authority of the justices

^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 215.
^Wallace Notestein, The English People on the Eve of
Colonization, 1603-1630 (New York, 1954), pp. 203, 209
(hereafter cited as Eve of Colonization).
^Notestein, Eve of Colonization, pp. 213, 216-218.

l®Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 213.
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who constituted the Court to be recognized by the community.
Respect for the justices was insured by selecting them from
the wealthiest, most influential families of the area.H
Had their duties been limited to sitting in the Quarter
Sessions, the justices of the peace, too, would have had
little influence on the operations of government.

Conducting

the Quarter Sessions was, however, only one of the justices'
many duties.

They were also responsible for supervision of

the county's records, H r0ad maintenance, binding appren
tices, licensing taverns, administering the laws which con
trolled laborers' wages and the price of exported grain, and
poor relief.

In addition, the justices, who did not ordi

narily exercise civil jurisdiction, might be called upon to
assist the bishop in investigating the state of the local
church.13

Men with such wide responsibilities were terribly

important for the smooth operation of government; without
their cooperation, no decision of the central government
could be transmitted to the people of the country.H

UNotestein, Eve of Colonization, p. 212.
12

Beard, Justice of the Peace, p. 79.

l^Black, Reign of Elizabeth, p. 213. This is only a
partial list of tne justices' duties. Eirenarcha (1581)
requires over 600 pages to describe their duties fully.

l^Smith, Government of Elizabethian England, p. 99.
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Since the justices were socially secure and unpaid
officials, the government in London had no way of coercing
them to follow its instructions.

They would implement

policy only if it was acceptable to them.15

If not, the

justices could distort and weaken,15 or simply ignore it.
The failure of Queen Elizabeth I to destroy the Catholic
Church in Lancashire,1? and the failure of King James II to
secure legal toleration for Catholics, for example, were due
to the opposition of the justices of the peace.
The county governments which rested on the shoulders of
the justices of the peace were not the only local govern
ments in England.

In rural areas the parish clerk and

parish council supervised local taxation, road maintenance,
and poor relief.

Many towns received royal charters which

freed them, to some extent, from the authority of the
county.18

The charters varied, but all established a self-

perpetuating body of men called a corporation, which exer
cised the rights granted in the charter.

As long as the

15Ibid.
15Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1471-1714
(New York, 1964), p. 7.
■^Smith, Government of Elizabethian England, p. 99.
15Kingsley B. Smellie, A History of Local Government
(London, 1963), p. 9, Black, Reign of Elizabeth, pp. 263-7.

15
corporation did not violate the terms of its charter, it
could act without fear of outside interference.19

One

privilege held by all municipal corporations was the right
to return a member to the House of Commons.

Thus, whoever

controlled the corporation controlled the election of a
member of Parliament.

During the sixteenth century many of

these seats came under the control of the gentry.20
Similarly, the authority of the colonial governments
also rested on the delegation of specific powers, under
specifically defined conditions.

Charters gave the colonial

governments, like their counterparts in England, control
over local affairs, while reserving final control of their
legal and economic systems to Britain.21

Even if the English

government had wanted to control colonial local government,
it would have been unable to do so.

There were too few Royal

officials in the colonies to monitor effectively the activ
ities of any colonial government.

England was apparently

concerned with profiting from the colonies, not controlling

l^Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 108.
^David Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and
William III (Oxford, 1963), pp. 58-59 (hereafter citedas
Englan<f)~l
^Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History, volume IV (New Haven, Conn., 1964), pp. 3-4.
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their internal affairs,22 an(j the principal Royal officials
in the colonies were those concerned with protecting England's
economic interests.23

This made the task of colonial admin

istration much simpler for England, but it also meant that
the government in Westminster was dependent upon the volun
tary cooperation of the colonial governments whenever it
wished to implement its policies in the colonies.

The

English, moreover, were seldom inclined to interfere in the
colonies' local affairs.2^

22Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, pp.
13-21, Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (New York, 1967), passim.
23Royal officials included the Governor, the customs
collector, the surveyor, and the surveyor of the woods. All
were concerned with protecting the economic interest of the
Crown.
2^Certainly in the case of New York it seems the Board
of Trade went to great trouble to avoid intervening in local
government. Robert Hunter struggled five years to keep the
Assembly from asserting control over the colony’s finances.
Despite repeated appeals to London, nothing concrete was
done to support Hunter. Under George Clinton conflict be
tween the governor and the Assembly led to the virtual paral
ysis of government. After an eight month investigation the
Board of Trade issued a voluminous report which concluded
that after the tempers aroused by seven years of conflict had
cooled, it might be wise to dispatch a new governor with in
structions which might be somewhat more exact than Clinton's
to re-establish cooperation between the governor and Assembly
in New York. Neil Ovadia, "The Struggle for Financial Con
trol, New York, 1674-1720" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queens
College, 1968), pp. 56-59, E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York,
volume VI (Albany, N.Y., 1861), pp. 259-260, 586, 614-636
(hereafter cited as N.Y.C.D.).
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Only once in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
had there been an attempt to subordinate local governments
in England, and in the colonies, to the national adminis
tration.

The attempt was an important part of King James

II's effort to secure legal toleration for Roman Catholics
in England, an effort which culminated in James losing his
throne.
James, who was fifty-four years old when he came to the
throne in 1685, was so determined to regularize the position
of his

co-religionists2^

that he ignored, and then collided

with, the strong anti-Catholicism of the Anglican gentry.2*>
This was not opposition to Catholicism per se,27 but the
fear, present since the reign of Elizabeth, of the re-establishment of "Papal authority" in England.2®

The declaration

of loyalty to the Anglican Church, which James made before
his Privy Council only minutes after ascending the throne,
and l-;>ter issued as a proclamation,2® was apparently intended
to quiet those fears.

The King's subsequent actions, how

ever, seem to have exacerbated them.

2^John Carsell, The Descent on England (New York, 1969),
p. 113.
2®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, p. 355.
2^Stuart Prall, The Bloodless Revolution (Garden City,
N.Y., 1972) p. 90.
2®Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 66-68.
2®Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 89-90.
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Despite the fact that the Jesuit fathers were regarded
by the English as the vanguard of Papal attempts to re
conquer England,30 James brought a Jesuit, Edward Petre,
into the Royal Court.

Petre, the King's confessor,31 was

even appointed Clerk of the Royal Closet.32
Father Petre1s presence at Westminster was not the
only manifestation of James' disdain for his subjects'
attitude towards Catholicism, and towards religious toler
ation.

In June 1685, he began issuing dispensations from

the Test Act,33 which, since 1673, required every holder of
civil or military office to take the Anglican Communion, an
oath of loyalty to the Church of England, and to subscribe
to a declaration denying the Roman Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation,3^ and commissioning Roman Catholics in
the

a r m y .

35

James' policy was tested in the Courts, which

affirmed his powex to dispense the laws.

Quite naturally

30()gg, England, pp. 165-166.
33-Lockyer, Tudor and Sruart Britain, p. 359.

op

Ogg, England, p. 165.

33Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 109.
34Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 80.
3^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 110.
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the Protestant gentry regarded the Catholic led army of some
16,000 men, which James concentrated at Hounslow Heath just
outside London during the summers of 168 5 to 1688®® as a
threat to their liberties.®^
As threatening as the dispensing power was to Anglicans,
it was only the first step toward James' goal of giving Roman
Catholics complete equality in England.

The King realized

that the Church of England would oppose toleration and so, in
July 168 6, as head of the church, he created an Ecclesias
tical Commission which was intended to force the church to
accept toleration by silencing opponents of the King's
policy,3® and by placing Roman Catholics, who were sympathetic
to toleration, into influential church offices.

The commis

sion was moderately successful in accomplishing these tasks,
but its accomplishment was Pyrrhic.

James' coercion of the

church offended the Anglican community, and alienated it
from its traditional loyalty to the Crown.®®

Thus the King's

efforts at furthering toleration seriously undermined his
throne.

®®Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 122.
o7

Maurice Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688
(New York, 1966), p. 120.
38

Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, p. 359.

"^Clark, Later Stuarts, pp. 124-125.
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The final step in the King's program came on April 14,
1687, when he issued a Declaration of Indulgence which
suspended the Test Acts, and permitted Catholics and Prot
estant dissenters to worship publically.40

Since his power

to suspend a law was not as clearly established as his dis
pensing power,4^ James prudently expressed the belief that
the Parliament which was not in session would approve the
Declaration when it met.

Since the House of Commons, as it

was then constituted, would not have consented to the sus
pension of the Test Acts, and of the Penal law which forbade
non-Anglican worship, James dissolved it in July 1687.42
The King then had to face the problem of securing the elec
tion of a House of Commons which would endorse toleration.
Finding support was difficult.

Parliamentary elections

were decided by the gentry, who by virtue of their influence
in county and municipal government, controlled most of the
seats,43 and as early as June, 1685, the gentry, which had
been the mainstay of the monarchy for two centuries,44 dem
onstrated its opposition to King James by failing to take

40Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 125.
41Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 80.
42Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 125.
4^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 80-81, Ogg, England,
pp. 58-59.

44Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 6, 351.
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strong action against King Charles il's illegitimate son,
James Scott, the Duke of Monmouth, when he invaded England
to seize the throne.4^

None of his policies had endeared

James to the traditional ruling class.
The King did have a small foundation to build on.

His

policy of toleration had resulted in the appointment of some
Catholics and dissenting justices of the peace,4® and in the
conversion of a few Anglican justices to the Roman faith.
Attrition and conversion would not, however, change the
loyalty of local government rapidly enough to meet James'
electoral needs.47

To speed the process, he began replacing

Anglican officials with Catholics and non-conformists.

Many

of James' appointees did not have the position in the commu
nity which was traditionally associated with a Commission of
the Peace.

This seemed to the Anglican gentry to be an

attempt to end its customary influence over local affairs,
and confirmed its opposition.4®
James’ policy of replacement had insured that the
Anglican gentry, who dominated the ranks of the justices of

4®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 356-358,
Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 107.
*^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 156.
^Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 123.

4®Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, pp. 36-361.
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the peace and the municipal corporations, would not support
him.

Since it was not possible to replace all 3,000 of

England's justices of the peace , ^ James had to find some
way to coerce those traditionally independent authorities
into supporting his policy of toleration.50
The King decided to use the personal prestige and
position of the Lord Lieutenant to overawe the Anglican
justices.

James had the peers ask each justice to agree to

vote for a parliamentary candidate committed to toleration,
to support that policy if he was elected to the Commons, and
to pledge himself to support the principle of toleration
among Christians;

James hoped that the justices would not

be willing to oppose the Royal will when questioned by one
of the most powerful men in the kingdom.^2

Affirmative re

sponses would have committed the most influential segment
of the community to support, however reluctantly, the King's
policy.

The justices were, however, not so easily dominated;

most of them refused to support toleration.53

This left

4Q

^Smellie, History of Local Government, p. 11.

^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 81-82.
^Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 105-106.
^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, p. 88.

53

Carswell, Descent on England, p. 111.
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only the municipalities as possible sources of support for
James' policy.

54

The man responsible for "convincing" the municipalities
to select members of parliament in support of the King's
policy was Robert Brent, a Catholic lawyer.

Brent's agents

reminded the post-masters and the revenue officers in the
boroughs that they were obliged, as servants of the Crown,
to support the King's policy, and to use their influence to
secure the election of members of Commons who would do the
same.

To insure effective communication between the Crown

and its local supporters, Brent appointed a correspondent
in every parliamentary borough.55

if it appeared that the

political party Brent was building would be unable to con
trol the election in a borough, then other methods for in
suring the voters' "cooperation" could be

a p p l i e d . 56

James' system for bringing recalcitrant municipalities
to heel was identical to the one his brother Charles had
used earlier.

The charter of a municipality was at once a

source of strength and of weakness.

As long as the pro

visions of the charter were scrupulously observed, the

54Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 126.
^Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 113-115.
56Ibid.
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corporation was inviolate, but even a trivial violation of
its terms provided legitimate grounds for withdrawing the
charter and the privileges it granted.

When a municipality

had refused to cooperate with King Charles II, he had used
the inevitable minor breaches of the charter as justifica
tion for recalling it and issuing a new document which
forced the corporation to recognize his authority.5^

James,

like his brother, now used his authority over the municipal
corporations to compel them to return Parliamentary candi
dates he approved of.5®

The King pressured the munici

palities for support throughout the winter of 1688.^9
At the same time that he was attempting to make local
government in England responsive to his will, James, who had
a "passion for organization,"5® inaugurated a restructuring
of England's system of colonial administration.

He intended

to increase the effectiveness of the laws of trade and navi
gation by uniting several colonial governments, and by
greatly reducing the colonists' authority over their own
affairs.

57clark, Later Stuarts, pp. 107-109.
CO

0gg, England, p. 61.

5®Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 182-183.
6®Carswell, Descent on England, p. 113.
5lviola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England
(New York, 1960), pp. 31-33.
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The process of unification began in the colonies (as it
had in the English municipalities) with the institution of
proceedings against the charters of Massachusetts, Connect
icut, and Rhode Island.^

in England, the Crown claimed

that the colonies had violated their charters,63 and, as in
England, the corporations could not resist the Crown.64

on

December 20, 1686, the colonies of Massachusetts, New Hamp
shire, Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were joined
to create a single administration for all the New England
colonies.

One judicial and military system for all of New

England was much easier for the English government to con
trol than several colonies, each with its own privileges.65
The Crown's interest in uniformity in colonial adminis
tration was illustrated by the Instructions issued to Edmund
Andros, the Governor of the Dominion of New England, which

fi2

Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 32-33. Massa
chusetts' charter was withdrawn on October 23, 1684, Rhode
Island's was suspended on June 22, 1686, and Connecticut's
was suspended on December 28, 1686. Charles M. Andrews,
The Fathers of New England, volume 6 in The Chronicles of
America Series, Allen Johnson, editor (New Haven, Conn.,
1919), pp. 163, 180, Barnes, Dominion of New England, p. 37.
®3Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Seventeenth Century, volume III (Gloucester, Mass., 1957),
pp. 396-397.
^Andrews,

Colonial Period of American History, IV,

p. 373.
^ B a r n e s ,

Dominion of New England, pp. 31-33.
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were identical to those issued to the governor of the neigh
boring Royal province of New York.

The most obvious mani

festation of the King's interest in ruling effectively the
new union was the presence of sixty British regulars, the
first to serve in New England, who arrived with Andros.®6
The Dominion was, however, not complete.

In August,

1688, New York and the Jerseys were added to it,®^ and a
new charter was issued.

That document made James' desire

to control tightly local government absolutely clear.

There

was no Assembly in the Dominion to challenge the governor's
authority; the governor and his Council were the legis
lators.

To keep the governor, whom he appointed, and the

Councilors, whom the governor appointed, from forgetting
their obligations to the mother country, James mandated that
all Dominion laws be reviewed in England.

Similarly, the

decisions of the Governor and his Council, who constituted
the highest court (as well as furnishing the occupants of
most of the colony's other offices) could be appealed to
the Royal Courts in cases involving more than

£300.®®

®®Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,
III, pp. 393, 400.
^^Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,
III, p. 400.

®®Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 41, 72.
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The Dominion of New England simply established the
effective national control of local government in the new
world that James was endeavoring to create in England.
Since James was admittedly Catholic, advised by a Jesuit,
and pressing a policy of toleration, many Anglican members
of the English gentry concluded the King was attempting to
destroy their religion, re-establish the Church of Rome,
seize their property, abrogate their traditional liberties,
and rob them of their place in society.69

This, of course,

he denied.
To save themselves from what they considered a growing
despotism on the French model,7** seven Englishmen invited
William of Orange to invade England.

William was not asked

to attack King James, but to protect the English people from
71

the King's army while his opponents prepared a revolt. x
Apparently a large portion of the English people shared
the "Immortal Seven's" belief that James was building a
tyranny.

Although their statement that "nineteen parts of

twenty of the people...are desirous of a change..."72 cannot
be confirmed, disloyalty to King James II was widespread.

^^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 122,201.
7**Carswell, Descent on England, pp. 67-68.
^Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 201-202.

72Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, p. 201
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A list now at the Hague lists eighty-five of one hundred
sixty-one English peers as being definitely opposed to
James, and thirty-five others as probably opposing him.

The

loyalty of the Royal Navy, which James had commanded in
battle,73 also crumbled.

The captains of some of the ships

which had been ordered to keep William from landing, held a
Council of War and formally agreed to join the Prince of
Orange's fleet, not to oppose it.

Even the army, which had

been considered the backbone of James' despotism, turned
against him.

On November 20, 1688, only two weeks after

William landed, the leading officers of the King's army
joined

h i m .

74

Among the desserters was James' second in

command, John Churchill.

Churchill had served the King

since the beginning of the reign, and his wife Sarah was one
of Queen Mary of Modena's

l a d i e s - i n - w a i t i n g .

75

The gentry

had made its attitude toward James clear as early as 1685,
when the Duke of Monmouth had attempted to seize the throne.
The almost universal welcome which William received in
England, made the failure of James' policies of toleration
and centralization absolutely clear.

As national control of

73Michael Lewis, The History of the British Navy
(Fair Lawn, N.J., 1959), p. 93.
74Ashley, Glorious Revolution of 1688, pp. 120, 158,

167.
^Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 229-230..
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local government had been closely associated with the hated
policy of toleration, it had become an anathema to the
gentry.

Fortunately, William had neither the need nor the

desire to control the local governments.

He had invaded

England to insure that she would remain steadfastly antiFrench. 76

AS the gentry strongly supported this policy,

William was sure of the voluntary support of Parliament, and
so could and did recognize the right of the gentry to con
trol local governments and their parliamentary

s e a t s .

78

News of the Glorious Revolution did not reach Boston
until April 4, 1689, two months after the Revolutionary
Settlement had been completed in England.

Governor Andros

responded to the news, not by proclaiming William and Mary,
but by jailing John Winslow who had carried the report from
Nevis.

This convinced the people of Boston, who had never

been sympathetic to the Dominion, that the governor intended
to surrender them to the French; this brought the city to
the edge of rebellion.

A tenuous peace was preserved until

April 17, when a militia company from Maine, which had muti
nied against its Catholic officers, arrived in Boston.

?6prall, Bloodless Revolution, p. 211.
^Carswell, Descent on England, p. 68.

78Prall, Bloodless Revolution, pp. 319-320.
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Their arrival set off the revolt which had been smoldering.
The Maine insurgents were soon joined by the Boston and
Charlestown militias.

Andros responded by prudently with

drawing to the fort with his small force of regulars.

The

next day he foolishly left the safety of the fort to meet
the rebel leaders at the town-house.

They arrested him and

obtained the surrender of Andros1 troops by the simple ex
pedient of informing them that the Governor had ordered them
to capitulate.

On April 20, a Council of Safety was formed

to govern Boston, and a little more than a month later, on
May 22, a colony wide convention decided to resume govern
ment under the old charter.

News of the rebellion spread

rapidly, and by July 2, 1689 all of the constituent parts of
the Dominion had broken away and formally proclaimed William
and Mary.
The people of America, like the people of England, had
taken advantage of the first opportunity to recapture the
control of their local governments which James had taken
from them.

As in England, William was willing to allow to

local governments in America freedom from national control.
He had come to the throne as an opponent of James' despotism,
and therefore could not have justified continuing one of
James' most repugnant policies, in the face of popular
opposition.

The new King had no inclination to defend

^Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 239-250,
N.Y.C.D., III, pp. 596-5^7.
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James' colonial policy.

He was concerned with European, not

American affairs, and viewed the colonies only as sources of
wealth which would make England better able to oppose France.
The decentralized, almost nebulous system, which James had
replaced with the Dominion, was admirably suited to William's
ends, so he returned to it.®®
Although William did make some minor changes in the
organs of colonial administration, neither he nor his suc
cessors, until the 1760's, made any fundamental changes in
the colonial system.

The English were concerned only with

regulating colonial trade, not the internal government of
the colonies.

This gave the colonies seventy years of vir

tually complete internal autonomy to develop their own polit
ical institutions.

New Yorkers took full advantage of that

freedom.

®®George Herbert Guttridge, The Colonial Policy of
William III in America and the West Indies (Hamden, Conn.,
1966) , pp. 41, 42,99.

CHAPTER TWO
THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE COLONIES:
AUTHORITY AND INDIFFERENCE

The failure of the English government to concern itself
with governing its American possessions,! and to develop a
coherent policy for controlling them^ was apparently inherent
in the English political system.

In the second quarter of

the eighteenth century England was going through profound
economic, social, and political changes, and many English
men, especially among the gentry found security^ by closing
their minds to as many alterations as

possible.4

sir Robert

Walpole, who dominated England's government from 1722 to

^-Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), p. 10.
John Harold Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (2 vols.,
Boston, 1956, 1961), II, 77.
^Plumb, Walpole, I, 35-6.
^James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton,
N.J., 1972), pp. 312-20.
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1742, 8 understood, and to some extent shared, the fears of
the gentry, the backbone of his Parliamentary support® and
essential to the survival of his administration.

To retain

such support Walpole adopted policies of peace and low
taxes? which were directly responsive to the gentry's needs
and concerns.®

Walpole saw no reason to concern himself,

or his government, with matters which were unimportant to
his supporters— if he almost completely ignored the colonies
they were, after all, far outside the ordinary interests of
the English gentry.
Unconcern with the colonies was rife; virtually all
civilian officials neglected North America.®

The papers of

men who wielded influence and power in Parliament, the min
istry, the Court, and the judiciary, during the period from
1717 to 1753, all clearly indicate that the men in London
legally responsible for governing America regarded it as
nothing more than a source of advantage for English merchants
and politicians.

Spiumb, Walpole, II, 245.
®Plumb, Walpole, I, 42, Michael Kammen, Empire and
Interest (Philadelphia, 1970), p. 43.
?Plumb, Walpole, II, 202.
8Plumb, Walpole, I, 3.
®Henretta, Salutary Neglect, p. vii.
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For example, Spencer Compton, Earl of Wilmington served
as Speaker of the House of Commons from 1715 to 1727, and
Lord President of the [Privy] Council from 1730 to 1742.10
Although he headed the bodies which legislated for, and
heard appeals from, the colonies, none of his letters men
tion America or the individual American colonies.

Only the

presence of some appeals from America in his correspondence
indicate that Compton was in any way aware of the existence
of Britain's over-seas possessions.H
Nor were individual Members of Parliament more inter
ested in the colonies than their one-time Speaker.

Edward

Knatchbull was one of the few truly independent members of
the Commons.

Occupant of a family seat for the County of

Kent,!2 his rather detailed diary of the proceedings of the
House of Commons from 1722 to 1730 mentions America only
twice!

On February 21, 1724, Knatchbull noted that some

investors in the ill-fated Bahama Island Company had

10”Compton, Spencer," Dictionary of National Bio
graphy, IV, 906-7.
^G re at Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission,
Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part IV, The Manuscripts of
the Marquess Townshend, pp. 127-144, 201-45,258-9 (includes
Wilmington manuscripts) (hereafter Townshend, MSS.).
!2Plumb, Walpole, II, 143-4, William Cobbett, Parlia
mentary History x?f England from the Norman Conquest, VIII
(New York, 1966, reprint of London, 1810 edition),p. 7.
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unsuccessfully petitioned for assistance in recovering their
investments.^

More than five years later, on March 6 and

March 13, 1729, Knatchbull found another piece of American
business worthy of mention.

He reported that merchants

trading with America had presented petitions complaining of
Spanish attacks on their s h i p s h e

did not, however, see

fit to record the House's action on their complaints.

As

these were not the only discussions of colonial affairs in
Commons between 1722 and 173015 it seems significant that
the only colonial matters Knatchbull recorded affected
British merchants as much as, if not more than, colonies.
It is likely, therefore, that Knatchbull's concern was for
English merchants, merchants who happened to trade with the
colonies, and not with the colonies themselves.
Unlike Knatchbull's diary, which rarely mentions the
colonies, the diary of John Perceval, first earl of Egmont,
which covers the years 1730 to 1747, betrays its author's
disinterest in colonial affairs with frequent references to

l^Edward Knatchbull, The Parliamentary Diary of Sir
Edward Knatchbull, 1722-1730 (London, 1963) , pp. 27-8.
14Knatchbull, Parliamentary Diary, pp. 89, 91-2.
■^See Leo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of
the British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1924-41), IV (hereafter Stock,
Proceedings).
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one of the colonies.

Egmont, an Irish peer, and member of

the English House of Commons, considered himself a leader
of the House, and of its "Irish Interest;

he was also an

active member of the Georgia Board of Trustees.1?

His diary

contains many references to G e o r g i a , a n d South Carolina,
1Q

its nearest neighbor. *

There is, however, only one entry

which demonstrates any interest in the other colonies.

It

records a discussion between Sir Robert Walpole, and General
James Oglethorpe, the chairman of the Georgia Trustees, in
which Oglethorpe emphasized the importance of a strong colo
nial defense establishment to the continued security of
G e o r g i a . 20

There is only one mention of the colonies which

is not directly linked to the development of Georgia.
Egmont discussed the unwillingness of the West Indian
colonies to provide adequate salaries for their governors
with Queen Caroline on July 28, 1732, but apparently the

^Opiurnb, Walpole, II, 144-5.
17,'Perceval, John," DNB, XV, 813-5.
18

.

Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission,
Sixteenth Report, Diary of Viscount Perceval afterwards
First Earl of Egmont, R.A. Roberts, editor (3 vols., London,
1920-1933) , III, 428-36 (hereafter Egmont, Diary).
^Egmont, Diary, III, 394-5.

20Egmont, Diary, II, 339-41, Feb. 5, 1736/7.
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subject was not of much interest to Her Majesty, for after
opining that the matter could be resolved only by an act of
Parliament she turned the conversation to Egmont's real
interest, Georgia.2^

Despite, or perhaps because of, its

recurrent references to Georgia, Egmont's Diary reflects no
interest in the development of the British empire as a whole,
and leaves the imp?‘ession that Egmont looked upon North
America only as an adjunct to Georgia.
The Earls of Marchmont, of the Scotch nobility, were no
more interested in America than was Egmont, an Irish peer.
They were the descendants of Patrick Hume, a Scot so passion
ately devoted to the maintenance of a Protestant monarchy in
Great Britain that he had joined James Scott, the Duke of
Monmouth, Charles II's illegitimate but Protestant son, in a
plot to insure the Protestant succession.22

Exposure of the

Rye House plot had forced Hume to flee to Holland where he
became an advisor of William of Orange.

He returned to

Britain with William's invading army, and was rewarded for
his loyalty with the Earldom of Marchmont in the Scotch
peerage.22

His son, Alexander Campbell, the second earl of

2^Egmont, Diary, I, 288.
^George Clark, The Later Stuarts 1660-1714, 2nd ed
ition, volume X, The Oxford History of England,George
Clark, editor (Oxford, 1961), pp. 104-5.
23"Hume, Patrick," DNB, X, 233.
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Marchmont, was also active in politics.

Selected as one

of the sixteen Scotch peers to sit in the House of Lords
at Westminster,24 he was a strong advocate of the Union of
England and Scotland, and of the Hanoverian

s u c c e s s i o n .

25

Yet despite his great interest in British unity, Marchmont
was almost totally unconcerned with the colonies which com
prised much of Britain's empire.

The only reference to

them in his letters is a note, dated December 9, 1739, from
John Dalrymple, second earl of Stair, which mentions the
possibility of English and American troops joining in an
assault on Havana in case of war with Spain.26
Alexander's son, Hugh Campbell, was active in politics
until his father's death (when his inability to secure elec
tion as one of the Scotish Representative Peers ended his
career) and while in the Commons, Campbell was an active
opponent of W a l p o l e . A p p a r e n t l y , however, he did not
quarrel with Walpole's neglect of the colonies for his
papers never mention America!

2*Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 289.
25"Campbell, Alexander," DNB, III, 760.
2®Marchmont, A Selection from the Papers of the Earls
of Marchmont, George H. Rose, editor (3 vols., London, 1831),
II, 170-1.
27"campbell, Hugh," DNB, III, 60.
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Walpole's own lack of concern with the colonies is
reflected in the papers of his youngest son, Horace, fourth
earl of Oxford, the noted letter writer and wit.28

Horace

Walpole's voluminous correspondence28 contains detailed de
scriptions of all aspects of life which were of interest to
his compeers:

English politics, European affairs, The War

of the Austrian Succession, Court gossip, the continual
search of English politicians for preferment, the rising of
1745 in Scotland, and the opera; but although America is
occasionally mentioned in Horace's extensive correspondence,
the sparsity and brevity of the references reflects the un
importance of America in his thinking.
Horace apparently shared his father's lack of concern
with America for on October 22, 1742 (O.S.) he dismissed
Admiral Edward Vernon's success in the West Indies as
"...most

a g r e e a b l e . . . . "30

two

months later, however, he

made a comment which reflected the British disdain for the
colonies, noting on December 16 that Charles Rose, son of a
Customs Commissioner, had been given a lieutenancy, which

28"Walpole, Horace," DNB, XX, 627-33.
^Horace Walpole, The Letters of Horace Walpole, Mrs.
Paget Toynbee, editor (16 vols., Oxford, 1903-1905).

3®Walpole, Letters, I, 112-3.
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saved him from the "dishonor" of refusing a post in the
West Indies.^

Mr. Rose's willingness to risk dishonor and

unemployment in that honor conscious and preferment hungry
age rather than go to the West Indies also reflects how
little he, too, thought of America.
The ministry's willingness, despite the continued
demand for positions, to find a post which would permit Rose
to avoid the unpleasant consequences of refusal, indicates
that his attitude toward America was considered "reasonable"
by those in power.
On June 30, 1742 Horace Walpole repeated a joke about
a Methodist Minister and an Indian

c o n v e r t ,

^2 which was at

the expense of the Methodist (a sect not then terribly pop
ular in England).33

After a six year hiatus, Walpole found

another American subject "worthy" of his attention.

He

mentioned that Admiral Vernon had given him some confidential
information about the effect West Indian conditions would
have on the negotiations at Aix-La-Chapelle.

31-Walpole, Letters, I, 142-3.
^ ^Walpole,

Letters, I, 245.

^"Methodism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973 edition,
XV, 302.

3*walpole, Letters, II, 319, July 14, 1748.
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Walpole's passing references to America suggest that
the colonies were, to him, of little importance.

His only

extended comment on American affairs indicates that his
disdain for the colonies was liberally mixed with scorn for
their institutions.

On February 25, 1750 he described the

activities of the House of Commons:
We have been sitting this fortnight on the
African Company: we, the British Senate, tem
ple of liberty, and bulwark of Protestant
Christianity, have this fortnight been ponder
ing methods to make more effectual that horrid
traffic of selling negroes. It has appeared
to us that six-and-forty-thousand of these
wretches are sold every year to our planta
tions alone! — it chills one's blood. I
would not have to say that I voted in it for
the continent of America..."35
Walpole's revulsion with the Americans apparently was,
however, of no more consequence than his other feelings
toward the colonies, for, despite the horrified tone of the
above letter, Walpole ignored the slave trade in his subse
quent correspondence.

Two weeks later he matter-of-factly

reported Rear Admiral Charles Knowles' opinion that the re
cent London earthquake was more severe than the West Indian
upheavals.

35walpole, Letters, II, 432-3.
^^Walpole,

Letters, II, 434, March 11, 1750.
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The Journal of George Bubb Doddington (first baron
Melcombe) confirms that English politicians were almost
totally unconcerned with the colonies.

Doddington aspired

to join the small group which dominated the English govern
ment, and apparently he devoted much of his energy to
reaching that goal.
office:

He had all the qualifications for high

a seat in Parliament, wealth, experience in foreign

and financial affairs, and powerful friends,3? but, despite
a lifetime of efforts which "raised toadyism to almost sub
lime proportions"38 he never obtained the august posts he so
badly desired.39
The Journal contains a fairly large number of refer
ences to America; some reflect his overwhelming concern with
obtaining office, and others the lack of a more interesting
subject for the daily entry in the Journal; none, however,
betray any real interest in America.
When Doddington was out of office he was interested in
finding ways to embarrass the government.

Consequently he

3?George Bubb Doddington, The Political Journal of
George Bubb Doddington, John Carswell and Lewis Arnold
Dralle, editors (Oxford, 1965), p. ix.
38sasil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, 2nd
edition, revised by C.H. Stuart, vol. XI, The Oxford History
of England, George Clark, editor (Oxford, 1962), p. IF!
39Doddington, Journal, pp. xi, xvi-xviii, xxiii.

43
paid considerable attention to the ministry's project to
increase the number of English settlers in Nova Scotia
which

had been acquired from France in 1713),4® which

Doddington believed was open to criticism.

On February 5,

1750 he wrote that only his inability to substantiate his
charges kept him from raising the Nova Scotia question.4^
He did not, however, abandon the Nova Scotia settlement as
a source of political advantage42 and on February 13, 1753,
just three years after he began to consider the political
uses of Nova Scotia, Doddington noted in his Journal that
his ally, John Russell, fourth duke of Bedford, had "ably"
presented the motion requiring the government to present the
records of Nova Scotia to the House of Lords.42
Surely Doddington was not interested in the welfare of
the people of Nova Scotia.

His only goal was to improve his

political position, and he was as willing to use the adminis
tration of Dunkirk to reach that end as he was the adminis
tration of Nova Scotia.44

His sanguine attitude toward the

40Wi lliams, Whig Supremacy, p. 311.
41Doddington, Journal, p. 45.
^Doddington, Journal, pp. 52, 77, Feb. 9, 1750, July 2,
1750.
43 Doddington, Journal, p. 205.

44Doddington, Journal, p. 45.
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colonies was reflected by the complete indifference with
which he reported the decision of the Trustees for Georgia
to surrender their charter to the Crown,4 5 and of the House
of Commons to delay consideration for a year of hearings on
the Sugar Colonies.4®
Thus the papers of Compton, Knatchbull, Perceval,
both Campbells, Walpole, and Doddington, men whose service
in Parliament spanned the period from 1720 to 1750, men of
different political persuasions, all unmistakably demon
strate the English legislator's almost complete unconcern
for the American colonies.

All these men, despite the differ

ences, agreed that the colonies were worthy of note only when
they could be of "advantage" to residents of the British
Isles.

Apathy toward the colonies was not merely limited to

members of Parliament.

At least two of the Secretaries of

State, the officials charged with administering the colo
nies, 4^ demonstrated almost complete indifference toward the
territories which they were theoretically supervising.
For example, the papers of Charles Townshend, second
viscount Townshend, who served as Secretary of State for the

45ooddington, Journal, p. 141, Dec. 19, 1751.
4®Doddington, Journal, p. 114, April 22, 1751.
4^Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 471.
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Northern department from 1714 to 1716, and from 1721 to
1730^® contain only passing references to the colonies,48
and summaries of reports on colonial affairs received by
the Board of Trade and the Privy

C o u n c i l . ^0

Although the

Northern Secretary was not normally responsible for colo
nial affairs, Townshend's complete lack of interest in the
colonies indicates that the colonies were not judged worthy
of even passing attention from high British officials.
John Russell, the fourth duke of Bedford's lack of con
cern for the colonies was even more remarkable than
Townshend's.

His papers indicate that he almost completely

ignored the colonies during his service as First Lord of the
Admiralty in the War of the Austrian Succession, a conflict
which involved the Royal Navy in America.

This apathy was

also apparent during his service as Secretary of State for
the Southern Department, the official directly responsible
for colonial administration.51

48Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 471.
^Townshend, MSS, pp. 356, 372.
^Townshend, MSS, pp. 254-306.
51"Russell, John," DNB, XVII, 447-52, Bedford served
in the admiralty from 1744 to 1748, and as Secretary of State
for the Southern Department from February, 1748 to June,
1751.
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Only twice did Bedford officially recognize the exis
tence of America in his four years at the Admiralty.

On

June 26, 1745, he used the success of the expedition against
Louisbourg to justify recommending Sir Peter Warren, who had
commanded it, for promotion to flag rank.^^

Nine months

later, Bedford and the other admiralty commissioners sent
Thomas Pelham-Holles, first duke of Newcastle, their eval
uation of a plan to invade

C a n a d a .

^3

These memoranda were,

of course, not the only mention of the colonies in Bedford's
papers during his tenure as First Lord.

On November 6, 1747,

Governor George Clinton of New York had written to him to
complain that the province's Chief Justice James Delancey
was obstructing New York's war effort; he asked Bedford to
secure Delancey's removal from

o f f i c e .

^4

Yet the Duke ap

parently did not feel that Clinton's complaint was important,
for he did not respond to it.
Bedford's failure to answer Clinton’s letter indicates
that he had little inclination to concern himself with colo
nial affairs, and a memoir he wrote after becoming Southern

52sedford, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of
Bedford, Lord John Russell, editor (3 vols., London, 18421846), I, 28-30 (hereafter Bedford, Correspondence) .
^Bedford, Correspondence, I, 65-9, March 20, 1746.
^Bedford,

Correspondence, I, 285-6.
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Secretary provides definite evidence of his contempt.

In

September, 1748 Bedford sent the Duke of Newcastle a long,
detailed analysis of the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle, in which
he carefully examined its effect on European affairs.

He

never even mentioned America in his analysis,55 a clear in
dication of how little value was placed on the Crown's
American possessions.
In 1751 Bedford, who had now left office, commented
that the Spanish efforts to curb the illegal trade between
British and Spanish subjects in America might be a cause of
war between Britain and Spain.

He seems to have felt, how

ever, that responsibility for the conflict would lay with
the Americans, who might not be willing to permit the com
plete suppression of the illegal trade.

Elimination of the

illegal trade would end Spain's justification for maintaining
the Costa Guarda fleet, the direct cause of the tensions
between the two

n a t i o n s .

^6

If Bedford, an official whose responsibilities were so
closely related to the colonies could ignore them almost
completely, it is not difficult to imagine how little weight
colonial affairs carried with those Englishmen who were not
forced by their official responsibilities to deal with them.

^ B e d f o r d ,

Correspondence, I, 529-38, Sept. 28, 1748.

^Bedford, Correspondence, II, 71-2, Feb. 7/17, 1750/1.
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British lack of interest in her colonies was also
reflected by the almost complete unavailability of infor
mation about them.

The autobiography of Richard Cumberland,

the noted dramatist, records how little an educated, in
telligent, and interested Englishman could learn about the
colonies.

Cumberland's father had recruited two companies

for a regiment being raised by George Montagu Dunk, second
earl of Halifax, and had supported the earl in the election
of 1748.

To repay the Cumberland's for their loyalty,

Halifax who was President of the Board of Trade, appointed
Richard his private and confidential secretary in 1748. ^
To prepare himself for his duties, Cumberland (a Cambridge
graduate) set out to learn as much as possible about colo
nial government.

He found that books about the colonies

were "most discouragingly meagre and most oppressively
tedious in communicating nothing."

The plaucity of the

material did not discourage young Cumberland, who "got a
summary but sufficient insight into the constitutions of
the respective provinces, for what was worth knowing was
soon learnt...."
Perhaps it was fortunate that Cumberland was not forced
to devote himself too strenuously to preparing for his post
as even his slight effort was wasted.

His duties consisted

57"Cumberland, Richad," DNB, V, 291.
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only of copying an occasional letter for the earl,58 who
despite his reputation as an activist leader of the Board
of Trade,59 found little for his secretary to do.
Nor was the Royal Court interested.

John Hervey,

Baron Hervey of Ickworth was a supporter of Robert Walpole.
He regularly visited with Queen Caroline to insure that her
considerable influence over the King would benefit the min
istry and its friends.5®

Retaining the Queen's good will

required Hervey's almost continual presence at St. James
Palace, which in turn led him to become familiar with all
the Court's concerns.81

His papers indicate that the colo

nies were important to the Court only as sources of place
and profit.
The small island colonies of St. Kitts and Nevis were
useful to the Crown principally because sale of their Crown
lands provided the

£80,000 marriage portion which King

58Richard Cumberland, Memoirs of Richard Cumberland
(2 vols., London, 1807), I, 137-8.
59oiiver Morton Dickerson, American Colonial Govern
ment 1696-1765 (New York, 1962, reprint of 1912 edition),
p. 49.
60"Hervey, John," DNB, IX, 735-9.
51John Hervey, Some Materials toward the memoirs of the
reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey, Romney Sedgwick,
editor, (3 vols., London, 1931), I, 1 (hereafter Hervey,
Memoirs.)
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George gave his eldest daughter Anne.®2

Even the island

colonies were not useful or interesting to Courtiers.

The

Privy Council's discussion of "...the Indies, Plantations,
ships, troops etc..." made it difficult for Hervey, who was
"...half dead to-day with a headache, the consequence of
dancing, supping, and sitting up late last night at the
Duke of Newcastle's" to concentrate on the letter he was
w r i t i n g

.®2

jf

the matter before the Council had been more

important, Hervey might have put off his correspondence.
What little interest Hervey had in the colonies was
in colonial offices.

On November 25, 1736, he wrote his

friend and political ally, Henry Fox, first baron Holland,
that he had been told there would be no changes in the
personnel of the colonial governments,®4 and a year later he
notified his friend of the good fortune of Francis Seymour
Conway, first marquess of Hertford, who secured the govern
ment of Minorca, and William Anne Keppel, second earl of
Albermarle, who was appointed governor of Jamaica.®®

®2Hervey, Memoirs, I, 194.
6^John Hervey, Lord Hervey and His Friends, 1726-1738,
Earl of Ilchester, editor (London, 1950) , pp. 113-4,
November 25, 1731.
64Hervey, Hervey and Friends, p. 2 56.
®®Hervey, Hervey and Friends, p. 273, Sept. 24, 1737.
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A dowry, a hangover, and two appointments, certainly
do not indicate an overwhelming interest in colonial affairs.
As Hervey was a courtier in the traditional sense, a man
whose position depended directly on the good will of the
Queen, it is probable that neither the Queen, nor the King
(whom she influenced greatly) were much concerned with
"their" colonies.

The Royal couple's attitude reflected

the apathy toward America which was rampant throughout the
government.
Even the law courts paid little attention to the colo
nies.

The memoirs of Philip Yorke, first earl of Hardwicke,

Solicitor General from 1720 to 1724, Attorney General from
1724 to 1733, Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1733 to
1737, Lord Chancellor from 1737 to 1764 and an active member
of both Houses of Parliament®® mentions the colonies only
twice.

Yorke's first, and only professional contact with the

colonies occurred in 1725, when as Attorney General, he
argued that the American colonies were not "conquered coun
tries," but "colonies of English subjects" who retained
their rights as Englishmen.®^

The colonies came to Yorke's

®®"Yorke, Philip," DNB, XXI, 1261-6.
®^Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of
Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of
Great Britain (3 vols., Cambridge, 1913), I, 89-91
(hereafter Yorke, Life).
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attention, for the second and final time, twenty-five years
later when he dissuaded his ally Henry Pelham from proposing
a Parliamentary tax on the American colonies.®®
As Yorke was preeminent in his profession, his memoirs
are also a detailed examination of his mid-eighteenth cen
tury Enqland's judicial and political history.

The lack of

references to the colonies indicates that America was of
very little or no interest to the English government.

This

conclusion is supported by the papers of Philip Dormer
Stanhope, fourth earl of Chesterfield, and Robert Hampden,
first Viscount Hampden, and fourth baron
both men had active and successful

T

r

e

c a r e e r s , 70

v

o

r

.

Although

neither saw

fit to mention America in their correspondence, clearly
indicating how little the colonies affected the British
political process.
The willingness to ignore the colonies, manifested in
the papers of British politicians of all persuasions, was

®®Yorke, Life, II,

8.

^Chesterfield, The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope,
fourth Earl of Chesterfield, Bonamy Dobree, editor (6 vols.,
London, 1932) , Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Com
mission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part IX, Trevor
Manuscripts (London, 1895).
7 0 "Stanhope, Philip Dormer," DNB, XVIII, 911-24,
"Hampden, Robert," DNB, XIX, 1153-4.
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a product of mid-eighteenth century England's "political
philosophy."

From the Tudor period to the death of Queen

Anne the English political community devoted its attention
to significant issues, the break with Rome, the religious
settlement, Elizabeth's successor, the limits of Royal
authority, the Civil War, the Restoration, the Glorious
Revolution, and the problem of who would follow Anne, the
last Protestant Stuart, on the throne of England.

The

accession of King George I insured a Protestant monarchy,
and for the first time in almost two centuries English
politicians found themselves without basic philosophic
differences.

Consequently the political community which for

so long had concerned itself with the nation's fate, occu
pied itself by turning to self-aggrandizement.

By the mid

eighteenth century, virtually every one in England viewed
politics solely as a system for advancing private interests;
the concern for the nation's well-being which had so long
been paramount in England had disappeared from the political
consciousness.
The dominant place of self-interest in English politics
is well illustrated by the behavior of the voters of the
borough of Tewkesbury in the election of 1753.

The

^Lewis B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the
Accession of George III (London, 1968), pp. 16-7.
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community's roads were in execrable condition and the voters
decided to secure their repair by agreeing to support only
candidates who would pledge
ments.

41,500 each for road improve

The incumbants, Lord William Hall Gage, and his son,

Thomas, refused to accede to Tewkesbury voters' demands and
were defeated by John Martin and Nicholson Calvert who were
more generous than the Gages.
The behavior of the Tewkesbury electors might have been
extreme, but it was not at all unusual for many members to
"buy" their seats in the Commons.73

no

more than 80 of the

558 members of the House of Commons were "independent coun
try gentlemen," serving in the House without thought of per
sonal gain or advancement, every other member was in the
House to gain status, and to open the way to profitable
offices.

As the "independents" (who were in any case a

small minority) were much less regular in their attendance
than those who hoped to profit from service in Parliament,
there was nothing to restrain the avarice of the other mem
bers, and the House of Commons became a body dedicated to
advancing private, not public, interests.74
As the government of Great Britain was drawn from the
Houses of Parliament, it too was comprised of men who placed

72Namier, Structure, p. 131.
^Namier, Structure, chapter 2.

^*Namier, Structure, pp. 12-7, 63.
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their own interests before the nation's.

It is, therefore,

not surprising that they neglected Britain's colonies which
were far away, and could provide little profit for the
English politicians.

The government dealt with colonial

affairs only when they were inescapable, resolved them as
rapidly and as quietly as possible, and returned to its
primary duty of ruling England .75

No one had the time or

inclination to develop a coherent colonial policy.7®
The member of the English government most directly con
cerned with the colonies was the Secretary of State for the
Southern Department.

Originally the monarch's private sec

retary, the Secretary of State had charge of the signet seal
which authenticated government correspondence.7?

The Sec

retary's duties included transmitting the monarch's instruc
tions to the various departments of government.

The acces

sion of Queen Anne, and the first two Georges, rulers who
had no inclination to actively control their governments
resulted in the Secretaries "inheriting" the Crown's author
ity to determine governmental policy in all but financial

75Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America
(New York, 1958, reprint of 1930 edition), p. 3.
7 5 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, pp. 10-11.

77Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782
(Oxford, 1932), p. 1.
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and military a f f a i r s . 7®

Simultaneously they obtained con

trol of the Board of Trade.

The Board, which had been

created to advise King William

111,79

began to advise the

Secretary, who, like the King, could delegate as much, or
as little authority to the
In 1702 Daniel Finch,

Board as he wished.®®
second earl of Nottingham, Queen

Anne's Secretary of State for the Southern Department, began
to retrieve the authority over colonial patronage which King
William had delegated to the Board.81

two

of King George I's

Southern Secretaries, James Stanhope, and Thomas PelhamHolles (first duke of Newcastle), continued to retrieve the
Crown's authority in colonial affairs until, ultimately, the
Board had none.®^
the

The Duke of Newcastle officially confirmed

Board's decline, when, in 1738, he instructed it to refer

78"secretary of State," Chamber's Encyclopaedia, new
revised edition (Oxford, 1967), XII, 399.
7®Derek Jarrett, Britain, 1688-1815 (New York, 1965),
p. 28.

®®Thomson, Secretaries of State, pp. 45-47.
8 1 Henretta,

"Salutary Neglect", pp. 24-5.

®2 Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 107-8,
Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council of England, 16031784 (2 vols., Baltimore, 1927-1928), II, 358.
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all important matters to his office, and to act only on
matters referred to it by the Secretary of State or the
Privy Council. 88

The elimination of the Board of Trade's

authority in colonial affairs meant that the colonies would
receive little attention from the British government.

The

Secretaries of State for the Southern Department, who had
assumed the Board's duties, were too involved in British
and European affairs to have the time or the inclination to
interfere in the colonial

g o v e r n m e n t s .

The Duke of Newcastle's pre-eminence firmly established
political expediency, not ability as the basis of the dis
tribution of offices in Britain and the c o l o n i e s . c o l o 
nial posts worth as much as

8 8 Dickerson,

£8 , 0 0 0 per annum®® were awarded

American Colonial Government, pp. 36-7, 47.

8 ^Williams, Whig Supremacy, pp. 311-2, Henretta,
"Salutary Neglect", p. 32, Thomson, Secretaries of State,
p. 49.

8 ®Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 165, Plumb, Walpole,
II, 92.

8 ®Plumb, Walpole, II, 98, Great Britain, Public Record
Office, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America
and West Indies, W. N. Sainsbury and others, editors (42
vols., London, 1860-1963), XL, xv-xviii (hereafter CSP)
contains a list of the colonial offices controlled b y t h e
Secretary of State.
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to English politicians whose support was useful to
Newcastle;

S’? and colonial revenues, which might have been

used to strengthen the colonial governments, were diverted
to England where they would be politically beneficial to
the ministry .88

In short Newcastle made the colonial govern

ments a mere adjunct of the British political patronage sys
tem, 89 and virtually no one in England questioned his ap
proach.

Even the internal politics of the colonies (when

they were noticed at all) were treated as extensions of
British

p o l i t i c s . 80

in 1733, William Cosby, the Governor

of New York, wrote Newcastle to suggest that opponents of
the ministry were attempting to embarrass it by stirring
up trouble in New

E n g l a n d . 81

The use of American offices to support English poli
ticians naturally meant that Americans could not hope for
positions in their governments,82 and so the governors were

87nenretta,

"Salutary Neglect", pp. 52-3,

®®Henretta,

"Salutary Neglect", p. 18.

®8 nenretta,

"Salutary Neglect", p. 130.

80cSP, XL, xv.
9 1 CSP,

XL, 25.

8 2 Henretta,

"Salutary Neglect", p. 134.

CSP, XL, xv.
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deprived of an inducement useful in obtaining the cooper
ation of colonial leaders.

It also meant that colonial

offices were often filled by deputies who abused their
powers and thereby created resentment of British authority
in the colonies.93

The British government, however, cared

so little about the colonies that it never considered the
possible ramifications of its exploitive policy in the
colonies.9*
The English politician best known for his willingness
to subordinate the colonies to the exigencies of English
politics was Thomas Pelham-Holles, first duke of Newcastle.
For a while after he was named Secretary of State for the
Southern Department, on April

6,

1724, Newcastle devoted

considerable attention to colonial

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

95

He

soon realized, however, that pursuing a coherent colonial
policy would make the realization of his basic goal, com
plete dominance of the British political system more diffi
cult, so he adopted an exploitive attitude toward the colo-

^•^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 237, 242-45, 254.
9 *Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 12, Henretta,
"Salutary Neglect", pp. 134-5, 281.

9 ^Henretta,

"Salutary Neglect", pp. 73-4.

96Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 47, 93, 259.
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Newcastle was so unconcerned with colonial government
that he had no qualms about subordinating the basic prin
ciples of colonial administration to political consider
ations.

When William Burnet was appointed governor of

Massachusetts Bay in 1728, his instructions required him
to obtain a permanent revenue from the colony's General
Assembly.

The colonists were unwilling to create a per

petual revenue, and a dispute developed.

Burnet informed

Newcastle of the situation and of his determination to se
cure obedience to his instructions.

Newcastle responded in

a "private letter" dated June 26, 1729, urging Burnet to ig
nore his instructions and accept a revenue grant which would
expire when he left office.

The Southern Secretary favored

this "compromise" because, despite its adverse effects on
the governor's authority, it would resolve the dispute and
spare him the politically inexpedient necessity of asking
Parliament to intervene in the situation in

Massachusetts.^7

Newcastle's treatment of Lewis Morris, of New York, who
traveled to London in 1734 to lodge complaints against
Governor William Cosby of that Province was also motivated
by the exigencies of English politics.

The dispute had its

origins on July 1, 1731 when Rip Van Dam, the senior member
of the colony's council assumed control of the government

9?Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 361-3.
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after the death of Governor John Montgomerie9® (as required
by the late governor's instructions) ® 9 and collected all of
the governor's salary and perquisites.

When Cosby arrived

in New York as its new governor, he produced his instruc
tions and claimed half of all of Van Dam's profits.

Van

Dam refused, and a bitter quarrel developed in which Lewis
Morris, Sr., who had been the colony's chief justice since
1715,I®9 supported Van Dam.l®!
Cosby responded by removing Morris from office in May,
1733,I®2

When correspondence with London failed to secure

reinstatement, Morris decided personally to press his suit
in the capital.

The Privy Council, after hearing Morris,

Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, re
print of 1924-1925 edition), II, 443, (hereafter Osgood,
Eighteenth).
99

Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instruction to British
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (2 vols., New York, 1967, reprint of 1935 edition), I, 78-9.
100New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Rela
tive to the Colonial History of the State of New York,
Edmund B. O'Callaghan, and Berthold Fernow editors Tl5 vols.,
Albany, N.Y. , 1861-1887), V, 419 (hereafter NYCD) .
^°^For detailed treatment of the dispute see, Katz,
Newcastle's New York, pp. 61-132.
102

Cosby's letter informing Newcastle of Morris' re
moval is dated May 3, 1733, NYCD, V, 942-50.
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ruled in November 1735, that Cosby had acted improperly;
but it did not restore the former chief justice to

o f f i c e .

Morris' triumph was consequently empty; yet the responsi
bility had been Newcastle's.

The Duke had used his enor

mous influence to protect Cosby-*-^ simply because George
Montagu-Dunk, second earl of Halifax, an important member of
Newcastle's i n t e r e s t , w a s Cosby's brother-in-law.106
Morris, unwilling to accept defeat, still hoped to secure
reinstatement by bringing his case to the King.

Newcastle,

whose duties as Secretary of State included accepting peti
tions to the Crown, refused those of Morris .^-®7

No other

official would bring Morris' address to the King,!®® and the
case was effectively closed and Cosby was protected from em
barrassment, and Newcastle's alliance with Halifax was fur
ther secured.
The next governor to serve in New York, Admiral George
Clinton, also became embroiled in a somewhat similar dispute,

!®®0sgood, Eighteenth, II, 464-5.
1 0 4 Katz,

ins

Newcastle's New York, P- 125.

Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 41-2, 227-8.

1 0 6 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, P- 61.

1 0 7 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, P- 113.

1 0 8 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, P- 124.
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and Newcastle again intervened to protect his English
interests.
When Clinton arrived in New York on September 20,
1743,1^9 he promptly formed an alliance with James Delancey
(Lewis Morris' successor as chief justice).

Apparently

Delancey felt that he, not the governor, should dominate
the colony's politics, and when Clinton, in February 1746,
induced the Assembly to pass a bill (intended to prevent
desertions from the regiments on the frontier) of which
Delancey disapproved, the chief justice had the Council re
ject the bill.

This was the immediate cause of a quarrel

which once again paralyzed the colony's government.H O
Newcastle supported Clinton in his dispute with Delancey
because the governor's nephew, Henry Clinton, ninth earl
of Lincoln, controlled a number of parliamentary seats
which were important to Newcastle, and the earl would have
been offended, perhaps to the point of finding new political
allies, had Newcastle not supported the g o v e r n o r . m

Al

though the War of the Austrian Succession prevented New
castle from supporting Clinton as vigorously as he had
C os by,H 2 the Board of Trade's report on the dispute did

10 9 NYCD,

VI, 247.

H^Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 165-70.
HlHenretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 216-7.
H 2 K a t z , Newcastle's New York, p. 198.

not propose any action against Clinton^^ so the Duke's ties
to Lincoln were safe.
Considering the relative unimportance of the North
American colonies to the British Empire, it is, perhaps, un
derstandable that the Secretaries of State who were deeply
involved in the myriad problems of governing Britain and
managing her foreign affairs could devote little attention
to the problems of colonial government.

Certainly the

neglect of colonial government was no greater than the
neglect of British local government, and the exploitation
of American patronage no worse than the exploitation of
Britain's.
The failure of the Privy Council, which should have
been deeply involved in the management of the colonies, to
deal with the problems of colonial administration cannot,
however, be excused in this way.
Originally the "private council" which assisted the
soverign in making policy and administering justice, the
Privy Council, had, by 1712, grown too large to be an effec
tive policy making body.

The responsibility for shaping

policy had been transferred to a smaller "cabinet council,"
and the whole Privy Council restricted to the role of the

1 1 3 NYCD,

VI, 614-36.
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Kingdom's highest ecclesiastical c o u r t . The establish
ment of the Committee for hearing appeals from the plan
tations in December, 1696^5 extended the Council's authority
to the colonies.
Since a court should not act without knowledge of the
circumstances which shape the events it judges, and as the
Privy Councillors (like almost everyone else in England)
had no experience in colonial aifairs, they turned to the
Board of Trade for information about colonial conditions.
The Board's role was, however, purely advisory; and the
committee on appeals and the whole Privy Council was never
legally bound by its advice.
The Privy Council's authority over colonial affairs
was further extended in 1709 when the Committee for hearing
appeals from the plantations was authorized to hear com
plaints, as well as formal appeals from the colonies,
and again in 1714, when the Privy Council was authorized to

H 4 " p rivy Council," and "Privy Council, Judicial
Committee of," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973, XVIII, 567.

H^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the
Privy Council-Colonial Series, W.L. Grant and James Munro,
editors (6 vols., Hereford and London, 1908-1912), II,
vi-viii, xiii-xiv (hereafter APC).
■^^■^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 92-3,
APC, II, xi.

117APC, II, xi.
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establish its own committee on colonial affairs.

This freed

the Council from dependence on the Board of Trade and con
tributed to the Board's decline.

The Privy Council's

committee on colonial affairs became more powerful as the
Board of Trade's influence was reduced by the Secretaries
of State; by 1729 the "Lords of the Committee of Council"
were supervising the B o a r d . I n

1738, in accordance with

Newcastle's instructions, the Board began referring all
petitions to the Council for a c t i o n , an(j in the 1740's,
Lords of the Committee completely engrossed the Board of
Trade's responsibilities as the Council's advisor on colo
nial

a f f a i r s .

^-20

B 0 a r d

merely continued to transmit

specific information and advice to the whole Council^2^through the Lords of the Committee. ^ 22
The decline of the Board of Trade greatly increased
the Privy Council's role in colonial administration, and
the Council was diligent in attempting to meet its new

118Turner, Privy Council, II, 359.
^^Turner, Privy Council, II, 365, Dickerson, American
Colonial Government, pp. 26-7, 27n., 47.
120Turner, Privy Council, II, 359.

^^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, p. 104.
122<purner^ Privy Council, II, 359.
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responsibilities.1 2 3

yet it never became an effective in

strument of colonial administration.

The Councillors,

despite their diligence in processing colonial business,
were apparently not interested enough to attempt to create
a coherent colonial policy.324

^he Council was consequently

willing to accept whatever solutions the Board of Trade pro
posed for problems involving the

c o l o n i e s .

125

Unfortunately,

the Board could not propose imaginative solutions.

It had

been created to fulfil (and had been specifically restricted
by Newcastle) to an information-gathering role, and so when
asked for advice it would report what had been done in the
past, not attempting fresh analysis.

Thus, the Privy Council

tended to perpetuate the existing system of ad hoc involve
ment in the colonies simply because, like so much of English
society, its members simply had little real interest in
America.
The interest of Parliament, "the principal organ of the
nation's will ," 1 2 6 like that of other agencies of the British

123APC, III, vi-vii.
1 2 4 APC,

IV, viii.

1 2 6 APC, III, 187 records the only instance in which the
Council did not accept the Board's recommendation on colonial
policy. The Council disagreed with the basic premise of the
Board's report and returned it for redrafting.

126wiHiams, Whig Supremacy, p. 22.
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government, was also self serving.

The members of the

House of Commons had gone to Westminster to improve their
f o r t u n e s ,

^^7 an(j they regarded the colonies only as a

possible additional source of profit.

As profits could

best be obtained with consent of the House, and as a number
of members were more likely to be able to influence the
House than could a single individual, Parliamentarians
formed associations based on family, geographic, or economic
ties to pursue their "interest."128

Most of the members of

the House were tied to one or more interests.3-29

Decisions

were shaped by negotiations among the various groups which
could, when they united, force policies on the government.130
Consequently, most legislation which passed the House
was intended to benefit one or more of these interest groups.
Even statutes which dealt with seemingly national concerns,
such as customs duties, or trade regulations, were often

1 2 7Namier,

Structure of Politics, p. 4, see above.

3-^Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest (Philadelphia,
1970), pp. 8-11, George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of
England Toward the American Colonies, vol. Ill, Columbia
College Studies in History, Economics and Public Laws (New
York, 1948, reprint of 1893 edition), p. 32.
129

Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 13-4.

^^Karnmen, Empire and Interest, pp. 63-4.
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drafted and advanced by interests which were totally un
concerned with the welfare of the nation.

Only the rule

which prevented members from proposing the expenditure of
public monies kept the Commons from becoming an overt
servant of private interests.131
Even colonists attempted to influence Parliament.

By

the 1670's, New Englanders considered themselves as inde
pendent "interest."

By 1680, the proprietors of Penn

sylvania and Maryland were defending their interests in
London, and by 1690, New York had agents in London to pro
tect its

i n t e r e s t s .

132

Although the colonies' interests

were clearly a factor in British politics by 1716, their
distance from the center of power, their lack of parlia
mentary representation, and their rivalries, kept them from
exerting much influence.133
The colonies' inability to sway the House meant, there
fore, that Parliament's interest in the colonies was re
stricted to enacting legislation aiding British interest
groups, merchants, manufacturers, or planters, which hoped
to profit thereby.

The practice of passing legislation

which served the needs of disparate groups of Englishmen

13^Richard Pares, King George III and the Politicians
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 3, 3-4n.
l^Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 37-40.

133Kammen, Empire and Interest, pp. 55-8.
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probably strengthened the British economy, but it also
resulted in the development of a "colonial system" which
had neither order nor direction . ^ 34

This was, however,

unimportant to the English government as the agencies
which had authority over the colonies had no interest in
colonial administration, and the Board of Trade, which
was interested in colonial administration, had little
influence. ^ 33
Parliament's exploitive attitude had had a long history.
During the Portectorate, merchants had convinced the nation
that trade was essential to England's prosperity,33® and so
Parliament had come to regard colonial legislation primarily
as a method for protecting the interests of British merchants.

137

It was completely willing to act when merchants

asked for protection, or for advantages in the colonial
market.3 3 8

3 3 4 Henretta,

135

"Salutary Neglect", pp. 105, 105-6 n.

Stock, Proceedings, III, xx.

136

Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660, 2nd
edition, vol IX, The Oxford History of England, George
Clark, editor, (Oxford, 1959), p. 336.
1 37

Stock, Proceedings, III, 1 1 1 , the Acts of Trade and
Navigation were also intended to improve England's ability
to wage war, and to raise some revenue, Davies, Early
Stuarts, pp. 316-7, Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 15-18.

338Stock, Proceedings, III, xiii.
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The objective of England's first navigation act, passed
during the Commonwealth, was to protect the English carrying
trade from Dutch competition, by requiring that all African,
Asian, or American goods shipped to England travel in ships
owned by English subjects, and manned by crews at least half
English.

European goods could be imported to England only

in English ships, or in ships of the nation which produced
the goods. ^ 39
After the Restoration, the Stuart monarch continued the
protective policies of Cromwell's g o v e r n m e n t . T h e first
Stuart Navigation Act even strengthened the older statute,
by requiring that the crews of English ships be at least
three-quarters English, and that foreign goods be shipped to
England directly from the place where they were produced, or
from the usual shipping point.

Those English merchants who

dealt in colonial sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, fustic,
and dye woods, were protected from foreign competition which
would drive costs up and profits down, by the "enumeration"
of those products.

The requirement that enumerated goods be

shipped only to England or English colonies, prevented for
eigners from purchasing them in the colonies and thereby re
served the market for English merchants.

1 3 9 Davies,

Early Stuarts, pp. 220-1, the act was passed
in October, 1651.

l^Beer, commercial Policy, p. 36.
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To insure compliance with the act, bonds were required
of all shippers.1^1

Bonding did not, however, effectively

prevent the sale of enumerated commodities to foreigners,
and in 1672 the act was strengthened by the imposition of
duties on enumerated goods shipped in intercolonial trade,
and the specific prohibition of the re-export to Europe of
enumerated goods which had been shipped between colonies.
Even these more stringent rules were not successful in pro
tecting the English merchants' monopoly of colonial goods
and, in 1695, another law, requiring colonists to post a
bond which would insure that goods being reshipped from a
colony would, in fact, reach England was passed.

The colo

nial market for English merchants was protected in 1663 by
a law which required all goods destined for the colonies
to be shipped from English parts in English

v e s s e l s

.^2

The Restoration Parliament also endeavored to protect
English farmers from competition, by placing prohibitively
high duties on rye, barley, peas, beans, oats, and wheat
shipped into England.

Six years later, in 1666, imported

beef, salt pork, and bacon were barred from the English
market; and in 1679 butter was added to the list of products

141B eer, Commercial Policy, pp. 36-8, the act was
passed in 1660.

142Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 37-40.
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which could not be imported.
These acts were not by any means the end of England's
efforts to capitalize on the American colonies.

As the

colonies developed, they began to produce goods which found
markets in Europe, which were useful to England, and which
competed with the products of English industry.

Parliament

responded to these developments by enacting legislation
which secured the advantages of the new trades for English
merchants, and prevented the colonists from competing with
English industries.
In 1698 Parliament protected the woolen industry, one
of England's oldest and most important, from colonial compe
tition by forbidding colonists to ship woolens in the inter
colonial trade.

This prevented the development of a colo

nial wool manufacturing industry by eliminating most of its
potential market, and made England the colonies' only source
of manufactured woolens.

(Home weaving, which did not com

pete with English industry, was not affected by prohi
bition.) 1 4 4
Parliament's willingness to aid English merchants at
the expense of colonial traders was further demonstrated by
the enumeration of rice.

By the beginning of the eighteenth

century, American rice had found a profitable market in

^■4 ^Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 73-4.
l4 4 Beer, Commercial Policy, p. 77.

Europe.

On February 21, 1705,145 the House of Commons,

which apparently believed that English merchants deserved
the profits of the rice trade more than colonials, de
stroyed the colonial rice trade by requiring colonists
to ship all their rice to England.

This rather arbitrary

action apparently succeeded in securing the rice trade for
English merchants, for, between 1712 and 1717 England
imported an average of 28,073 cwt. of rice a year, and re
exported 22,936 cwt.

In 1729 the colonists were permitted

to resume selling rice directly to Portugal, a market
British merchants had not successfully penetrated.^-4®
British sugar policy was equally insensitive to colo
nial interests.

Molasses and the sugar produced from it

were valuable commodities in the eighteenth century and so
in February, 170514? Parliament placed molasses on the
enumerated list.

In 1717 France, which resented British

dominance of the world sugar market, began encouraging her
West Indian possessions to produce sugar.

The program was

so successful that by 1730 Franch sugar was replacing
British in England's continental colonies. Naturally this

1 4 5 Stock,

Proceedings, III, 96.

1 4 6 Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 45, 52-3, CSP,
XXXII, 490.

14^Stock, Proceedings, III, 96.
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disturbed the West Indian planters who were being deprived
of an important market.

They met the challenge of French

competition by utilizing their interest in the Parliament
to secure passage of the Molasses Act of 1733 which pro
tected their North American market by placing prohibitively
high duties on foreign molasses, sugar and rum.

The planters'

effort was not altogether successful as the Molasses act was
never str’ fly enforced,148 perhaps because execution of the
law would have raised the price of American rum thereby ad
versely affecting the British merchants involved in the
triangular trades with America.
Only in the production of naval stores and copper was
British policy toward the colonies influenced by public, as
well as private, interests.

In 1702 England was drawn into

the War of the Spanish Succession, and, although the war was
primarily continental, the Royal Navy played an important
r o l e . 149

The activity of the Royal Navy created a demand

for more naval stores than England could produce, and she
was forced to meet the deficit with purchases from the
Baltic.

Dependence on foreign sources for supplies essential

to the fleet, the backbone of England's power, was unde
sirable because it placed England at the mercy of her

148Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 52, 63-4.
149j4ichael Lewis, The History of the British Navy
(Fair Lawn, N. J., 1959), pp. 107-111.

76
suppliers, and, because it resulted in a trade deficit with
the Baltic of about

£777,000.

To avoid these unpleasant

consequences, the English government began encouraging
the colonies to produce the required naval stores.

In

1705 the Parliament passed legislation which placed naval
stores on the enumerated list, and established bounties to
encourage the colonists to produce them.
set at

£6

per ton on hemp,

The bounties were

£4 per ton on tar and pitch,

*3 per ton on rosin and turpentine, and

£1 per ton on masts.

This policy met some initial difficulties.

At first

the colonists could not (despite the assistance of skilled
workers whose passage to America was financed by Parliament)
produce stores which met the requirements of the Royal Navy.
The Parliament did not wish to spend public money for sub
standard goods and responded, in 1719, by forbidding the
payment of bounties for products which did not meet the
Navy's specifications.

By 1728, however, the initial prob

lems were solved, and the quality and quantity of the goods
produced had increased so much that it was possible to lower
the bounties to

£2 4s. per ton for tar not of the highest

quality,

per ton for turpentine, and

£1

8 s.

£l per ton for

pitch .150
As the Navy was the keystone of imperial defense in the
eighteenth century, attempts to increase the production of

150Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 55, 91-100.
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naval stores (including copper which was enumerated in
1722),

151

certainly served the national interest as well

as the interests of the English merchants who profited from
the new industries.

Even Americans benefited from the new

naval stores industry, although the Parliament had apparently
not been concerned with them when it adopted the policy .^

2

In 1722 the Parliament acted to assist British merchants
in their search for profits from colonial products by placing
beaver, and other furs, which found a ready market in Europe
on the enumerated list^3 thereby assuring English merchants
of their share of the trade's profits.

Nine years later the

15lBeer, Commercial Policy, pp. 56-7, the rumored large
copper deposits which led to the enumeration of copper,
never materialized.
152^he preamble of the Naval Stores Act makes the sub
ordinate place of Americans clear:
"...whereas Her Majesty's colonies and Plan
tations in America were first settled, and are
still maintained and protected, at a great ex
pense of the Treasure of this Kingdom, with a
design to render them as useful as may be to
England, and the Labour and Industry of the
people there, profitable to themselves...."
The Board of Trade had hoped that the production of naval
stores would provide the New Englanders with a product they
could market in England in lieu of foodstuffs, and woolens
which were barred by English law. Events did not develop
as the Board had hoped, the Carolinas became the center of
the American pitch and tar industry. Joseph J. Malone,
Pine Trees and Politics (Seattle, Washington, 1964),
pp. 26-28, 36-38.

l^Beer, Commercial Policy, p. 60.
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Company of Feltmakers petitioned the Houses to assist its
members by eliminating the colonial competition which was
reducing the demand for British hats in foreign markets, and
in Britain itself.

The Parliament responded in 1732 with

the Hat Act which forbade the colonies to export

hats.

The Parliament was so anxious to encourage English
trade that it was even willing to disburse public money on
projects which would benefit only a few merchants.

Indigo

was an important dye in the eighteenth century, and, as
England did not produce any, it was necessary to import it
from France.

In the 1740's an experiment in indigo produc

tion was started in South Carolina.

The merchants who

traded with the colony realized that the experiment's
success would provide them with a valuable new commodity.
They therefore asked Parliament to establish a bounty on
indigo which would make producing it more profitable.
Parliament agreed and established a bounty of

6

The

d. per pound

which enabled American indigo, which was imported and mar
keted by English merchants, to dominate the English market
and compete with the French dyestuff in the rest of
Europe.155
England's third largest industry, ironmaking, also
looked to the colonies as a source of profit.

154Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 81-3.
l^Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 103-4.

The
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ironmakers, however, faced a dilemma.

They wanted to en

courage colonial production of pig and bar iron (which could
not be economically produced in England because of shortages
of ore and fuel), but did not want the colonists to begin
competing with them in the remunerative production of fin
ished goods. ^ 6

jn

1750

the Parliament solved this problem

by eliminating duties on pig and bar iron imported from the
colonies, while forbidding the colonists to build the
rolling and slitting mills, forges, and steel making furnaces
required to convert the raw iron into finished products which
would compete with English

g o o d s .

^7

The Parliament also felt that the colonies should be
encouraged to produce goods which were in short supply
whereby the colonies would free England from dependence on
foreign sources, lower the price English manufacturers would
have to pay for raw materials, and provide England with ad
ditional exports.

Thus in 1750 Parliament responded to a

shortage of Spanish and Italian silk by passing a resolution
intended to encourage American silk production by admitting
colonial silk to England without duty.
Parliament was never willing to subordinate English
profits to the well being of the colonies.

In 1750, New

Yorkers, who produced salt meat and salt fish which were

156Stock, Proceedings, III, 396.
157Beer, Commercial Policy, pp. 83-90.
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exported from the colony, asked the Parliament for per
mission to purchase their salt from Southern Europe.

This,

they explained, would enable them to purchase better salt
than British manufacturers could provide at lower cost,
thereby improving their competitive position.

The Parlia

ment consulted the English salt manufacturers who would be
affected by the change, and were told that English salt was
"perfectly adequate" for the Americans' needs, and that per
mitting them to purchase salt abroad would violate the prin
ciples of the Navigation Acts.

The proposal was thereupon

dropped.*58
Thus, the Parliament, more than any other agency of the
British government, used its power over the colonies not to
benefit them, or to create a balanced colonial system, but
to force the colonies to advance the economic interests of
Englishmen no matter what the effect.

Colonial resentment

of Parliamentary interference in their affairs naturally
followed.
The Parliament's desire to exploit the colonies had,
however, little practical effect.

Although the Houses could

legislate for the colonies, they could not enforce their
decisions, and the agencies charged with implementing them
simply did not bother to do so.

The Secretaries of State

*5®Stock, Proceedings, V, xvi-xvii, CSP, XXVI, 519-20.
159CSP, XXIX, xxiv.
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and the Privy Council apparently never even attempted to
rigorously enforce the Acts of Trade and Navigation, and
so, despite Parliament's efforts at regulation, the colo
nial economy was as free of British control as were all
other aspects of colonial

l i f e .

1^0

160W iiiiams, Whig Supremacy, p. 317.

CHAPTER THREE
THE BOARD OF TRADE AND THE COLONIES:

LIMITED

AUTHORITY AND LIMITED INTEREST

There was, however, one agency of the British govern
ment, the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantation,
known more familiarly as the Board of Trade,* which was more
directly concerned with the affairs of Britain's overseas
possessions.

It's concern was, however, not nearly as over

whelming as Oliver Morton Dickerson suggests in his highly
influential study of American Colonial Government 1696-1765
which was published in 1912.

Far from being the powerful,

influential, ever vigilant supervisor of all aspects of colo
nial government, the Board was a rather insignificant agency
which seems to have been the product of a struggle between
the Crown and Parliament for influence over trade, rather
than the result of an effort to increase the efficiency of
Britain's colonial administration.
Competition between the monarch and the legislature for
control of England's trade policy first emerged when the

■^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the Privy
Council, edited by W.L. Grant and James Munro (6 vols., Here
ford and London, 1908-1912), II, v (hereafter APC).

82

83
disruption of the ordinary business of government by the
Revolution of 1688, and the onset of the War of the League
of Augsburg in early 1689,^ kept the Privy Council from
exercising its traditional jurisdiction over England's
commerce.

As the European war disrupted trade and dis-

asterously depressed the English

economy,3

the mercantile

interest began to agitate for the creation of an agency
which would concern itself exclusively with protecting and
furthering England's commerce.

The House of Commons, tra

ditionally responsive to merchants' desires and wishing to
absorb the Crown's authority over trade, had accepted the
merchants' petition and, in November 1695, established an
internal committee on trade.

The Lords in their turn felt,

however, that such a trade committee, completely dominated
by the Commons, was inappropriate, and suggested the estab
lishment of an "independent" council to supervise commerce.
The Commons accepted the peers' advice and legislation to
create the council on trade was introduced.

Such Parlia

mentary energy seems to have disturbed King William III,
who ended the Houses' efforts to dominate trade policy when
he created, by Privy Council order, on May 15, 1696, a' Com
mission of Trade and Plantations, thus meeting the merchants'

^David Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and
William III (Oxford, 1963), p. 348.
^Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and William
III, p. 305.
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demands for closer government supervision of trade.*
Despite its title, the opening of new markets and the
developing of new industries was not the Board's only re
sponsibility.

It was also instructed in the Commission to

find the most effective methods of creating gainful employ
ment for the poor whose support was a burden on the public.
It could not, however, act to solve the problems it inves
tigated.

It was an investigative agency which could only

suggest action to the King or the Privy Council "from time
to time...as the nature of the Business shall require."
The members of the Board which William had created were
to insure "...that the Trade of Our Kingdom of England, upon
which the strength and riches thereof do in a great measure
depend, should be all proper means be promoted and advanced;
...."

Specifically, they were to
examine into and take an account of the state
and condition of the general Trade of England,
and also of the several particular Trades in
all Foreign parts, and how the same respec
tively are advanced or decayed, and the
causes or occasions thereof; and to enquire
into and examine what Trades are or may
prove hurtfull, or are or may prove benefi
cial to our Kingdom of England, and by what
ways and means the profitable and advanta
geous Trades may be more improved and extended
and such as are hurtfull and prejudicial

*APC, II, v, Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council
of England, 1603-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, 1928-1929),
II, 339-41 (hereafter Privy), Oliver Morton Dickerson,
American Colonial Government 1696-1765 (New York, 1962,
reprint of 1912 edition), pp. 21-2.
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rectifyed or discouraged; and to enquire into
the several obstructions of Trade and the
means of removing the same: And to consider
by what means the severall useful and profit
able manufactures already settled in Our said
Kingdom may be further improved, and how and
in what manner new and profitable Manufactures
may be introduced....
As Englishmen generally regarded the colonies primarily
as an adjunct to trade, it was not surprising that the Board
of Trade was also instructed to
take into your care all Records, Grants and
Papers remaining in the Plantation Office or
thereunto belonging.
And likewise to inform you selves of the
present condition of Our respective Planta
tions, as well with regard to the Administra
tion of the Government and Justice in these
places, as in relation to the Commerce thereof;
And also to inquire into the limits of Soyle
and Product of Our severall plantations and how
the same may be improved, and of the best means
for easing and securing Our Colonies there, and
how the same may be rendered most usefull and
beneficiall to our said Kingdom of England."
The commercial basis of England's interest in the colo
nies was manifestly clear, as in the requirement that the
members of the Board
inform yourselves what Navall Stores may be fur
nished from Our Plantations, and in what Quan
tities, and by what methods Our Royall purpose
of having our Kingdom supplied with Navall Stores
from thence may be made practicable and promoted;
And also to inquire into and inform your selves
of the best and most proper methods of settling
and improving Our Plantations, such other Staples
and other Manufactures as Our subjects of England
are now obliged to fetch and supply themselves
withall from other Princes and States; And also
what Staples and Manufactures may be best en
couraged there, which are or may prove prejudiciall to England, by furnishing themselves
or other countries with what has been usually
supplied from such Trades, and whatsovever else
may turne to the hurt of Our Kingdom of England.
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The Board's interest in the colonies was, as had been
mentioned, not completely commercial.

It was also to deter

mine whether any changes were necessary in the governors'
instructions, to report significant colonial developments
to the Crown, to recommend suitable candidates for vacant
colonial offices, to evaluate colonial legislation and to
advise the Crown as to its suitability.for Royal appro
bation, to hear complaints from the colonies, and to audit
the colonies' accounts.
The Board could collect all such varied information
under oath, but once having accumulated it, all it could
then do was "report all your doings...in writing...to Us,
or to Our Privy Council, as the nature of the thing shall
require."5

Clearly the Board was not intended for a major

role in Britain's colonial administrative structure.

Super

vision of colonial governments was the least of its duties**
and it was given no authority over the colonies.

It could

investigate and advise, nothing more.
The limited role of the Board was reflected in its
working membership, which was composed of men who exerted

^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative
to the Colonial History of the State of New~lfork, E.B.
O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow editors, (15 vols., Albany,
1861-1887), IV, 145-8 (hereafter N£CD).
^Colonial administration occupies less than one para
graph of the Board of Trade's commission.

87
relatively little influence on the decisions of the govern
ment.

Although the Chancellor of England, the President

of the Privy Council, the first Commissioner of the Treasury,
the first Commissioner of the Admiralty, both Secretaries of
State, and the Chancellor of the Exchecquer were named as
members of the Board by its original commission, at the
same time it excused them from attending its meetings.?

Had

the Board been conceived as a significant part of the English
bureaucracy, its prestige would not have been diminished from
the first by excusing from its meetings seven of the most
powerful and influential men in England.
As the Board had no authority of its own, it could in
fluence policy only by presenting suggestions to the Crown,
or the Privy Council.®

The Board's role in colonial adminis

tration was, necessarily, to a large extent, shaped by the
attitudes of the agencies which exercised authority in colo
nial matters.
However, the Board was allowed something of a direct
role in the supervision of colonial affairs until 1714, when
the Privy Council was permitted to form its own committee on
"colonial affairs."

This committee soon engrossed most of

7NYCD, IV, 148.
^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America
(New York, 1958, reprint of 1930 edition), pp. 29 (here
after Royal Government), Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries
of State, 1681-1782 (Oxford, 1932), pp. 41-4.
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the Board's authority and, by 1729, was directly supervising
the Board's activities.

By 1740, the committee had super

seded the Board in the conduct of colonial affairs.^

The

Board still remained active but instead of making decisions
or recommendations, it was thereafter reduced to supplying
information to those who actually exercised power.1®

The

Board's increasing subordination was reflected in its ad
missions in its letters to the colonial governors that it
was ignorant of its own government's decisions in colonial
affairs.
The declining position of the Board of Trade in the
administrative hierarchy was also apparent in its relations
with the "cabinet," which was then emerging as an important
part of the government.

Although its importance in the

formation of colonial policy had been generally recognized
in the early years of the eighteenth century (it was, for
example, summoned to Whitehall to confer with the Queen and
Privy Council committee which was then emerging as the

^Turner, Privy, II, 359.
l^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of
State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies,
W.N. Sainsbury and others, editors (42 vols., London, 18601963), XXXVI, x (hereafter CSP).

1;LCSP, XXXIX, xxvi.
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"cabinet" in July, 1 7 0 2 ) , the development of the cabinet
system of government in the first decade of the century had
resulted in a rapid decline in the Board's petition.

The

"cabinet" simply usurped much of its influence over colonial
affairs.

Instead of meeting with the Board, the "cabinet,"

in 1713, instructed it to meet with the merchants who wished
to comment on the commercial treaty then being negotiated
with Spain, and to report the results of that meeting to the
appropriate members of the cabinet.13
By the beginning of King George I's reign in 1714, it
was customary for the "cabinet" to act on information
supplied by the Board without asking its advice.14

jn

1730,

the "cabinet" instructed the Board to hasten the evacuation
of Santa Lucia, which was threatened by a slave uprising in
Jamaica.

Nine years later, in July 1739, the "cabinet"

decided to dispatch additional military supplies to the West
Indies without communicating with the Board.15

Perhaps the

most telling indication of the Board's inferior position was
the "cabinet's" unwillingness, in December 1739, to even

Edward Raymond Turner, The Cabinet Council of England,
1622-1784 (2 vols., Baltimore, Md., 1930-1932), I, 183,
(hereafter Cabinet).
l^Turner, Cabinet, I, 453.
l^Turner, Cabinet, II, 156-7, 169, 195.

l^Turner, Cabinet, II, 176.
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accept advice from Colonel Martin Bladen, the senior member
of the Board of Trade, and the person who "...was supposed
to have the most generall knowledg of all the plantations..."
Members of the "cabinet," who possessed and claimed no ex
pertise in colonial matters were sharply critical at that
time of Bladen's estimate of the number of fighting men
Britain could raise in her colonies.16

Had the Board re

tained any influence in the British government, members of
the "cabinet" would have been quite willing to accept
Bladen's expert advice without debate, no matter how un
pleasant it might have been.
The Board of Trade was similarly subordinate to the
Secretary of State for the Southern Department.

The Secre

taries of State had inherited much of the Crown's authority
during the reigns of Queen Anne and King George

1

, ^ an(j the

Board became, in many ways, part of the Southern Secretary's
Department.

Until the reign of George I, it had been cus

tomary for the Southern Secretary, who had always retained
complete legal authority over colonial affairs to allow the
Board of Trade to have almost complete autonomy in the con
duct of colonial

b u s i n e s s .

^8

^Turner, Cabinet, II, 294.
17

See chapter two.

l^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 107-8.
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James Stanhope, first earl of Stanhope, one of King
George I's Secretary of State for the Southern Department,
abandoned his predecessors' passivity and began expropriating
the Board's authority in colonial administration.

He began

making colonial appointments without consulting the Board
of Trade, and his successors continued the erosion of the
Board's authority, until in the 1730's the Board was left
virtually without power19 or incluence.2®

By then the Board

was required to refer all matters to the Southern Secretary's
office2^ or to the Privy Council for decision.22

Unfor

tunately, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, neither re
garded the colonies as worthy of attention.
The Board of Trade had always had even less influence
on the Houses of Parliament than it had on the "cabinet,"
Privy Council, or the Secretaries of State; for although it
regularly sent committees of Parliament information, they
generally failed to utilize the information supplied by the
Board as the foundation for colonial legislation.22

■^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 111-4.
20Turner, Privy, II, 358.
2^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp.36-7, 47.
22Turner, Privy, II, 365.
22Leo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the
British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1924-1941), III, xx.
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Parliamentary interest in the colonies was in any case so
rare that Benjamin Keene, secretary to the Duke of Newcastle,
commented on the extraordinary nature of the House of
Commons' interest in the colonies during the debate over the
Molasses Act which had begun in 1731.24
The Board's lack of power, and itsinability
real influence on the formation ofp

o l i c y ,

25

to exert

made it un

attractive to those ambitious politicians who hoped to play
a major role in the development of Britain's policies.

Con

sequently, when the Board's decline became apparent after
1714, it necessarily became a resting place for "deserving,"
if somewhat mediocre, friends of the
salary of

g o v e r n m e n t .

26

The

*-1,000 per year2? was sufficiently attractive to

make a place on the Board much sought after,28 but the Board's
lack of influence encouraged its members to be lax in their
duties.

From 1741 to 1743, only four of the eight working

24CSP, XXXVIII, xviii-xix.
25James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N.J., 1972),
p^ 27 (hereafter "Salutary Neglect").
2^Turner, Privy, II, 345.
2?Turner, Privy, II, 343-4.
2®Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), p. 17.
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members of the Board of Trade— the Board's president Sir
John Monson, Colonel Martin Bladen, Richard Plumer, and
James Brudenell— attended more than hsTf of the Board's
meetings, and one of the Board's members, Sir Archer Croft,
missed all one hundred thirty-eight meetings in 1742.29
This apparent unconcern with exercising what little influence
they possessed may indicate that the Board accepted its re
stricted role in the management of the

colonies^O

passively.

Perhaps the Board's members were unconcerned with their
lack of influence on colonial administration because they
were occupied with other matters.

All members of the Board

at any time were also members of the House of Commons, and
as the House was the font of preferment and profit in eight
eenth-century England, it was natural for the members to be
more involved in Parliamentary affairs than they were in the
work of the Board.^

Nor is it surprising that the members

of the Board of Trade were, like virtually all other politi
cally active Englishmen, more interested in the pursuit of
patronage than in the formation and implementation of

p o l i c y .

^Dickerson, American Colonial Government, pp. 34-5.
2®Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, 2nd
edition, revised by C.H. Stuart, vol. XI The Oxford History
of England, Sir George Clark, editor, p. 311.
2lRatz, Newcastle's New York, p. 19.

32Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 163.
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The lack of concern with colonial business prevalent
among persons charged with supervising the colonies33 had
by the 1730's resulted in the displacement of the formal
i

colonial bureaucracy-’4 with an informal structure, which
accurately reflected the personal patronage concerns of
those who were involved in colonial administration.

Instead

of depending on the Board of Trade to represent their
interests in England, many occupants of colonial offices,
or merchants involved in colonial trade, or colonists with
political aspirations, would make contact with a Londoner
who himself had contacts on the higher levels of government.
These allies could present points-of-view to the men who had
the power to shape colonial policy.3^
enabled all the members of
to

the Board

This informal system
of Trade whohadaccess

the ministry and to the Privy Council, to affectthe

government's policies —

if their "friends" in the govern

ment were more powerful than those of the others involved
in the dispute.3^
The greatly reduced role of the Board made its continued
smooth operation less important to the government, and

33Henretta, "Salutary

Neglect",

pp. 266-7.

^^Henretta, "Salutary

Neglect",

p. 145.

^Henretta, "Salutary

Neglect",

pp. 142-3.

■^Henretta, "Salutary

Neglect",

pp. 154-5.
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consequently when Allured Popple resigned in 1737, to become
governor of Bermuda, the position of Secretary of the Board
of Trade was given to Thomas Hill, a minor poet who had good
political connections37 but no experience in colonial affairs
nor any administrative ability at all.

Hill's misadminis-

tration further reduced the Board's effectiveness.

It was

not until 1748 when John Pownall replaced Hill, that the
op
Board began to operate efficiently again.
Pownall's
efficient administration, combined with the ambitions of
George Montagu Dunk, second earl of Halifax, who was named
president of the Board in 1748, restored the Board to a
position of some influence.

The informal, "interest domi

nated" system of colonial administration, which had developed
in the 1730's, was now superseded by a system which tried to
evaluate the "effectiveness" of colonial officials.39
Halifax was able to gratify his ambition and enhance
his status in the government by restoring a measure of in
dependence to the Board of Trade, only because his own per
sonal political influence freed him from any fear of the
Duke of Newcastle who was one of the most influential men

37nenretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 189.
^®Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", p. 263.
•^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 282-5, 293-7.
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in England.

As powerful as Newcastle was, he could not re

main in power without Halifax's support, and Halifax made
the Board of Trade's independence the price of that
support.40

Indeed, Newcastle was so concerned with retain

ing Halifax's loyalty that he supported Halifax's quest for
a seat in the "cabinet" to tie him more closely to the admin
istration.^

The King, however, refused to seat Halifax in

1750, on the grounds that the Board of Trade was a subor
dinate agency, and that the Board's president would be
obliged to follow the Secretary of State's instructions even
though he were a member of the "cabinet."42

jn

1751,

Halifax

again attempted to secure a place in the "cabinet," and this
time the King refused his request on the grounds that the
"cabinet" was already too l a r g e . i t was not until 1757
that Halifax finally obtained the "cabinet" seat he so
badly wanted, and had so long pursued.

He was seated, how

ever, as the Earl of Halifax, not as the President of the
Board of T r a d e , a clear indication of the Board's low
position in England's administrative hierarchy.

4 0 Dickerson,

American Colonial Government, p. 40.

^Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", pp. 308-310.
^Turner, Cabinet, II, 29.
4 3 Turner,

Cabinet, II, 25.

44Turner, Cabinet, II, 32-3.
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Although the Board of Trade was devoid of authority
and had little influence over the government's policies for
most of the first half of the eighteenth century, it was,
however, not moribund.

Although the Board did not exercise

the influence over colonial policy or administration which
some have credited it with, it worked hard as a "civil
service" for the Secretaries of State, for the Privy Council
committee on colonial affairs, and on occasion, for the
Houses of Parliament.

It investigated, collected infor

mation, and suggested actions to the Secretary of State for
the Southern Department, as well as for the Privy Council
committee on colonial affairs^® which virtually always
accepted its advice.4?
Since the Board of Trade was primarily an intelligence
gathering agency, its files were constantly used by other
agencies of the British government which wanted information
on the state of England's commerce and

c o l o n i e s .

48

t0 keep

45CSP, XXXIV, xi, XL, vii-viii.
4®Dickerson, American Colonial Government, p. 104.
4^Charles M. Andrews, "The Government of the Empire,
1660-1763," The Old Empire: From the Beginnings to 1783,
vol. I, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, J~
Holland, A.P. Newton, and E.A. Benians, editors, TNew York,
1929), pp. 412-3, APC, III, 45, 54-5, Dickerson, American
Colonial Government, pp. 81, 101.

48CSP, XL, VI.
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abreast of the continual requests for data, the Board's
staff actively collected statistics on the colonies, the
state of their trade, and matters related to trade.

To

insure the reliability of its sources, the Board sent the
colonial governors detailed instructions on the methods to
a

q

be used in compiling all statistics it requested. ^
The Board's diligence in accumulating and dispersing
information was apparently appreciated by the other agencies
of the English government.

They requested so much infor

mation that the Board's Secretary was occasionally com
pelled to apologize for the Board's inability to transmit
data rapidly.50
The Board's industriousness was fully tested by the
Parliamentary activity which culminated in passage of the
Molasses Act of 1733.

The question of regulating the sugar

trade first came to the Board's attention on April 5, 1731
when the House of Commons asked the Board for copies of the
Barbadoes Sugar Duty Act of 1715, the Royal confirmation of
that Act, and the nineteenth article of Barbadoes Governor

49CSP, XXXV, xxi-xxii.
5°CSP, XXXVII, xxvii. The information the Board so
industriously collected and distributed was largely
statistical.
It kept careful records of the population,
trade, and internal resources of the colonies. The infor
mation was obtained from the governors who were required
to submit regular reports on these matters.
It also
served as a central archive for colonial legislation.
Most of the requests for information came from those who
were concerned with the colonial economy.
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Henry Worsley's "instructions."

The Lords also requested,

on the same day, copies of Cadwallader Colden's memorial
on the navigation of Canadian rivers, an extract from a
1717 report on the sugar trade between New England and
foreign colonies, the 1694 Massachusetts act for controlling
Indians, and the 1715 Barbadoes sugar act that the Commons
had requested.

Despite delays which were inevitably

attendant upon hand copying, the Board was able to deliver
this wide assortment of information within two weeks.^
Supplying the information requested by the Houses wa s ,
however, only the beginning of the Board's labors.

In May,

1731, the sugar interest induced the Commons to request the
Privy Council to order the Board of Trade to investigate
the trade between England's continental colonies and foreign
sugar-producing islands.

At the initial hearing, the con

tinental colonies' agents objected to the West Indian request
for the termination of their trade with foreign sugar colonies.
To resolve the conflict between the two groups of colonies,
the Board organized hearings which would permit both sides
to fully present their positions.^2

The Board's investi

gations was so thorough that it was dilatory in presenting

51CSP, XXXVIII, 84, 100.
S^Great Britain, Trade and Plantations Commissioners,
Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,
1704-1782 (14 vols., London, 1920-1938) [1728/9-1734J, pp.
176-7, 253-4, 257-9 (hereafter Journal), CSP, XXXVIII,
xiv-xvi.
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its report to the Commons, which requested it for the second
time on January 28, 1731/2. 53

On February 4, Newcastle

urged the Board to hasten the completion of its report.
The Board objected to the emphasis on speed; it felt that it
could conduct an objective investigation only by the timeconsuming process of supplying all interested parties with
copies of all relevant material, and of allowing them an
opportunity to reply.-’-' However, the Board must have decided
to comply with the Commons' and Newcastle's pleas for speed,
for on February 15 the complete report was delivered to the
Commons.56
Since the Board of Trade had been created primarily to
protect and encourage English trade,57 it is not surprising
that the information it supplied to other agencies reflected

53CSP, XXXIX, 32-3.
54CSP, XXXIX, 37-8.
55CSP, XXXIX, 4 5-7.
56CSP, XXXIX, 52-62.
^George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of England
Toward the American Colonies, vol. Ill Columbia College
Studies in History Economics and Public Law (New York,
1948, reprint of 1893 edition), pp. 124-5 Thereafter
Commercial Policy).
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the interests and concerns of British merchants.®9

in 1734,

for example, the House of Lords asked the Privy Council to
instruct the Board to report on a petition from a group of
London merchants, objecting to the duties several colonies
had laid on British goods.
takingly complete:

The Board's report was pains

it examined the history and operations

of Anglo-American trade since 1686, and pointed out the many
loopholes which existed in the system, and explained how it
had attempted to protect British merchants.®9

In fact the

report lacks only a discussion of the American point-of-view,
a matter which apparently could be neglected because it was
of no importance in the formation of policy.
All of the Board's proceedings reflect the importance
of trade and the relative unimportance of the colonies.
Considerable attention was devoted to projects which would
benefit Britain's economy,®® but little time to the adminis
tration of the colonies.

Again and again, the Board of

®9Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest (Philadelphia,
1970), p. 53. The importance of commercial concerns is
reflected by the Board of Trade's Journal. Although there
are more entries dealing with the colonies than with trade
the Journal indicates that the Board dispatched colonial
business rapidly while it often devoted several sessions to
considering trade matters. The difference is reflected in
the length of entries in the Journal. Colonial business
was usually reported in less than half a page, and often in
only a few lines. Trade matters usually filled most of a
page, and often several pages.
59CSP, XLI> 11-25.
®®See, for example, Journal [1718-1722], pp. 16-18,
19-23, CSP, XXXVI, xxiv-xxv.
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Trade's Journal used the phrase, "...was agreed to and
ordered to be transcribed..." to describe its pro forma
handling of colonial business.

This was an extremely

efficient manner of dispatching business, but efficiency
was possible only because no one, on or off the Board,
apparently felt that colonial affairs were worth the effort
involved in a more detailed examination.
Consequently, the Board's only concern with colonial
legislation, which it was required to review, was to deter
mine whether a colonial law encroached upon the Crown's
prerogatives, whether it conformed to English law and judi
cial practice, whether it contained technical defects which
would cause confusion in enforcement, and if it would
adversely affect British trade.61

The Board seems to have

been completely unconcerned with the intrinsic merits of
the colonial legislation thus reviewed.
The Board's treatment of the laws passed in the colony
of New York for example, reflect the limits of its interest
in colonial legislation.

Between January 1717 and December

1753, New York passed 623 laws of which the Board disallowed
only

1 9 ;62

and, although the Board considered representation

SlgsP, XXXI, 14 6, 156-9, Dickerson, American Colonial
Government, pp. 228, 231-61.
^^New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision,
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution
(5 vols., Albany, 1894), I, II, III (hereafter cited as
NYCL).
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from Governors, Assembly agents, and partisans of colonial
interests, its reasons for all the disallowances reflect
the concerns and convenience of Englishmen, not of New
Yorkers.
The earliest act disallowed was An Act to lay a duty
of two pounds on every hundred pounds value prime cost of
all European goods imported into this colony, passed on
November 19, 1720.®3

Qn April 30, 1724, the Board of Trade,

having received complaints against the act from merchants
trading with New York, advised the King (despite Governor
William Burnet's contention that the duty had been in force
since 1691, often at higher rates) that "...the said act is
not fitt for your Majesty's Royall approbation..."

The

Board's report suggested that British merchants be protected
from colonial taxation by the dispatch of an additional
instruction, forbidding colonial governors to approve laws
which placed duties on European goods imported in British
ships.6*

The Board's recommendation was followed, somewhat

belatedly, in 1732 when the governors were "...expressly
forbid [sic] to pass any law by which the trade or navi
gation of this kingdom may be any ways affected, hereby
declaring it to be our royal intention that no duties shall
be laid in the province...under your government upon British

63NYCL, ch. 397.
64NYCD, V, 706.
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shipping or upon the product or manufactures of Great
Britain upon any pretense w h a t s o e v e r 65
The same New York Assembly which passed the two
per-cent duty, which was disallowed in 1724 also pursued,
under the guidance of Governor Burnet, a policy intended
to destroy the French trade with the Indians.®*’ The New
York Assemblies' efforts to implement Burnet's policy
culminated in 1729 with the simultaneous disallowance of
ten acts.
Burnet's motives were simple and patriotic.

The colo

nists of New York and the colonists of Canada had long been
competing for dominance in the Indian fur trade.

French

domination had been based on purchasing English cloth from
New Yorkers, at lower cost than it could be obtained from
France, and using it in their trade.

Since the Indians

intended to support whoever provided them with the cheapest
manufactured goods, the Canadian preponderance in the Indian
trade created a threat to New York's security.

To remove

that danger, Burnet secured in 1720, passage of An Act for
the encouragement of the Indian trade and rendering it more
beneficial to the inhabitants of this province and for

®5Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British
Colonial Governors, 1670-1776.(2 vols., New York, 1967,
reprint of 1935 edition), pp. 146-7 (hereafter cited as
Instructions).

66NYCL, V. 576-81.
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prohibiting the selling of Indian goods to the French.67
The act was evaded; so in 1722 Burnet sponsored An Act for
the further and more effectual prohibiting of selling Indian
goods to the French which tightened enforcement by requiring
suspects to swear, under oath, that they had not traded with
the French.

Refusal to take the oath was tantamount, under

the provisions of the law, to admitting guilt.

The acts

were so successful in restricting the French traders that in
1724 they were extended by An act for continuing the acts
for prohibiting the selling of Indian goods to the French
with some alterations.69
Burnet's enthusiasm for the trade laws was, however,
not universal.

Richard West, the Board of Trade's legal

advisor, agreed that the objectives of the 1722 law were
laudable but he felt that the enforcement procedure it
established was so defective that it made the act unsuitable
for royal

a p p r o b a t i o n . 70

also displeased.

67n y c l , ch.

a group of London merchants were

Unaware that the New York government had

392, passed

Nov. 19,

1720.

68NYCL, ch.
425, passed July 7, 1722, Herbert L.
Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century
(4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, reprint of 1924-1925
edition), II, 419-20, NYCD, V, 586-7, 682, 684-5.
89NYCL, ch.

449, passed

July 24,

70CSP, XXXIII, 366-7, Nov. 26, 1723.

1724.
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already acted on April 30, 1724, they presented a petition
to the Privy Council asking that the governor of New York
be instructed to permit renewal of the Indian Trade Act of
1720, because, they argued, it brought "...great discourage
ment on British Trade" without affecting French commerce.71
The petition was referred to the Board of Trade on July 7; 72
it suggested that a decision on the petition be delayed until
information on the actual effects of the act could be
obtained.73

The Privy Council accepted the Board's sugges

tion, 74 and the Board embarked on a series of ten hearings,
which occupied almost a year, on the acts' effects.75
Critics of the law argued that it hurt English commerce
by reducing New York's beaver trade, raising the prices New
Yorkers paid for fur, and depriving New York's cloth mer
chants of the Canadian market, without harming the French
who could obtain the goods they had purchased from New York
elsewhere.

The law's opponents also contended that commerce

between private individuals had no effect on their respective

71APC, III, 68.
72Journal [1722/3-1728], p. 104.
73NYCD, V, 707-9, July 14, 1724.
74APC, III, 68, July 23, 1724.
7~*The hearings extended from July 22, 1724 to June 16,
1725, Journal [1722/3-1728], pp. 108, 113, 162-78, 182-3.
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nations, and that New York's attempt to obtain fur by direct
trade with the Indians had created competition, which had
raised the price.
The act's supporters, including the former governor of
New York, Robert Hunter, argued that the profits of the
direct fur trade were greater than those which could be
obtained when the pelts were purchased from French inter
mediaries; that the French could not obtain furs from the
Indians without cloth supplied by English merchants; that
the price of pelts had not increased; that eliminating
French traders would strengthen New York by attracting other
Indians to the English interest; and that ending the trade
would speed the economic collapse of the French colonies.
After hearing all the evidence and examining the sta
tistics of New York's trade, the Board of Trade concluded
that the Indian Trade Acts had not reduced the total volume
of the colony's trade, and that the reduction in fur exports
from New York which had taken place would soon be eliminated
with all of the profits of the trade remaining in English
hands.

The Board could not, however, endorse the Indian

Trade Acts.

It felt that the act's enforcement procedures

(especially the requirement for the establishment of inno
cence by oath, the assumption that refusal to take the oath
was an admission of guilt, and that authority might be

76NYCD, V, 745-7.
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given to men of low rank, even common soldiers, to impose
high

£100 penalties) made it objectionable.

The Board

therefore suggested that the governor of New York should
be encouraged to secure repeal of the objectionable sections
of the law, and to secure passage of a new act which achieved
the same goals through a more equitable enforcement pro
cedure. 77
On November 10, 1725 the New Yorkers, apparently
ignorant of the Board's opinion, passed An act to revive
and continue the severall acts therein mentioned relating
to the prohibiting of selling Indian goods to the French and
for promoting the trade with remote nations of Indians during
the time therein mentioned and for the recovery of such pen
alties as are now directed by the said acts.7**

This act

adopted a system of differentiated taxation to regulate the
trade; the duties of goods sold to the French were to be
twice those on goods used in direct trade with the Indians.
Burnet hoped this would control the trade more effectively
than the blanket prohibition of the earlier laws had

d o n e . 79

The system of abjurement by oath was, however, retained.

77NYCD, V, 760-3, June 26, 1725.
78NYCL, ch. 465.

79NYCD, V, 775.
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On June 17, 1726 An act to lay different duties on the
goods therein mentioned and for regulating the Indian trade
in the City and County of Albany for the term of two years
and moderating and ascertaining the fines inaur'd by former
acts if paid within the time limited in this act was
Q /\

passed.ou

Governor Burnet informed the Board that this act

was free of the defects which had marred the earlier legis
lation.

It retained, however, the objectionable system

assuming that a suspect who was unwilling to protest his
innocence under oath was guilty.
The intent of the Juen, 1726 law was clarified on
November 11, 1726 by An act for explaining and enforcing an
act entitled an act to lay different duties on the goods
therein mentioned and for regulating the Indian trade in the
City and County of Albany for the term of two years and for
moderating and ascertaining the fines incurred by former
acts if paid within the time limited in this act.82

An act

for regulating and securing the Indians' trade to the west
ward of Albany and for defraying the charge thereof83 which

80NYCL, ch. 469.
81NYCD, V, 778.
82NYCL, ch. 497.

83NYCL, ch. 499.
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was intended to prevent the French from isolating the Indians
who lived in the western part of the colony from trade with
English colonists84 by building an English trading post at
Oswego, New York85 was passed at the same time.
Apparently maintaining the trading post at Oswego was
expensive, for the colony was obliged to enact on November
25, 1727, An act for defraying the cost and contingent
charges of the trading house erected at Oswego and the main
taining of it during the time herein mentioned for applying
several fonds and borrowing a certain sum out of the excise
for that purpose, for the effectual recovery of former fines
and forfitures and for continuing the different duties on
Indian goods during the time herein mentioned and for making
good the money so to be borrowed out of the excise.88

The

trading post's financial difficulties were, however, not
over, for on September 20, 1728, An act for confirming the
act therein mentioned with some alterations and additions,
for paying provisions and other stores and services already
furnished and done for the use of the trading house at
Oswego and for subsisting it during the time therein men
tioned for borrowing money for those purposes and providing
fonds for the repayment thereof was passed.87

84NYCD, V, 803-4.
85NYCD, V, 818-9.
86NYCL, ch. 500.
87NYCL, ch. 542.
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The colony's efforts at securing the Indian trade had,
however, not gone unnoticed in London.

On February 1, 1729,

a group of merchants complained to the Privy Council that
New York's Indian trade acts had prejudiced trade between
the colony and England, a violation of the governor's
instructions.

The Privy Council referred the petition to

the Board of Trade on November 12, 1729 with instructions
to report on the merchants' objections and on any similar
charges.88
The Board of Trade received the Privy Council's request
on November 13 and immediately asked the Customs Commis
sioners to transmit detailed information on New York's trade.
The information arrived five days later and the Board immedi
ately determined the fate of the New York statutes.89

it

accepted the merchants' claims that the New York acts reduced
trade by raising the price of beaver from 3 s to 5 s 3 d per
pound, making English beaver more expensive than French or
Dutch beaver which, in turn, enabled French hatters to
undersell English hat makers thereby depriving England of
the Spanish and Italian hat trade.

The Board agreed that

the New York laws had reduced the volume of beaver exported
by two-thirds, and deprived English woolen manufacturers of

88APC, III, 209-14.

"journal [1728/9-1734], pp. 72-3.

112

their Canadian customers.

It also recognized that the pro

cedure of enforcing the acts by oaths was unfair because it
placed suspects in the position of either accusing them
selves or committing perjury, often before low ranking
soldiers.
The Board therefore concluded that as the fur trade
"...appears to be so much affected by the said acts, and
that the clauses relating to the execution thereof are
grevious and oppressive..." the King should be advised to
Q A

disallow them.

The Board's report, which was drafted on

November 18, and approved officially on the next

day^l

was

accepted by the Privy Council on December 3, 1729,92 and the
series of ten laws, some of which had previously been
approved by the Board of Trade, were disallowed by King
George II December 11, 1729.93
The Indian trade acts were disallowed because they
adversely affected the interests of British merchants.

The

Board did not, however, limit its intervention in New York's
legislative affairs to matters of trade.

90APC, III, 209-14.
91Journal [1728/9-1734], p. 73.
92APC, III, 209.

93APC, III, 214.

It also intruded
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to protect the Crown's prerogatives.

On November 25, 1727,

New York enacted An act for preventing prosecutions by
informations which forbad the provincial Attorney General
to bring suspects to trial without first obtaining an in
dictment from a grand

j u r y .
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The law came to the Board

of Trade's notice in late May, 1728 and was transmitted to
Francis Fane, the Board's counsel, for evaluation.

On June

5, 1728 Fane reported that the act was "...a very violent
and extraordinary attague upon the prerogatives of the
Crown, for the right of the Attorney Generali to file infor
mation is delegated to him from the King, and has ever been
thought a most essential and necessary power with regard to
the security of the publick tranquility...."95

The Board

then sent the act to the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General, both agreed with Fane's evaluation.95

Having deter

mined that the New York law impinged upon the Crown's pre
rogative, the Board sent a representation to the Privy
Council requesting repeal,97 and on November 6, 1728 the
order for disallowance was signed by the king.99

94NYCL, ch. 502.
95CSP, XXXVI, 112-3.
96CSP, XXXVI, 156, 175.
97Journal [1722/3-1728], p. 429.
"journal

[1722/3-1728], p. 433.
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The fall 1737 session of the New York Assembly passed
and Lieutenant Governor George Clarke signed An act for the
frequent election of representatives to serve in General
Assembly and for the frequent calling and meeting of the
General Assembly so elected.

The act, which required the

Assembly to meet annually, limited the Assembly to a three
year term, and required election to be held within six
months of dissolution,99 engendered a strong reaction in
London.

The Board of Trade concluded it "...takes away the

undoubted Right that the Crown has always exercised of
calling and continuing the Assembly of that Province at such
times and as long as it has beenthoughtnecessary for the
Publick Service," and onSeptember

4,1738^^®the Privy

Council disallowed the law.
In the 1740's the government of New York attempted to
settle the confusion which surrounded the collection of
quit-rents by legislation.

An act for regulating the pay

ment of His Majesty's quit-rents and for the partition of
lands in order thereto was passed on May 22, 1742^®^ and was
modified on September 21, 1744 by An act to amend part of an
act intitled an act for regulating the payment of his

99NYCL, ch. 650.
100APC, III, 617.

101NYCL, ch. 728.
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Majesty's quitrents and for partition of lands.102
Lieutenant Governor Clarke supported the laws which allowed
the government to collect proportionate shares of the quitrents from each of joint tenants of a large grant because
it would simplify the collection of the quit-rents, and
would encourage settlement of the frontier by freeing the
pioneers from the fear of being sued for huge arrears of
q u i t - r e n t s . A f t e r careful consideration of the acts,104
the Board of Trade concluded that allowing the quit-rents
to be paid within six months of the due date was incon
venient for the Crown's officers, and that the fee estab
lished for issuing a receipt for quit-rents was so low that
no one would be willing to accept the post of deputy col
lector.

As the laws forgave quit-rents when there was no

collector, the Board determined they were prejudicial to the
Crown's interests and suggested they be vetoed.
Council accepted the Board's report on May 23,

The Privy

1745.

102NYc l , ch. 733.
103NYCD, VI, 215.
104The Board of Trade held seven meetings on these laws.
Journal [1741/2-1749], pp. 148-163, Feb. 1, 1744/5, March 5,
6, 22, April 9, 25, 26, 1745.

105APC, IV, 4-5.
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The Board of Trade was also concerned with insuring
that the legal systems of the Province of New York remained
consistent with Britain's.

Consequently it was careful to

ascertain that New York's laws conformed to British statute,
and that the legal procedures necessary to enforce colonial
laws would not be burdensome or overly complicated.
Thus when, in 1718, New York passed An act for reviving
an act of General Assembly entitled an act for the easier
partition of lands in joint tenancy or in common and making
the same more useful and effectual for the purposes therein
mentioned-*-^ the Board found it was defective because it
failed to distinguish among the various types of tenancy.
That omission meant that a tenant who had only a term
interest in the lands might, under the terms of the law,
participate in a division of the lands and emerge as the
absolute owner of a portion of the grant thereby depriving
the other share holders of land which would have become
theirs.

The Board therefore, on July 19, 1719, recommended

disallowance.
The New Yorkers did not, however, abandon their desire
for an act which would permit the division of land grants
held in common, and, on November 11, 1726, Governor Burnet
approved An act for the easier partition of lands held in

1Q6n y CL, ch. 362, passed Oct. 16, 1718.
107NYCD, V, 529-30.
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common and promoting the settling and improvement thereof
and for confirming former divisions of settled townships
of this colony. T h i s
than its predecessor.
on several grounds.

act had no more success in London
The Board of Trade objected to it

It felt there was no need for a public

law to accomplish the divisions which could have been con
veniently arranged by private agreements or private acts,
that the act did not provide sufficient protection for the
interests of minors and incompetents whose property might
be affected by the divisions, that the act did not specif
ically reserve the Crown’s rights on the lands involved,
and most significantly that the act would defraud the Crown
of vast tracts of land by legitimizing exorbitant grants,
grants which even failed to reserve adequate quit-rents.
Consequently, it advised d i s a l l o w a n c e an(j the privy
Council transmitted its recommendation to the King on
January 18, 1728.
An act to prevent the taking or levying on specialties
more than the principle, interest and cost of suit and other
purposes therein mentioned which was enacted on October 29,
1730 was also unacceptable to the Board of Trade because

108NYCL, ch. 490.
109NYCD, V, 843-4.

^ A P C , III, 180-2.
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of technical deficiencies.

The law forbade the plaintiffs

who collected more than their just d e b t . m

Governor John

Montgomerie's letter to the Board of Trade explained that
the law had been passed to protect defendants from exploi
tation by plaintiffs, and to spare them bother and expense
of recovering the excessive damages in chancery.H2

Fane,

the Board's counsel, did not agree with Governor Montgomerie;
he felt that the act was completely unnecessary.

He argued

that there were remedies available to defendants in the
ordinary course of the law, and that the act would encourage
defendants to over pay the plaintiff only to sue for the
surplus under the advantageous terms of the l a w . T h e
Board of Trade and the Privy Council agreed with Mr. Fane
and suggested the King disallow the law because its remedies
were inappropriate to the problem it was intended to
resolve. H-4
The Board's concern with guaranteeing that colonial
statutes conformed to
to

English lawdecided

thefate

impower the vestry of theParish ofJamaica

of An act

inQueens

County to dispose of sixty pounds now in the hands of the

11:LNYCL, ch. 559.
112NYCD, V, 905.
113CSP, XXXVIII,

104-5.

114CSP, XXXVIII,

114-5.
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church wardens of the said parish for the use and benefit
of that parish which was passed on November 1, 1733.^^
The Bishop of London, who had been given jurisdiction over
the churches in the American colonies in 1728-H® complained
to the Board of Trade that the act, which gave the vestry
control over funds intended for a minister's salary en
couraged them not to appoint a new minister to their
church.117

The Board then sent the act to its counsel,

Mr. Fane, who reported on March 5, 173 4, that he saw no
legal reason to object to the act.H^

nis Lordship was,

however, not willing to abandon the issue and, on June 5,
he informed the Board that the New York law violated a
statute of 28 Henry VIII which required the profits of a
11q

vacant benefice to be reserved for the next incumbent.

The Board consequently advised disallowance, and on July
23, 1734 the Privy Council accepted the Board's advice that
the law be repealed because there was no pressing reason to
accept its deviation from English law.3-20

115NYCL, ch. 602.
116NYCD, V, 849-54.
117CSP, XLI, 35-6.
118CSP, XLI, 40, 46.
119CSP, XLI, 393.
120APC, III, 415-6.
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The Board of Trade's deliberations on New York statutes
which it permitted to remain in force reflected the same
concern for English economic interests, the prerogatives of
the Crown, and the preeminence of the English legal system
which shaped its decisions on disallowance.
In 1726 New York passed a revenue act which imposed a
duty of 5 ounces of plate or 50 s paper currency on each
slave over four years of age imported into the colony
directly from Africa, and placed a 5 per cent duty on all
European goods imported from the West Indies.-*-2*- A group
of Bristol merchants found these provisions objectionable
and complained to the Privy Council which forwarded their
petition to the Board of Trade for consideration*-^2 on
November 1, 1734.123

The Board examined the merchants'

complaints on July 24, 1735*-24 and concluded that the duties
were "...greatly prejudicial to the Trade and Navigation of
this Kingdom, and are likewise expressly contrary to His
Majesty's Instructions to the Govr. of New York, ... we
should for these reasons propose to your Lordships that

121NYCL, ch. 467.
*~22Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 6.
123NYCD, VII, 32-4.

124Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 44.
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the Act in question might be laid before His Majesty for
Disallowance."

The Board, however, refrained from doing

so because disallowance of the revenue act would cause
confusion in the colony and disrupt the orderly functioning
of its government.

Instead, it recommended that an instruc

tion ordering the governor to secure repeal of the duties
be dispatched to New York.125

The instruction was sent on

August 6, 1735 but the colonists ignored it.

The offending

act expired on September 1, 1737,126 it was, however, not
renewed.
Since the Board was an agency of the Crown, it was
naturally concerned with protecting the Crown's interests.
As the Crown's lands were its greatest resource in the
colony, the Board of Trade was especially careful when it
considered land grants.

On April 7, 1731 Anthony Rutgers,

a member of the New York Assembly, applied for a grant of
a piece of land in New York City called the Swamp, which he
proposed to drain.

The Board met on Rutgers' request in May

and was informed that the Swamp had been excluded from all
grants because it had been intended as the site of a dock.
The plan to construct a dock had not proved feasible, how
ever, and draining the Swamp, the Board was told, would
serve the public interest.

This convinced the Board that

125NYCD, VII, 32-4.

126Ny c l , II, 768, Labaree, Instructions, pp. 152-3.
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Rutgers' project would not harm the Crown and, on June 2,
1731, it approved the grant.^27

The Order in Council

conveying the land to Rutgers was signed by King George II
on August 12, 1731.128
The same care was applied to the application of a
Mr. Stock for land in New York.

The Board of Trade con

sidered his application at seven meetings before it decided
to approve the grant on October 28, 1737.129

When Lauchlin

Campbell applied for land in New York the Board found his
petition defective and returned it to him.33®
The Board was equally punctilious in insuring that
private acts passed in New York did not confuse the legal
system.

In 1724 the Board of Trade's counsel, Richard West,

reported that he had no objection to a New York Act which
enabled Gilbert Livingston to sell certain lands.

He did

note, however, that the colonists tended to make their
private acts too general and suggested an instruction
requiring careful drafting of all private acts be sent to

127Journal 11728/9-1734], pp. 191, 200-1, 203, 208,234.
128CSP, XXXVIII, 223.
129Journal [1734/5-1741], pp. 87, 88, 91, 136, 137, the
first meeting was held on Feb. 3, 1736/7.

130Journal [1734/5-1741], p. 330.
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The commission of the Board of Trade required it to
investigate complaints about colonial maladministration or
misadministration, and it fulfilled these obligations.

It

heard Lewis Morris Jr.'s complaint that his suspension from
the New York Council by Governor Montgomerie was wrong;^33
Lewis Morris Sr.'s, Rip Van Dam's and James Alexander's
complaint that Governor William Cosby had removed them from
office improperly;334 and Daniel Horsmanden's complaint that
his removal from the Council in 1747 was unjustified.^33
After being deluged with letters from Governor George
Clinton from 1745 to 1751,^3^ the Board finally investigated
the causes of the political turmoil which gripped the prov
ince of New York.
all pointless.

The Board's investigations were, however,

None of the officials who protested their

removal were restored to office, and the report on the
"state of the province" made no recommendations at all for

133Journal [1728/9-1734], 77, 81-3.
134Journal [1734/5-1741], pp. 74-7, 111.
135Journal [1741/2-1749], p. 263.
136Journal [1749/50-1753], pp. 66, 74-5, 79, 90, 97,
117-8, 121, 139, 156, 158, 167, 169, 180-1, 220, 222-3,
257-8, 262-3, 285-6, 325, 381-3, 417-8, 449-50, 452-3. As
the Journal gives only the subjects of most letters each
page contains several communications.
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changing those conditions that Cosby had found so objec
tionable. ^37
Even the Instructions which the Board of Trade dis
patched with each new governor of New York reflected its
lack of concern with the day to day problems of colonial
administration.

In the period from 1717 to 1753, 169

articles of "instruction” were issued to each new governor
of New York.

Of those, 126 dealt with the administration

of the colony's government, methods of operation, salary,
administration of justice, militia, reports, and the style
of legislation; 25 dealt with trade, but only 18 gave the
governor specific instructions as to what actions he should
take as the colony's chief executive.I3®

Thus, as the

governors received virtually no guidance from London, they
necessarily had to find their own way in the colonial
political system.
Thus, even the Board of Trade, the agency of the British
government which is generally credited with acting as the
keystone of Britain's system of colonial
manifested only limited interest.

administration,-*-3 ^

In accordance with its

137NYCD, VI, 614-36.
See Appendix I.
^3^See
M. Andrews,
(New Haven,
a much less

Dickerson, American Colonial Government, Charles
The Colonial Period of American History, vol. IV
1964 reprint of 1938 edition), chapter IX takes
sanguine view of the Board.
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original commission, it always treated the colonies pri
marily as a source of wealth for the mother country and,
consequently, devoted most of its efforts to insuring that
the colonies would continue to contribute to Britain's
prosperity.

If it fulfilled its obligation to review colo

nial legislation, to protect the interests of the Crown,
and to hear complaints from the colonies, it never went
beyond the letter of these requirements to examine the
internal developments in the colonies; it did not exert a
direct influence on the internal affairs of the colonies.
Thus, the governors' success or failure in any particular
colony was completely and necessarily their own.

CHAPTER FOUR
AN ENGLISH POLITICIAN IN THE NEW WORLD

A British governor of the province of New York usually
first set foot on the colony's soil at the "white Hall"
located near the foot of Manhattan Island, and his entrance
would be observed by the members of the Council, the Alder
men and Assistants of the Corporation of the City of New
York, and the "principal gentlemen" of the town who had
assembled to welcome their new executive.
This imposing multitude would then form itself into a
procession to escort the governor designate to nearby Fort
George.

There he prepared to formally take charge of the

colony's government by reading his commission, and would
become acquainted with the leading colonists at a series of
banquets which would be held in his honor.1

These festiv

ities were punctuated with expressions of esteem for the
King and his representative in the colony; although a part

iwayne Andrews, "The Tragic End of Sir Danvers Osborne,
Bart.," New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XXXV
(October, 1951), 405-6, Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Govern
ment in America (New York, 1958) , p. 85 (hereafter Royal
Government).
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of the ritual of arrival,^ they were apparently quite
encouraging to the new governor whose first letters to the
Board of Trade usually reflected the optimism generated by
the apparent good will of the colonists.^
Unfortunately the promise of complete harmony which
surrounded the governor's arrival rarely endured.
honeymoon was soon over."

"The

He soon learned that some of

the colonists would not willingly cooperate with the ad
ministration, and that he had to find some way to impose
his will on them.

The governor's strongest weapon for

meeting opposition was apparently the Commission, which
ostensibly granted him vast powers (powers unhampered by
the Bill of Rights, the Triennial Act, the Septennial Act,
the Act of Settlement, or the traditions which limited the
Crown's authority in England) over his subjects.^

However,

the Commission was, unluckily for the governor, a much
weaker instrument than it seemed to be; its power had been

^Lab^xee, Royal Government, pp. 88-90.
^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative
to the Colonial History of the State of New York, E.B.
O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, editors (15 vols., Albany,
1861-1887), V, 572-3, 855-6, 936-7, VI, 248 (hereafter NYCD).
^Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (New
York, 1968), pp. 66, 69, Evarts Boutell Greene, The Provin
cial Governor of the English Colonies of North America (New
York, 1966), p. 92 (hereafter Provincial Governor.
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diluted by conscious and unconscious decisions of the
British government, and by precedents established in the
colony.

The broad language of the Commission, which had

convinced historians that the governor dominated the
provincial political system, has merely served to obscure
the essential weakness of the governor's position.
Under the terms of his Commission, a governor of New
York could, on his own authority, do many things:

administer

oaths to the colony's officials, suspend members of the
Council, veto proposed laws, adjourn, prorogue, and dismiss
the Assembly, act as the province's Chancellor, appoint
judges and other judicial officials, pardon persons convicted
of all crimes except willful murder and treason, fill eccle
siastical vacancies, call up and command the militia, execute
captured enemies, rebels, and pirates, enforce martial law
in periods of invasion, appoint naval officers in war time,
authorize them to enforce martial law, and punish "disorders
and misdemeanors" committed ashore by officers and men of
the Royal Navy in accordance with local law.^

A separate

Vice-Admiralty Commission also entitled the governor to
appoint the judges and officers of a Vice-Admiralty Court
which had jurisdiction over a wide variety of nautical
matters including contracts between ship owners and merchants,
ship charters, contracts which were outside the competence

5NYCD, V, 92-8.
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of ordinary courts, felonies committed within the colony's
waters, treasure troves, anchorages, and the Royal fish.
As Vice-Admiral, the governor was also charged with en
forcing all of England's maritime statutes, and supervising
the colony's rivers and ports.®
Although this list of powers is long, it is not, on
closer survey, terribly impressive; none would be likely
to have much effect on

the

everyday lives ofmost New

Yorkers.

did

possess the powerto make

The governor

decisions which would touch the lives of his subjects more
directly, but he could

not

exercise it independently.The

Commission required him to obtain the "advice and consent"
of the Council before he could call General Assemblies,
establish courts, build and arm fortifications, issue warrants
for the expenditure of public funds, grant lands, or "Order
and Appoint Fairs, Marts and Markets,...[and] Ports, Harbours,
Bays, Havens, and other places, for convenience and Security
of Shipping...."

He could enact laws only with the consent

of a majority of the Council and of the Assembly, and his
decisions were, moreover, subject to review by the Board of
Trade and by the Privy Council in London.

The colony's

"chief executive" was also required to obtain confirmation
from London whenever he nominated Councillors, appointed

®Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 26-7.

130
acting Councillors, or pardoned traitors and willfull
murderers.7
Another, albeit minor, restriction of the "unlimited"
powers in the governor's Commission, was the 1700 Act to
Punish Governors of Plantations in this Kingdom for Crimes
by them Committed in the Plantations.

This law, intended

to keep colonial officials "...from oppressing His Majestyes
Subjects within their respective governments...,"8 appar
ently was generally ignored, for it was used as the basis
of only one prosecution (in 1711 against Governor Walter
Douglas of the Leeward Islands).8

Nonetheless it did remain

in force and did, at least to some extent, threaten an overzealous governor with retribution, and thereby perhaps con
tributed to his passivity.
Such restrictions placed on the governor's authority
by his Commission and the Act to Punish Governors... were,
however, insignificant when compared to the restraints
imposed by his "Instructions."
For example, the governor's authority to suspend
Councillors was limited by the Instruction's mandate that

7NYCD, V, 92-8.

p

Leo Francis Stock, Proceedings and Debates of the
British Parliaments Respecting North America (5 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1924-1941), II, 339.

8Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 123-4.
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he have good cause for the removal, and that he transmit
the record of the Council's deposition hearing and the
evidence against the suspended Councillor to the Board of
Trade for review.10

The governor's authority over the

judiciary was similarly limited by his Instructions which
ordered him to obtain the Council's approval of the men
he named to the colony's bench, and Royal confirmation of
his permanent judicial appointments.^

The requirement

that judges be removed only for "good and sufficient cause"
further restricted the governor's authority.12

The

governor's pardoning power was restricted by the Instruction
which required him to obtain specific approval from the
Commissioners of the Treasury and the Board of Trade before
he could remit fines or forfitures of more than

^lO.^2

His authority over church appointments was circumscribed
by the requirement that he award benefices only to men
licensed by an English bishop.1*

His powers as commander

^Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British
Colonial Governors 1670-1776 (2 vols.. New York, 1967),
pp. 60-3 (hereafter Instructions).
^Labaree, Instructions, p. 781.
l2Labaree, Instructions, p. 369.
^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 330-1.

^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 484-5.

132
in chief were limited by the Instruction which required
him to avoid excesses in the training program he imposed
on the militia,15 an(j by the necessity for obtaining the
Council's approval for a declaration of martial law.^®
The Instructions even restricted the governor's freedom
to shape military policy; he was required by the Board of
Trade to obtain funds to build a fort in the Onondaga
Country, and to repair forts at Albany and Schenectady
which it believed were important for the colony's defences.^
The Instructions also limited, to some extent, the governor's
Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction by mandating the appointment of
a receiver-general to take charge of the admiralty dues
collected in New

Y o r k .

18

The Instructions did not permit the governor and his
Council to erect or to dissolve a Court without specific
instructions from London.I9
was restricted, too.

Their authority to grant land

Consultation with the collector of

customs, the provincial secretary, or the surveyor-general,

l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 393.
l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 397.
l^Labaree, Instructions, p. 412.
l^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 457-8.
l9Labaree, Instructions, p. 295.
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to insure that all grants had a similar proportion of good
and bad lands, and that all grantees had access to water
transport, was necessary before a grant could be made.2®
Even those powers which the governor shared with the
government in London were curtailed by his Instructions.
His limited power to nominate Councillors was reduced by
the requirement that he maintain, in the capitol, a list
of men he considered qualified for a seat on his council.21
Such a list of potential nominees would allow the Board of
Trade to suggest new Councillors to the Privy Council and
King without specific consultation with the governor, and
thereby reduced the governor's ability to control the future
composition of his administration.
The most detailed restrictions in the Instructions were,
however, reserved for the governor's legislative and finan
cial powers.

His authority to "make constitute and Ordain

laws, Statues, and Ordinances," (which under the Commission
was shared with the Council and Assembly) was furthered
limited when he was ordered not to consent to private acts
affecting private property until the person who petitioned
for the law presented proof to the Council that he had
announced his intention to seek the legislation in the

2®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 531-2.
21

Labaree, Instructions. p. 50.
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church of the parish where the property was located for at
least three successive Sundays before the act was passed.
The governor was required to enclose proof of compliance
with each act sent to London for approval.

These rather

stringent requirements were not, however, the only limita
tions on his freedom to approve private acts.

After 1723,

governors of New York could sign only private acts which
would not take effect until approved by the

C r o w n .

22

These restrictions were not, by any means, the only
restraints on the governor's legislative authority.

He was

required to withhold his approval from any bill of "unusual
and extraordinary nature and importance wherein our prerog
ative or the property of our subjects may be prejudiced or
the trade or shipping of this kingdom any ways affected"
which had not been previously approved by London unless it
contained a suspending clause.22
tion barred the

in addition, the Instruc

governor from approving anyacts which

placed higher duties on ships

and

goods ownedby nonO A

residents than on those owned by New Yorkers.
The governor's ability to control the financial, as well
as the legislative life of New York was further diminished

22Labaree,

Instructions,pp.

22Labaree,Instructions, pp.

140-1.

144-5.

24 Labaree, Instructions, pp. 146-7.
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by the Instructions which ordered him to disapprove all
acts for the emission of "bills of credit" which did not
contain a suspending clause,25 an<j an
the Crown's

r e v e n u e s . 26

laws which reduced

The Crown further curtailed the

governor's ability to conduct the colony's financial affairs
by issuing Instructions which required him to insure that
all colonial taxes were levied in the King's na me ,^ and to
veto any act which challenged the right of the Commissioners
of the Treasury, the High Treasurer of England, and the
Auditor General of Plantations to audit New York's accounts.
The requirement that the governor forward duplicates of his
accounts to London for semi-annual

audit2

8 indicates the

extent of London's concern with the colony's finances.
Yet the Instructions which defined and curtailed his
specific powers were not the most significant restriction
placed on the governor of New York's ability to control
"his" government.

The most profound restriction simply

warned:
... if anything shall happen which may be of
advantage and security to our said province
which is not herein or by our commission

2^Labaree, Instructions, pp. 218-9.
0 fi

Labaree, Instructions, pp. 171-2.

27Labaree, Instructions, p. 170.

28Labaree, Instructions, pp. 174-5.
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provided for, we do hereby allow unto you,
with the advice and consent of our said
council, to take order for the present
therein, giving unto us by one of our
principal secretaries of state and to our
aforesaid Commissioners for Trade and
Plantations speedy notice thereof, that
so you may receive our ratification if we
shall approve the same; provided always
that you do not by color of any power or
authority hereby given you commence or
declare war without our knowledge and
particular commands therein, except it be
against Indians upon emergencies, wherein
the consent of our council shall be had,
and speedy notice given thereof to us as
aforesaid.
This left the governor no freedom of action at all.

He was

to adhere to his detailed instructions, and if they proved
incomplete, he was to turn for advice to his Council, a body
which was rather independent of his interests.

Even after

receiving the Council's advice, he would not be free to act.
He had to concern himself with presenting his actions in a
light which would be acceptable to London.

Either of these

limitations would have made it extremely difficult for a
governor to lead effectively the colony in a crisis; com
bined, they made it practically impossible.

The British

government seemed more interested in consultation and
justification than in action.
Perhaps the British government felt that the governors
could best be managed by keeping them as powerless as

2®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 82-4.
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possible.30

its policy toward Council appointments seemed

intended to reduce the governor's already limited influence
over that body.

The governor could, it was true, nominate

Councillors; but so could many other persons —

merchants,

army officers, the Bishop of London, colonists who happened
to be in London, or anyone else who professed an interest
in colonial affairs.

The Board of Trade listened atten

tively to the arguments presented for and against nominees
by such individuals, and was sometimes willing to accept
their advice over the governor's .31

The governor's distance

from London placed him at a disadvantage in his efforts to
influence the selection of the members of the very body
which had a voice in many of his decisions.
Thus, the attitude of the British government toward
its colonial administrators was ambivalent.

On one hand,

it attempted to control the governors by keeping them as
powerless as possible, but on the other, it was so disinter
ested in colonial affairs that it virtually ignored the
colonies and permitted the governor and the colonists to
evolve their own political relationships.

In practice, the

desire for control was clearly subordinate to disinterest,

3^The English government had, since the Tudor period,
been concerned with controlling the "overmighty" subject.

^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 137-9.
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and so, the governor was left to carry on the administration
of the colony as best he could.
Despite all the limitations placed on him, the governor
was responsible for the administration of the colony.

He

was responsible for raising the money necessary for the
operations of the colonial government, and for pursuing
the various projects London had ordered him to undertake.
As the Parliament at Westminster never appropriated money
for the operation of the colonial government, the governor
was obligated to convince the colonists to supply the
requisite funds.32

This task was more difficult than it

seemed; despite many superficial similarities, there were
rather profound differences between the British and American
33
views of New York's government.
There was essential disagreement over the status of
the Assembly.

The British government took the position

that New York had been granted an Assembly only to encourage
Englishmen to settle in the

p r o v i n c e ,

34 and that like any

other body created by the Crown, the Assembly's powers
were completely dependent upon the prerogative.35

The

^^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 269-71.
33fiailyn, Origins of American Politics, passim.
3^Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Background of the
American Revolution, revised edition (New Haven, 1931), p.35
(hereafter Colonial Background) .
^^Andrews, Colonial Background, pp. 31-3, Mary Patterson
Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies (New
York, 1971), p. 202.
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colonists adamantly rejected this argument and insisted
that their Assembly grew from the same right of Englishmen
to representation in the government as the House of Commons,
and that it could no more be suspended by the Crown than
could the lower house at Westminster.^6
This disparity alone would have been sufficient to
confuse the governor's relations with his "subjects."

They

were further complicated by the British government's ambiv
alent attitude.

Although it insisted that the Assemblies

had no "right" to exist, it sometimes seemed to recognize
that "right."37

The government's Instructions ordered the

governor to deny the Assembly "any power or privilege what
soever which is not allowed by us to the House of

C o m m o n s ,

and it never took any active steps to deny the Assembly's
claims to the authority and privileges of the Commons.
This apparent approval convinced the colonists of the
justice of their position,^ but left the governor in a

3®Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower
Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies 1 6 S1T1715 (Chapelhill, N.C., 1963) , pp. 14-5 (hereafter
Quest for Power) .
^Greene, Quest for Power, pp. 14-5.
3®Labaree, Instructions, pp. 112-3.
OQ

Andrews, Colonial Background, p. 41.

^Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 174-7.

"38
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quandry.

He could neither confirm nor deny the Assembly's

authority without violating the wishes of the government.
This paradoxical situation was resolved by the Assembly
itself.

It did not restrict itself to claiming the prerog

atives of the House of Commons; it actively pursued them,41
and managed to establish itself as a legitimate and power
ful element of New York's constitution primarily by obtain
ing control of the levying and distribution of public
f u n d s .

42

The Assembly became essential to the continued

smooth operation of the colony's government.

The governor

was forced to accept it as such.
For example, the Assembly began engrossing financial
authority in New York (because it said it was responsible
to the taxpayers)43 very early in the colony's history.

The

commission of Governor Henry Sloughter, drawn in 1690, had
authorized "the colony" to control the disposition of the
colony's revenues.

New Yorkers thereafter assumed they had

been given complete control of their finances, and, despite
all attempts to dissuade them, clung tenaciously to their

41-Greene, Quest for Power, p. 11.

42Greene, Quest for Power, pp. 7-8.
43nerbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958), II,
71, (hereafter Eighteenth).
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interpretation of the commission.44
The Assembly had first demonstrated its intent to
dominate finances in 1691, when it refused to appropriate
money for terms of more than two

y e a r s , 4^

appointed a com

mittee to inspect the colony's financial records,4® and
began appropriating monies for specific uses.47

The system

of specific appropriations even extended to the salaries.
Since money was voted to pay the incumbent of each public
office, the Assembly could easily reduce or eliminate the
salaries of individual officials.

This quite naturally

increased its influence over all provincial officers.4®

In

1695 the Assembly flatly claimed it was competent to judge
the colony's needs, ignored the governor's request for funds,
and appropriated only what money it believed necessary for
the operation of the government.4®

44Neil Ovadia, "The Struggle for Financial Control"
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.,
1968), pp. 8-9.
4^Osgood, Eighteenth, I, 247.
4®Osgood, Eighteenth, I, 243.
470sgood, Eighteenth, I, 242.
48

4Q

Greene, Provincial Governor, pp. 116-7.
Osgood, Eighteenth, I, 255.
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Nine years later, the Assembly increased its control
over finances by specifying, in appropriation bills, the
precise manner in which the money it granted was to be spent,
and claimed, for the first time, that the Council could not
amend revenue bills.50

In 1706 the Assembly's influence

again increased when, under pressure from the Board of
Trade,51 Lord Cornbury allowed it to appoint a Treasurer to
supervise the expenditure of appropriations.

Cornbury even

consented when the Assembly authorized various provincial
officials to warrant the expenditure of public

m o n i e s

,52

thereby further limiting his own authority to control the
colony's finances.

The Assembly first demonstrated its

willingness to withhold complete appropriations to force the
governor to accept legislation it favored during the adminCO

istration of Robert Hunter. J
As the governor could not possibly hope for a successfull administration and his own continued employment if the
colony's government was forced into complete chaos because
of a lack of funds, and as he was in New York primarily for

5^0sgood, Eighteenth, II, 70-1. Although several
governors vigorously denied the Assembly's claim to exclusive
control over appropriations, the lower House was immovable
in its assertion.

51NYCD, IV, 1171-3.
52()sgood, Eighteenth, II, 74.

■^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 111-2.
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the profits of office,54 the Assembly's control of finances
was probably its most effective means of influencing him.
It was not, however, the only means.
One of the governor's most important, and inescapable
responsibilities was defense.

To protect the colony from

Indian raids, and the possibility of invasion from Canada,
it was necessary at all times to maintain a body of men
under arms.

The discipline and effectiveness of the

colony's military formations could not be preserved without
a code of martial law, and martial law could be established
only by an act of the Assembly.

(The New York Assembly,

like the British House of Commons, refused to pass a
perpetual mutiny a c t , a n d so it could coerce the governor
by threatening not to renew his authority to discipline the
troops who defended the colony.)

Since Britain was involved

in hostilities which to some degree affected New York for
much of the first half of the eighteenth century, the main
tenance of an effective military force was of immediate
importance to the governors of New York.

The Assembly's

influence increased proportionately.
Since the governor could not hope to rule New York
without an Assembly —

despite the constitutional theories

5^Greene, Provincial Governor, 117.

55Greene, Provincial Governor, pp. 99-101, David Ogg,
England in the Reigns of James II and William III (Oxford,
1963), pp. 230-1.
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espoused by VThitehall —

he had to find some means of

obtaining its cooperation.

He could not use the Provincial

Council to counterbalance the Assembly, for the Councillors,
like the Assemblymen, were colonials who shared the desire
of the leaders of the Assembly to obtain political authority
commensurate with their leading social and economic positions
in the colony.56

Consequently, Councillors often supported

the Assembly rather than the governor when disputes

a r o s e .

Nor could the governor use his position as the King's
representative in New York to overawe the Assembly.
colonists were fully

aware that the governor,despite his

Commission and imposing titles,
ical authority.

The

was nottheultimatepolit

They knew that the governor, who was far

removed from the center of authority and the influential
friends who had helped him secure his post often had as
little influence on the decisions the London government
made affecting New York as the humblest colonists,56 and
that any decision the governor might make could be

56Greene, Quest

for Power,p. 8.

5^Greene, Quest

for Power,p. 12.

56Alison Gilbert Olson and Richard Maxwell Brown,
editors, Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1970), p. 93.

57
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challenged by a voyage to London, or through family or
CO

personal connections.

To maintain any sort of psycho

logical advantage over the colonists, the governor had to
be able to present concrete evidence that he was "in favor"
/TA

in London,

so as to convince them that it would be

impossible to obtain favorable governmental action without
his cooperation.61

Yet this was almost impossible, since

access to the British government was rather easy for almost
anyone of influence.

Being largely unconcerned with colo

nial matters,62 the government was unlikely to refuse a
petition simply to protect the prestige of a governor some
3,000 miles away.
Lacking any more convenient means for obtaining the
cooperation of the Assembly, it would have been natural for
the governor to apply the techniques of political manage
ment, which he learned through his involvement in British

S^The best examples are Robert Livingston's, and Lewis
Morris' trips to London, and James Delancey's use of Sir
Peter Warren's influence.
66oison and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations,
p. 98.
^Labaree, Royal Government, p. 140.
62

James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial Admin
istration Under the Duke of Newcastle" (Princeton, N.J.,
1972), p. 266-7 (hereafter Salutary Neglect).
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politics and which had brought him his office.63

In the

period from 1716 to 1783, the domestic powers of the Crown
and House of Commons were almost perfectly balanced,6^ and
so a structure to prevent conflicts between the monarch and
the Commons (which might have immobilized the government)
was necessary.66

The emergence of such a system was eased

by the relative simplicity of interests.

The Crown and its

ministers were interested in obtaining the votes necessary
for carrying the government's business in the Parliament;
the members of the House of Commons were interested in
profiting from their service at Westminster.
agreement was obvious —

The basis for

members would provide the votes the

government so badly desired, and the government would provide
the posts of profit and honor many members so badly desired.66
Sir Robert Walpole made this rather crass system of barter
c.7

into one of Britain's fundamental political principles,07

Olson and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations,
pp. 5-6.
6^Betty Kemp, King and Commons 1660-1832 (London, 1957),
PP. 2,5.
^ J o h n Harold Plumb, The Origins of Political Stability:
England 1675-1725 (Boston, 1967), passim (hereafter Origins
of Political Stability).
66Stanley Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), p. 8.
6^Plumb, Origins of Political Stability, p. 179.
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and his successors preserved it as the keystone of eight
eenth century British politics.
The system worked "effectively" because the members of
Parliament were free to accept employment from the Crown , ^
and because the government had a large number of posts
available for distribution to its "friends" and their
f a m i l i e s .

Positions were available in the exchequer, the

customs service, the excise service, the army, the navy, the
Royal Court, the households of the King's children, the
diplomatic service, the church, the judiciary, the govern
ments of Ireland and Scotland, and, of course the colonies.
The government could also reward its friends with lucrative
government contracts.7J.
The governor of New York was not able to apply these
principles to his own little government.

From 1717 to 1753

no British government had a budget (exclusive of debt

^Lewis B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the
Accession of George III, second edition (London, 1968) ,
passim (hereafter Structure of Politics).
®^Kemp, King and Commons, pp. 5, 43.
70

Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 121, 358, chapter
8, Plumb, Origins of Political Stability, p. 112.
71piumb, Origins of Political Stability, pp. 108, 114,
118-9, 122-3.
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service) of less than

£2,445,000 a year;72 in the same

period, New York's annual budget (exclusive of war-related
expenses) was probably less than
less than

£10,000.7^

New York

£5,00073 and certainly
simply

did not possess the

resources which were necessary to generate the patronage
which was the sine qua non of the British system.
Lack of money was not the only obstacle a governor of
New York had to face in attempting to adapt the British
patronage system to his new home.

He could not even control

what little patronage the colony did have.

Officials in

London abrogated the governor's authority to make appoint
ments to the more important, and profitable, colonial
offices.

Either they filled the posts directly by obtaining

commissions for their nominees from the King, or indirectly,
by ordering the governor to appoint their nominees.73

In

either case, the colonial governor was deprived of offices

72

Brian R. Mitchell and Phyllis Dean, Abstract of
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 389-90.
E . James Ferguson, "Currency Finance: An Interpre
tation," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, X (April,
1953), 171.
7^Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and
Society in Colonial New York (New York, 1971), p. 80, Osgood,
Eighteenth, II, 80.

75Labaree, Royal Government, p. 102.
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which could have been used as a reward for political loyalty
in New York.7** The appointment of colonial officials from
London further reduced the governor's ability to rule by
creating an element within his administration which was
independent of his authority.77
An additional hindrance was the growth of the custom
which allowed Assemblymen to nominate county officers, even
though they were appointed by the governor.

This practice

was so firmly established that the governor would unhesi
tatingly honor the nominations of an opponent, during the
most acrimonious disputes.7®
Unlike the colonists who were free to engage in
political controversy, the governor was barred from fullfledged participation in partisan politics,7® and conse
quently was prevented from utilizing the prestige of his
office to secure the election of an Assembly which would
do his bidding.

7**Henretta, Salutary Neglect, pp. 242-5.
77Labaree, Royal Government, pp. 104-6.
7®Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, 1960),
p. 274 (hereafter "New York Government").

7®Varga, "New York Government," p. 275.
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Controlling an election was considerably more compli
cated in New York than it was in Britain.

Virtually all

New Yorkers possessed the forty shilling property qualifi
cation, 80 and New York had no rotten boroughs, so it was
impossible to "influence" an election by bribing a few
v o t e r s .

Even if there had been votes for sale, the

governor, with a small budget controlled by the Assembly,
could not have bought them, and there were no colonists
who could afford to support candidates with their private
fortunes as did the Duke of Newcastle in

B r i t a i n .

An additional complication was the lack of stable
parties.83

secure a friendly Assembly, a governor

could no simply support a "faction;" he had to locate the
individual colonists who were willing to cooperate, and
hope they would remain loyal for the Assembly's term.

It

was, in practice, impossible for him to create his own
"faction" in the

A s s e m b l y .

84

®®Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, p. 86.
81

Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, p. 80, Milton
M. Klein, "Democracy and Politics m Colonial New York,"
New York History, XL (July 1959) , 221-246 (hereafter
"Democracy and Politics").
o^
Klein, "Democracy and Politics," p. 231.
p O

JVarga, "New York Government," p. vii.

84oison and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations,

p. 6.
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As the governor could not dominate the Assembly, his
only remaining option was to bargain with its leaders, the
men of influence.

Yet this was difficult.

Because the

British government had used the prerogative as its main
argument for denying the Assembly's claims to political
power, New Yorkers had come to regard the prerogative and
the man who embodied it as an enemy of their liberties.8®
Their distrust of executive authority was strengthened by
the British opposition tradition itself,8® and so New
Yorkers were less than enthusiastic about cooperating with
the individual who represented, to them, forces of reaction
and repression.

Fortunately for the governor, New Yorkers

did accept the idea that the function of politics was to
create, protect and expand emoluments and profits for
office-holders.8^

If the governor would assist them in

pursuing those goals,88 they were willing to subordinate

85Labaree, Royal Government, p. 216.
8®Basilyn, Origins of American Politics, pp. 39-43,
53-7, for a more detailed treatment of the issue see
Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revo
lution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), and Caroline Robbins,
The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, Mass.,
1961) .
8^Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston 1654-1728 and
the Politics of Colonial New York (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961),
p. 174 (hereafter Robert Livingston).

88Varga, "New York Government," pp. vi-vii.
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their distrust to a desire for assistance.®®
If a basis for cooperation with the colonists could be
established, the governor still had to determine who the
leaders of the Assembly really were.9®

The inchoate nature

of local politics meant that many individuals and factions
competed for the governor's support,91 and while this gave
him the option of choosing his allies from a number of
competing groups, it also created difficulties.

Each

individual faction was rather small and generally no single
political leader could dominate the Assembly.

Consequently,

building and maintaining an alliance large enough to control
the Assembly was rather difficult.

Politicians once wooed

might leave the governor's alliance on little or no provocation. 9 2

Only an astute governor could utilize the system

effectively.
The first governor of New York to adapt himself fully
to the colony's politics was Robert Hunter.

He recognized

the importance of the Assembly by approving a naturalization

99Leder, Robert Livingston, ch. XIV-XV.
9®Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 43.
9^Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 77, Milton M. Klein,
"Politics and Personalities in Colonial New York," New York
History, XLVII (Jan. 1966), p. 7.

92Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 46.
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bill (which although contrary to his Instructions was
important to the Assemblymen), and he recognized Lewis
Morris' and Robert Livingston's role as leaders of the
Assembly by satisfying their ambitions.

Morris was

appointed Chief Justice, and Livingston Manor was made
an Assembly district.93

in return, the Assembly under

the guidance of Morris and Livingston, voted a five year
revenue for the government.9^

The agreement was durable,

and Hunter's administration which had begun in discord
ended in harmony.
Hunter was able to resolve the colony's political dis
putes only because the British officials charged with the
supervision of colonial affairs were willing to permit
deviations from the letter of British colony

p o l i c y . 93

The

success of other governors in taking advantage of similar
opportunities determined to a large degree how peaceful
and profitable their administration would be.

93Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 236-7, Varga, "New York
Government," p. 3l.
9^Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 227, 235-6, 241.
9301son and Brown, Anglo-American Political Relations,
p. 97.

CHAPTER FIVE
BURNET AND MONTGOMERIE: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

After Governor Hunter surrendered to the Assembly's
demands for effective control of New York's finances in 1715,
his relations with the Assembly smoothed considerably.

His

supporters were not, however, in control of the Assembly, and
on August 11, 1715, Hunter dissolved the House and called for
new elections.^

He was apparently encouraged to take this

step by the success of Lewis Morris and Robert Livingston in
forging a disparate group of Hudson landowners into a polit2
ical coalition which was committed to supporting him.
The
ensuing campaign was hard fought,^ but the Morris-Livingston
league triumphed.

It was to dominate the Assembly for almost

^Patricia U. Bonami, A Factious People (New York, 1971) ,
p. 85, Appendix C [p. 302],
2

Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston 1654-1728 and the
Politics of Colonial New 7ork (Chapel Hill,
, IS'6lit ,
p. 284 (hereafter kobert Livingston).
^Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Eighteenth Century (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1958, reprint
of 191Z4-S edition) , II, 412 (hereafter Eighteenth) .
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ten years,

4

until Governor Burnet's political ineptness

destroyed the very fabric of the alliance that Morris,
Livingston and Hunter had created.
The victory of the pro-Hunter group quieted New York's
bitter political conflicts, and once it became clear that his
allies were firmly in control of the Assembly, Hunter appar
ently decided that he could leave New York without too great
a risk of a renewal of the political strife which had marked
the early years of his administration.^ He left for England
6
in July, 1719, and Peter Schuyler, the senior member of the
Council, took charge of the government.^

Schuyler was assog

ciated with the group which had opposed Hunter,
and encour9
aged by Adolph Philipse, he set about insuring that his
allies would profit from his administration.

As the acting

governor of New York, Schuyler had the authority to appoint
the mayors of the cities of Albany and New York, and when the

4
Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 284.
^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 87.
^New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative
to the Colonial History of the State of Newjfork, b. &.
O'Callaghan and BertKold F^ernow, editors (15 vols., Albany,
1861-1887), V, 529 (hereafter NYCD) .
7
Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 249.
0

Osgood, Eighteenth. II, 415-6.
9NYCD, V, 534.
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one year terms of Hunter's appointees expired, he replaced

them with his partisans.

Replacing officials with his friends

was, however, apparently not the only way in which he hoped to
change the political balance in New York.

It was widely

rumored that Schuyler intended to dissolve the Assembly, and
call for new elections which, he hoped, would result in his

allies taking control from the Morris-Livingston associa10
tion.
Naturally, Morris, Livingston and their friends were
disturbed at the possibility of being deprived of the politi
cal advantages they had worked so hard to obtain.
ported the ominous developments to Hunter.

They re

He described the

developments in the colony to the Board of Trade, and it
responded by forbidding Schuyler to make any changes in New
York's government.
While in London, Hunter had arranged to exchange offices
12
with comptroller of customs William Burnet,
who hoped to
recover his lost fortune in New York.

13

Hunter had briefed

^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 415-6.
^^Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 87-8, N Y C D , V, 535.
12

Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 250.

^ W i l l i a m Smith J r . , The History of the Province of New
York , Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols., Cambridge Mass., l!V72) ,
1, 166 (hereafter History) Burnet, like many other
Englishmen had been badly hurt financially by the collapse
of the South Sea Bubble.
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Burnet before the new governor left England,

14

so when Burnet

read his commission on September 8, 172015 he was better
acquainted with conditions in the colony than were most new
admins trators«
Since Burnet had learned about New York from Hunter, it
was not at all surprising that he had adopted the ex-governor's
political prejudices.

He decided to be guided by the advice

of Lewis Morris, Cadwallader Colden, James Alexander,^ and
17
18
Robert Livingston
who had all been close to Hunter.
The
decision was wise.

Lewis Morris managed the pro-governor

alliance in the Assembly and he had taken pains to maintain
its coherence and loyalty during the "interregnum".

He had

advised Surveyor General Cadwallader Colden to delay all land
grants to Assemblymen, thereby keeping the members dependent
19
and amenable to discipline,
and had cautioned Colden against

14Bonomi, Factious People, p. 88.
15NYCD, V, 572-3.
^Smith, History, I, 166.
17
Bonomi, Factious People, p. 87.
18NYCD, V, 576-80.
19
Beverly Me Anear, "Politics in Provincial New York,
1689-1761" (2 vols., unpublished Ph. D. dissertation Stanford
University, January, 1935) , I, 314-5 (hereafter "Politics").
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turning Assemblymen against the administration by disallowing
20
grants they had already obtained.
Consequently, when
Burnet arrived in New York his "friends" still controlled the
Assembly.
Their position was, however, not as strong as it had
been when Hunter left for England.

Schuyler had controlled

the executive for fourteen months, and consequently his asso
ciates had managed to improve their position at the expense
of the Morris-Livingston group.

Morris apparently felt his

allies would be defeated if an election were held, and con
sequently advised Burnet to ignore the custom which required
new Assembly elections at the start of an administration, and
to continue the sitting Assembly which was dominated by men
who were willing to cooperate with the governor.
21
accepted the suggestion.

Burnet

The Assemblymen, who were spared the expenses of an
election campaign and the risk of defeat,

22

repaid the gov23
ernor by being unusually amenable to his request.
The

20

New York Historical Society, The Cadwallader Colden
Papers, New York Historical Society Collections, 1917-1923,
l9V4-l93n r vols". ;~N~ew York,
T
104-5
(cited as Colden Papers).
21NY C D . V, 572-3.
22

Milton M. Klein, "Domocracy and Politics in Colonial
New York," New York History. XL, no. 3 (July, 1959), 228-31.

23Smith, History. I, 167.
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24

Assembly extended the colony's revenue for five years,

raised Governor Burnet's salary to b 1,560 (N.Y.), selected
25
Burnet's ally Robert Livingston as Speaker,
voted new
duties on imported goods to repay New York's debts,

26

and

unhesitatingly followed suggestions for other legislation.

27

Its loyalty even extended to expelling one of its members for
criticizing the Governor.

(Samuel Mulford, a representative

from Suffolk County, and a member of the opposition was so
incensed by Governor Burnet's refusal to dissolve the Assembly
that he refused to participate in its deliberations.

The

Assembly, which was dominated by members of the MorrisLivingston group which supported the governor, responded by
expelling Mulford.

This rather harsh reaction apparently

cowed the opposition in the Assembly.

28

)

Mulford's expulsion from the Assembly did not completely
eliminate opposition to Burnet's policies.

Several leaders

24NYCD, V, 601.
25

Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 417-8.

26

New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision,
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution
(5 vol's ” Albany . IW47V H T, 3T ‘(hereafter MYCt)T H e w - Y o rk
Historical Society, The Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 57.
27NYCD, V, 576-81.
28

Bonomi, Factious People, p. 89, Mulford was expelled
on October 26, 1726.
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of the opposition held seats on the Council and they utilized

its sessions as a forum in which to express their opposition
to Governor Burnet's tax on imports and his continuation of
29
the Assembly.
The Governor responded to some of these
attacks in a simple and effective way.

On November 26, 1720,

he asked the Board of Trade to remove Adolph Philipse, and
Peter Schuyler, the two leaders of the opposition, from the
Council.

His request was supported by New York's agent in

London, George Bampfield (who was the Board of Trade's
30
Secretary, William Popple's cousxn ) and by Robert
Livingston's son-in-law, Samuel Vetch, a London merchant.
Bampfield and Vetch were apparently effective advocates for
the Board acted on Burnet's request with unusual dispatch;
the two offending Councillors were removed on February 10,
1720/1

31

and replaced by Burnet's allies, Cadwallader Colden

and James Alexander.

32

The Governor did not, however, take such Draconian action
against George Clarke, the third opposition Councillor.
Apparently Burnet felt that the Board would not be willing

29

Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 47.

30
Lawrence H. Leder, "Robert Livingston: A New View of
New York Politics," New York History, XL, no. 4 (October,
1959) , 364.
31Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 257.

32
Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 89-90.
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to deprive Clarke (whose uncle, William Blathwayt,

33

had

served as the Secretary to the Board of Trade until his death
34
in 1717 ) of his seat, for he did not ask it to act against
Clarke.

Instead, he contented himself with removing Clarke
35
from his post as Clerk of the Circuits.
Clarke thereupon

abandoned his active opposition to the governor and so the
adminstration's antagonists were effectively, albeit terapor36
arily, silenced.
The addition of Lewis Morris J r . , Philip Livingston,
37
and William Provoost (Alexander's son-in-law ) to the
Council insured that it was as firmly committed to Burnet's
38
interest as the Assembly.
This placed the Governor and
his allies in the enviable position of having virtually un
challenged control of the colony's government.

Securing

political supremacy was useful to Burnet because, unlike
other governors of New York, he had a specific

program.

hoped to encourage the colony's growth, and to

expand its

33"Clarke, George," D.A.B.. IV, 151.
34"Blathwayt, William,” D.N.B., II, 668.
35Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I# p. 47.
JOBonomi, Factious People, p. 90.
3^Boncmi, Factious People, pp. 89-90.
38M c Anear, "Politics" I, 321.
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influence over the Indian nations.

39

Control over the Indian nations not already committed to
England could best be secured by encouraging them to become
dependent upon New Yorkers for the European goods they
desired.

The English colonists were not the Indians' only

source of manufactured products; the French colonists in
Canada, who were as anxious as the Englishmen to secure the
friendship of the Indians, were also more than willing to
supply them with manufactured goods.

Thus, eliminating

French competition in the Indian trade was a necessary pre
requisite to New Yorkers securing uncontested domination over
the Indian nations in the north.

Since New York merchants

supplied the French with the goods they used in their trade
with the Indians, eliminating competition would seem to have
been simple.

All the English had to do was to stop supplying

trade-goods to the French.

The Five Nations of the Iroquois

Confederacy, which were allied with New Yorkers, had asked
40
Governor Hunter to take this step,
but he had refused
because he feared the political consequences of cutting off
the trade with Canada.

Merchants in Albany and New York City

were deeply involved in the trade and they would have been
adversely affected by its elimination.

^Smith, History, 1 , 4 .

40
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Rather than give the
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merchants (who generally did not support him) further reason
to oppose his adminstration, Hunter allowed the trade in
Indian trade goods to continue.**
Lacking Hunter's political astuteness, Burnet decided to
42
destroy the Canadian trade on Indian goods,
but immediately
encountered opposition.

The Commissioners for Indian Affairs

(Albany merchants responsible for supervising the Indian
trade) objected to the Governor's proposal to close off the
trade with Canada which they felt would do them irreparable
damage.

Since no legislation affecting Indian affairs could

reasonably be submitted to the Assembly without the approval
43
of the Commissioners,
it was necessary to overcome their
unwillingness to sanction the governor's proposals.

Burnet

did so by replacing the recalcitrant Commissioners with men
who would not oppose him.**

The governor then presented

his plan to the Assembly which loyally passed it on
45
November 19, 1720.

■»onomi, Factious People, pp. 87-8, Leder, Robert
Livingston, p. 251.
42

Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 90-1.

43NYCD, IV, 177-8.
44
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Governor Burnet had managed to impose his will on the
merchants but his triumph sowed the seeds which were to
destroy the political calm that Hunter had so carefully
nurtured*

Callously disregarding the interests of the mer

chants of New York City and Albany, and circumventing the
authority of the Indian Commissioners, he had given a rather
large, influential section of the colony's political commun
ity reason to actively oppose h i m . T h e

opposition would

eventually triumph.
The Indian Trade Laws were not, however, the only cause
of the breakdown of the political alliance structure which
Hunter had so laboriously created.

Finances, which were the

pervasive and often festering issue in New York, also con
tributed.

Hunter had eliminated control of finances as an

issue only by surrendering to the Assembly.

In 1714 he rec

ognized the right of the Assembly to appoint a Treasurer for
the Colony.

The colonial official usurped the duties and

income of the Royal Auditor General, William Blathwayt, and
his deputy in New York, George Clarke, but both men apparent
ly accepted the change, and the accompanying loss of income,
philosophically.

When Blathwayt died in 1717, the post of

Auditor General was given to Horatio Walpole.

(Walpole, the

Prime Minister's brother, was not so sanguine and he set
about recovering the lost prerogatives of his position as
Auditor General.)

46M c Anear, "Politics," I, 331-3.
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In 1721, Walpole reminded Governor Burnet that the
accounts of the colony had to be transmitted to him for audit,
and ordered the colonial Treasurer to submit his accounts for
audit by Royal officials.

As might have been expected,

Abraham De Peyster, the Treasurer who had been appointed by
the Assembly, did not obey Walpole's order; instead, on
June 15, 1721 he turned it over to the Assembly.

Uhder the

leadership of Lewis Morris S r . , who apparently was more con
cerned with the interests of his fellow colonists than of his
patron, the Governor, the Assembly now drafted a memorial
which explained that the New Yorkers had not submitted their
records for audit because they were unable to afford the
auditor general's five per cent fee.

Although there is no

indication that Walpole believed the colonists' cries of
poverty, he did not permit himself to become involved in a
debate with the Assembly.

Instead, he secured an order from

the British Treasury (headed by his brother) which instructed
Governor Burnet to persuade the Assembly to recognize his
right to audit the colony's records and to receive the lawful
fee for his w o r k . ^
Burnet was obviously in a difficult position.

He could

not support the Assembly's refusal to allow Walpole to audit
the colony's books without making an extremely powerful enemy
in London, and he could not support his authority to conduct

47
Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 262-5.
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the audit without alienating the Assembly by denying one of
its most important privileges.

His sense of duty as a Royal

official, and Walpole's influence with those who had the power
to terminate Burnet's career in New York (and his hopes of
recouping his lost fortune), apparently combined to convince
the Governor to support the Auditor General's claims.
decision was not action.

But a

Burnet still faced the problem of

convincing the Assembly to surrender some of its authority
over finances by submitting to (and paying for) an audit of
the colony's books.
His task was complicated by the voters of Westchester
County.

In a by-election they had returned Adolph Philipse

(whom Burnet had removed from the Council) as one of their
Assemblymen.

His entry into the House on June 22, 1722

provided the opposition with a nucleus.

49

48

The strengthened

opposition, anxious to embarrass the governor, now combined
with members of the Governor's "alliance" to defeat a bill
appropriating funds to pay Walpole for auditing the colony's
50
accounts in the recent Assembly session.
However, the
Governor's defeat was only temporary.

Despite their

48
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49
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resistance to accepting Walpole's claims, Burnet's friends
in the Assembly were still willing to listen, and the gov
ernor was eventually able to convince them of the futility
of resisting the claims of the Auditor General.

On June 21,

1723, the Assembly voted h 1,600 to satisfy Walpole's claims
for auditing the colony's accounts.

51

Burnet had been faced with an extremely difficult posi
tion, and had handled it as well as possible.

He had man

aged to avoid a complete break with his supporters in the
Assembly, and had obtained the results demanded by the
authorities in London.

He had not, hcwever, been victor

ious; he had defended the prerogative against the interests
of the people of New York, and had convinced the Assembly
to abandon its defense of one of its most treasured prerog
atives.

His actions demonstrated to New Yorkers that de

spite the tranquillity achieved by Hunter, the interests of
the Governor and his subjects were not necessarily identical,
and that opposition to the executive might serve the colo
nists' interests.

They were encouraged to support candi

dates for office who opposed the Governor.

The opposition

grew rapidly in the next three years, 52 and Burnet's posi
tion in the colony deteriorated quickly.

5 ^Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 275-6.

52

In 1725, Burnet explained that the Assembly had turned
against him because he had supported Walpole's demands.
Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 287.
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The decline in Governor Burnet's influence was by no
means due solely to popular reaction to his handling of the
audit dispute.

His clumsy handling of a revenue issue which

developed contemporaneously with the dispute between the
Auditor General and the Assembly, had a much more direct ef
fect on the decline of his political fortunes.

Although

Burnet had "inherited" a revenue which would adequately
support the government tax collections in New York were
chronically deficient, and the colony was soon in debt.

By

1722 the deficit had reached b 1,700, and in May of that
year, Governor Burnet announced that he favored a land tax
which would discriminate against the owners of unoccupied
tracts, as the means of eliminating the deficit.

Burnet

apparently advocated the tax because it would help solve two
nagging problems simultaneously.

It would eliminate the

province's debt, and would help the colony to grow by en
couraging owners to reduce their tax burden by finding
tenants for their unoccupied lands.

Although the existence

of large tracts of unoccupied land was an endemic problem,
and although the discriminatory tax was a reasonable method
of encouraging landlords to find settlers for their lands,
Burnet was rather unwise to suggest the tax.

His support

came from an alliance of Hudson River landowners.

These

men possessed large areas of empty land, and were adversely
affected by the proposed tax.

It was unreasonable for the

Governor to expect his allies to vote against their own
interests.

Assembly Speaker Robert Livingston
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(who was close to Burnet)

attempted to dissuade him from

presenting the tax to the Assembly.

When he failed to do so,

Livingston led the fight against it.

As the Assembly was

dominated by landowners who would have been hurt by the tax,
Livingston's task was not difficult, and the tax was easily
defeated.

Governor Burnet's precipitate action in attempt

ing to force the Assembly to accept his land tax proposal
did not result in a complete breakdown of the Assembly asso
ciation which supported him, but the Livingston-Morris group
was weakened somewhat,

53

and the Governor's ability to in

fluence the Assembly, which was essential to govern New York
effectively, was consequently weakened also.
The debilitating effect of the Governor's actions was
mirrored by the growth of the opposition faction's influence
in the Assembly in 1723 and 1 7 2 4 . ^

In an effort to secure

the good will of the Assemblymen who were not supporting
him, Burnet had diverted some patronage to them, and support
ed legislation which they favored.

His concessions were,

however, insufficient to convince the opposition to ally
itself with his supporters in the Assembly.

55

The conces

sions weakened Burnet's hold over his "friends".

Every

office he gave to a member of the opposition was taken from

53

Leder, Robert Livingston, p. 265-7.
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^ M c Anear, "Politics," I, 322-4.

170
one of his allies in the Assembly, and as New York politi
cians were hungry for office, and extremely sensitive to
real or imagined slights, his attempt to woo the opposition
could only have hurt his position.
The vulnerability of Governor Burnet's position, which
had been unassailably strong in 1720, became apparent when
one of the Albany Assemblymen died in 1724.
announced their intention to see

Six candidates

the seat; four of them were

strongly opposed to the Governor's policies.

The prepon

derance of candidates opposed to the Governor simply re
flected the attitude of the voters of Albany.

Opinion was

so strongly opposed to the Governor that the Speaker's eld
est son, Philip Livingston, refused to run as an advocate of
the administration's policies.

He excused himself from the

race by claiming that service in the Assembly (which met in
New York City) would adversely affect his business, but he
probably avoided making the race because he did not wish to
be forced to endorse publically the Indian Trade Laws he
privately opposed, and because he did not feel he could win
the election.
This left Burnet's supporters with the problem of find
ing a candidate.

Eventually, Robert Livingston J r . , the

Speaker's youngest son, was convinced to represent the
Governor's allies in the election.

The governor did not,

however, endorse him, but endorsed David Van Dyck, whose

5^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 92.
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candidacy was sponsored by Councillor Francis Harison.
Predictably, Livingston and Van Dyck divided the voters who
still supported the Governor's policies, and so the election
went to Myndert Schuyler, an avowed, extreme opponent.
Burnet had contributed to Schuyler's victory by encouraging
his supporters to run two candidates.

He could have in

creased their chance of success if he had convinced either
Livingston or Van Dyck to withdraw, but apparently he made
no attempt to do so.

His apparently arbitrary decision to

support Van Dyck was especially unwise.

It alienated Philip

Livingston who had been a loyal supporter of the administra
tion in the opposition stronghold of A l b a n y . ^
The growing strength of the opposition, which was re
flected in the growing unwillingness of the Assembly to
support the Governor, became apparent in the summer

of 1725.

When illness prevented Speaker Robert Livingston from reach
ing New York in time for the opening of the Assembly's ses
sion, Adolph Philipse, a leading opponent of the Governor
58
was elected as speaker in hi3 place.
Governor Burnet's position, and his ability to influence
the Assembly, deteriorated further in the fall of 1725, when
Stephen DeLancey was elected to the Assembly by the voters
of New York City.

57
58

DeLancey had rarely agreed with the

Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 276-9.

Leder, Robert Livingston, pp. 282-3, Osgood,
Eighteenth, II, 425.
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Governor; he opposed Burnet's Indian Trade Policy, and the
two men had come into conflict again early in 1725 when
Burnet ruled that the Consistory of the French Church of
New York City, which included DeLancey, could not remove
Reverend Louis Rou from his post as minister of the church.

59

When DeLancey appeared before the Governor to take the oath
of office on September 13, Burnet declined to administer it,
60
and challenged DeLancey's citizenship.
The Governor's
action, which apparently was an attempt to usurp the
Assembly's right to determine the qualifications of its mem
bers, was incredible in light of the fact that DeLancey had
first served in the New York Assembly in 1702.^*

The Assembly

was naturally, (and predictably) offended by the Governor's
action.

It immediately responded by unanimously passing a
62
resolution condemning the Governor's action.
Burnet's
political advisors were appalled by his action, and urged
63
him to make amends as rapidly as possible.
He accepted

59
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their advice and swore DeLancey in on September 25,
the damage had been done.

64

but

A number of Assemblymen who had

previously been completely loyal to the governor were driven
into opposition by his blatant disregard of the House's
p r i v i l e g e s a n d DeLancey, (who had merely been Burnet's
opponent) was now transformed into an implacable and venge66
ful enemy.
The Assembly's negative reaction to Burnet's attempt
to exclude DeLancey was immediately apparent.

The Governor

had requested the Assembly to extend the colony's revenue
for five years in the August to November 1725 session.

The

angered Assembly demonstrated its increased distrust of the
Governor by voting to extend it for only two years.

Although

Burnet was not pleased by the Assembly's action, he did accept it.

67

He was not, however, willing to passively surren

der the influence he had exerted over the Assembly for so
long.

He attempted to restore his influence over the Assembly

by threatening to strip Assemblymen who stopped supporting
him of the "honors" he had given them.

The Assemblymen re

sisted the Governor's attempt at coercion.

For the first

64
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time in his administration, Burnet was faced with an
Assembly dominated by a group which opposed him.
When the House reassembled on August 6, 1726, the oppo
sition was finally in a position to obstruct effectively the
Governor's policies.

In addition to refusing to grant the

five year extension of the revenue (which Burnet had again
requested), the Assembly added insult to injury by reducing
the colony's budget.

6o

Some of the reductions were appar

ently politically motivated.

It seems likely that the

Assembly's decision to reduce the salary of Chief Justice
Lewis Morris, (who had also led Burnet's allies in the
Assembly)

from

£300 to

£250 per year, was politically

motivated.
Despite its attack on Morris, the Assembly was not
blindly opposed to the Governor.

Although it refused to im-

plenient a land tax which Burnet had proposed,

69

i cs action

should not be ascribed purely to political malice.

An

Assembly dominated by Burnet's supporters had defeated a
similar proposal in 1722, and so it is reasonable to assume
that the land tax was simply unacceptable to most members of
the Assembly.

The willingness of the House to cooperate with

the Governor was clearly demonstrated

by its decision to

6 8N Y C D , V, 775.
69
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renew the Indian Trade Acts.7**

Although unpopular with

many members of the dominant Philipse group, these were im
portant to the Governor.

Despite the Assembly's apparent

willingness to "do business” with him, Burnet decided that
he could not continue to deal with an Assembly dominated by
his opponents, and, on August 10, 1726 he dissolved it.7*
The Assembly election, the first in ten years, was a
triumph for opponents of the Governor. Every newly-elected
72
member was opposed to the Governor,
and Adolph Philipse
was again selected as Speaker.

The differences between the

Governor and the Majority of the Assembly had, however,
little effect on the session which began on September 27,
1726.

The Assembly concerned itself primarily with the

construction of a trading post at Oswego.

Because the

Assemblymen and the Governor agreed that it was a necessary
barrier to the French, they cooperated.

Perhaps the second

session of the Assembly would have been marred by conflicts
between the Governor and the Assembly, but it never met.
The death of King George I on August 21, 1727 dissolved the

70NYCD, V, 775.
7*Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 302], Me Anear,
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Assembly, and new elections were now necessary.

73

The membership of this new Assembly, although not
identical to its predecessors, was also dominated by oppon
ents of Governor Burnet, and Adolph Philipse was again
74
selected as Speaker.
The session began peacefully, but
before it ended the Governor and the Assembly were plunged
into the most acrimonious political dispute of Burnet's
administration.
The conflict centered around the Chancery Court, and
Burnet's exercise of his authority as Chancellor;75 it was
all the more severe because Chancery jurisdiction had long
been an area of contention between the Governor and the
Assembly in New York.

New Yorkers objected to the Chancery

Court because it had been created by the Crown, not by their
76
Assembly,
and because they feared the judicial authority
which the governor derived from his commission as Chancellor.
Specifically the New Yorkers feared the Chancellor's power

7^Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 426-8.
74

Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [pp. 303-4].

75Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 367-8.
75Lawrence, M. Friedman, A History of American Law
(New York, 1973), p. 47.
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to compel payment of quxt-rents

77

which were chronically in

arrears in the colony.
The colonists' objections to Chancery were not complete
ly selfish.

The Chancery Court was generally an inefficient

means of dispensing justice because the governor, who sat as
Chancellor, generally was not trained for the position, and
consequently had little inclination to attempt to conduct a
court.

Even when the governor felt competent to sit as

Chancellor, the Court could not function effectively.

The

Court could not function properly without subordinate officials to guide its operations.

78

Although there was provi

sion in New York for the appointment of a Master of Rolls
and Registrar in the Chancery Court, the office was vacant
79
from 1687 to 1774.
Proceedings in Chancery were, conse80
quently, bedeviled by long delays
which discouraged use of
the Court.
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The objections to Chancery jurisdiction in New York
were, however, not completely, or even primarily practical.
Chancery jurisdiction was closely associated with politics
in New York, and so objections to the Court were often tied
to the state of politics in the colony.

Although Lieutenant

Governor John Nanfan and Governor C o m b u r y had issued ord
inances establishing a Court of Chancery for non-political
reasons, the effective life of the Court was closely tied
to political considerations.

In 1711, David Provoost

(a political ally of Governor Hunter) had been imprisoned.
Although he was charged with debt, apparently the real
reason why Provoost had been incarcerated had been to pre81
vent him from attending the Assembly.
As Hunter had few
allies at that point in his administration, it was import
ant for him to secure Provoost's freedom.

He did so by

having the Council confirm that his instructions authorized
82
him to create a Chancery Court, to open the Court,
and to
exercise his authority as Chancellor (thus freeing his
83
friend.)
Having weathered the storm of protest which
accompanied the creation of the Court, Hunter had decided

8*Mc Anear, "Politics," I, 30 3.
82NYCD, V, 297-302.
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to continue it although he apparently was not an especially
active Chancellor.®4
William Burnet, on the other hand, enjoyed sitting as
Chancellor, and did so more than any other governor of New
York.

He apparently had carried out his duties rather well

despite his lack of legal training and his injudicious
85
habit of making quick decisions.
His fondness for exer
cising Chancery jurisdiction was one of the causes of the
political difficulties which Burnet experienced in the last
years of his administration.

The jurisdiction of the

Chancery Court included hearing cases relating to the collection of quxt-rents,

86

and because Burnet frequently sat

as Chancellor, he consequently often issued decrees compel
ling landowners to pay back taxes.

Naturally, the Hudson

River landowners (who were the backbone of the Governor's
political strength)

resented being compelled to pay their

taxes, and their resentment was reflected in the decline of
87
the Governor's influence in the Assembly.
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Increased resentment was, hcwever, not the only conse
quence of Burnet's penchant for acting as Chancellor.

In

1725, Adolph Philipse, the Speaker of the Assembly had
become involved in litigation involving recovery of quit88
rents and a land grant in the Chancery Court.
Although

the case had been argued earlier, Burnet did not complete
his judgment in the case (which was against Philipse) until
November 23, 1727.

Having learned of the order on

November 25, 1727, Philipse induced the Assembly, which was

almost universally unsympathetic to Chancery, to pass a
89
series of resolutions

attacking the Chancery Court.

The

Assembly's resolutions, which had been drafted by Colonel
Isaac Hicks of Queens County,

90

claimed that some New

Yorkers had been ruined by the Court, that other residents
had fled the colony to escape being bankrupt, that the
Chancery Court demanded excessive bail, and that the fees
for litigation in the Court of Chancery (which had been set
by Governor Burnet) were excessively high.

The Assembly

concluded that the Chancery Court had never been properly
established in New York, and that its judgments were,
therefore, illegal and of no force.

The Assembly

88
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resolution concluded by expressing the House's intention to
91
consider establishing a proper Chancery Court in New York.
This attack on the Chancery Court, and on his activities as
Chancellor, so angered Governor Burnet that he immediately
92
dissolved the Assembly.
The Council, dominated by members of the MorrisLivingston alliance which had been displaced in the Assembly,
now leapt to the Governor's defense.

It concluded that the

Assembly's resolutions were an unwarranted attack upon the
prerogative, which, if recognized, would only serve to de
prive the people of the Equity Court (an institution which
93
had long been considered a basic right of Englishmen).
It did not agree that the Chancery Court was imperfect, but
suggested a reduction in the fees charged by the Court.
Although considerably lower than those demanded by English
Chancery Courts, they were simply too high for the resources
94
of the people of New York.
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Burnet's anger was understandable, but his decision to
dissolve the Assembly over the politically explosive
Chancery issue was an error.

The Assembly's criticisms of

the Court apparently reflected the voters' sentiments.

The

election resulted in an Assembly more firmly dominated by
the opponents of the governor than its predecessor.

Even

Lewis Morris Sr., the leader of Burnet's supporters in the
Assembly, was defeated in his bid for re-election.

95

The new Assembly would have no conflicts with William
Burnet.

Its tranquillity was not due to a change of heart;

it was the result of King George II's accession.

The new

King wanted to reward those who had supported him in his
incessant quarrels with his father, and making room for his
special friends necessitated displacing some incumbents.
Burnet had the misfortune to hold an office coveted by one
of the men the new King wanted to reward.

John Montgomerie

had served as groom of the Bedchamber to the King before he
came to the throne, and as a mark of the King's "particular
esteem" Montgomerie was permitted to choose the position he
desired.

He selected the government of New York as the most

profitable, and least burdensome of the posts offered to
96
him.
Burnet was now unceremoniously transferred to
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Massachusetts Bay.

97

William Burnet had arrived in a colony which was polit
ically tranquil, and, by his continuous unwillingness
(or inability) to accept its political system,

had managed

to destroy the harmony which Hunter, Livingston, and Morris
had worked so hard to establish.

He had created a situation

which pitted the executive against the lower House of the
legislature, and thereby severely curtailed his ability to
govern effectively.

He could have avoided that unhappy

state of affairs (which the Historian William Smith suggest98
ed was responsible for his removal ) if he had only demon
strated more consideration for the sensibilities of New
Yorkers.

It was his repeated failure to recognize the

necessity for paying at least some attention to the needs
and desires of his allies which led to the collapse of his
support in the Assembly.

If he had recognized the need for

at least occasionally propitiating the opinion of his
"friends" in the Assembly, he probably could have preserved
his influence and effectiveness in New York.

While this

would, in all likelihood, not have prevented his removal,
it would have made the last years of his administration
more peaceful than they were.

^S mith, History, I, 186.
98
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The new Governor, John Montgomerie, arrived in New York
on April 15, 1728, and, unlike his predecessor apparently
arrived uncommitted to any particular group.

He began his

administration by conferring with Burnet, the members of
99
the Council, and the leading citizens of the colony.
It
seems reasonable to assume that the group he met with
included leaders of the group which had opposed Burnet in
the Assembly, and also George Clarke, a Councillor who was
100
to become his leading advisor.
As a result of the meet
ing, Montgomerie decided to dissolve the Assembly which had
been elected under Burnet.

He was apparently careful to

avoid any action which might offend his subjects.
This careful neutrality was to be the hallmark of
102
Montgomerie's administration.
His resolution of the
Chancery Court dispute (which had erupted at the end of
Burnet's term) illustrated this well.

The lower House,

which had opposed Burnet, was still energetically attacking
the Court, and the upper House, which had supported him,

99NYCD, V, 855-6.
*^°Varga, "New York Government," p. 35.
^^Smith, History, I, 188.
102

Colden Papers, I, 259-61, Me Anear, "Politics," I,
370-3. The pro-Burnet group, which had long been accustomed
to active support from the executive did not feel that
Montgomerie was neutral. Letters by Colden and Alexander
indicate they were convinced the governor was opposed to
them. See Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, pp. 71, 77, 93, 95,
for examples.
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was equally energetically defending it.

Neither side

appeared willing to allow the other the last word in the
conflict, and the two Houses of the colonial legislature
seemed to be on a collision course.

Montgomerie success

fully quenched the controversy by asking the Council to
refrain from publishing resolutions on the dispute until the
Assembly met.

It would be, he told the Councillors, unfair

for them to present their position while the Assembly, which
was not in session, could not respond.

The Councillors

wished to retain the Governor's good will and they complied
with his r e q u e s t . T h e hiatus thereby engendered allowed
tempers to cool, and Montgomerie's decision not to sit as
Chancellor terminated the conflict.

104

The elimination of the dispute over the Chancery Court
removed the single issue which the group that had supported
Governor Burnet might have been able to use as an election
issue.

Consequently, the group led by Philipse and

DeLancey dominated Montgomerie's first A s s e m b l y . T h e
Governor's scrupulous attention to colonial sensibilities
at the start of his administration indicated that he would
do all in his power to cooperate with the Assembly, and,

^^Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, pp. 101-3.
104Smith, History, I, 188.
* ^ M c Anear, "Politics," I, 369.
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indeed, his relations with the House were excellent.
Montgomerie was able to maintain good relations with
the Assembly because he was willing to accept its evalua
tion of the needs of the colony, and to act accordingly,
although he did not always agree with its judgment.

His

decision not to sit as Chancellor was not justified by
reference to the Assembly's criticism of the legitimacy of
the Court of Chancery, but by the claim that he lacked the
106
legal expertise necessary for conducting the Court.
This display of modesty enabled the Governor to protect
his prerogatives as Governor by avoiding the constitutional
issues raised by the debate over the Chancery Court without
angering the Assembly.

As practical politicians (not
107
theoreticians) the leaders of the Assembly
were pleased
by the governor's decision, which seemed to recognize the
justice of their arguments against the Equity Court.

They

showed their appreciation by granting Montgomerie the five
year revenue they had stubbornly denied Burnet.

10 8

He applied the same principle to his functions as the
intermediary between the Assembly and the British

10<*Smith, History, I, 188.
^Milton M. Klein, "New York in the American Colonies:
A New Look," New York History, LIII, no. 2 (April, 1972),
132-156, Henry tl. Mac Cracken, Prologue to Independence
(N.Y. , 1964) , p. 26.

10 8
Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 249.
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Government.

Unlike other governors who included their

personal evaluation of the "constitutionality" of some of
the bills they transmitted to London for examination,109
Montgomerie restricted himself to transmitting the act, with
an explanation of the reasons for its passage.

When the

Assembly passed An Act to prevent the taking or levying on
specialities more than the principle interest and cost of
suit and other purposes therein mentioned in the fall of
1730, Montgomerie took no position on the law which barred
plaintiffs and their attorneys from collecting more than
the principal, legal interest, and costs from defendants or
from bonds posted by defendants under penalty of double
damages and triple c o s t s . H e

simply informed the Board

of Trade that:
This Act took its rise as 1 am informed,
from some executions lately executed for the
full penalty of the Bonds, without any regard
to what is really due, in which case, I am told
the Defendant has no other remedy but in
Chancery, which being a tedious and expensive
way to obtain redress, it was thought proper
to pass this law, which will be a general bene
fit to all Defendants in the like cases and no
injury to Creditors, since their whole princ
ipal, interest and costs is preserved to them,
and left the decision in the hands of the Board, thereby

10^See, for example, NY CD. v, 416 [Hunter], 664
[Burnet].
110

NYCL, ch. 559

111NYCD, V, 905.
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freeing himself from any involvement in the Board's decision.
Whatever happened in London, Montgomerie's relations with
the Assembly would be unaffected.

From the pragmatic view

point of the colonists, he had endorsed the law.
Montgomerie's precautions were, however, unnecessary; he
died on July 1, 1731, before word of the English government's decision to disallow the law had reached New York.

112

The best example of Montgomerie's unwillingness to
offend the Assembly was probably the dispute over the salary
of Chief Justice Lewis Morris, which became serious in 1729.
Morris's salary as Chief Justice had been raised from h 250
to b 300 per annum in 1715.

When the "alliance" headed by

Adolph Philipse and Stephen DeLancey had obtained control of
the Assembly in 1726, it had attempted to "punish" Morris by
reducing his salary as Chief Justice.

The attempt was resis

ted by Governor Burnet, and was a b a n d o n e d . I n April,
1729,

114

after Montgomerie became Governor, the Philxpse-

DeLancey group again attempted to reduce Morris's salary to
115
h 250.
Montgomerie felt that accepting the Assembly's

112

Disallowance was recommended on May 27, 1731, Great
Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers,
Colonial Series, America and Wesi tncties,fr/.N. Sainsbury, and
others, editors (42 vols., London l§f>b-l963) , XXXVIII, 104-5,
114-5.
^^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 95.

114
NYCD, V, 877-82
*^5Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 429-31.
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decision to reduce the Chief Justice's salary would be an
excellent means of restoring the good relationship between
the Assembly and governor.

He apparently did not wish to

recognize the Assembly's right to determine salaries; a step
which might have grave political and constitutional implica
tions on his own.

Consequently, he asked the Council for

its opinion on the question and in June it advised him to
sign the warrants for the reduced s a l a r y . T h e

Chief

Justice's son, Lewis Morris Jr., who had been appointed to
the Council by Burnet, objected to the reduction of his
father's salary, and read a document which attacked the
Governor and Councillors Abraham Van Horne, and Rip Van Dam
in the Council meeting of June 13.

The Council was so dis

turbed by the severity of the attack (and by the younger
Morris's unwillingness to accept the Council's decision),
that it asked Governor Montgomerie to suspend him

118

despite

the fact that he had apologized for his intemperate words.
Lewis Morris Jr., was suspended from the Council on

116NYCD, V, 877-82.
117
118

119

Colden Papers, I, 274-7, 280-6.

NYCD, V, 877-82.

Colden Papers, I, 280-6.

119
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120

June 26, 1729,
and was replaced by Philip Van
121
122
Cortlandt,
a member of the Philipse-DeLancey group.
The appointment of Van Cortlandt to the Council indi
cated that the dispute with Morris had caused Montgomerie
to abandon his careful neutrality and turn more actively to
the Philipse-DeLancey group.

123

This change was, however,

not the product of a desire to became more actively involved
in politics; rather it was the result of Lewis Morris, Jr.'s
intemperate words.

He had bitterly attacked the members of

his father's group who had not supported his effort in the
Council to keep the salary of the Chief Justice at
per year.
125

Kennedy,

£300

James Alexander, Cadwallader Colden,12* Archibald
126
and Abraham Van Horne
were all so offended by

the younger Morris's attacks that they withdrew from the

12®NYCD, V, 877-82, Smith, History, I, 193 erroneously
reports Jan. 26, 1729 as the date of his suspension.
121
Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 314-5.
122

Me Anear, "Politics," I, 377.

123

Me Anear, "Politics," I, 377, Bonomi, Factious
People, p. 100.
12 4
Rutherfurd Collection, vol. I, p. 131.
125

"Kennedy, Archibald," D.A.B., X, 332, NYCD, V,

766-8.
126

Smith, History, I, 166.
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elder Morris's alliance.

It consequently became completely

impotent, 127 leaving Montgomerie with no option but to turn
to the Philipse-DeLancey group.
Montgomerie's efforts at retaining the good will and
cooperation of the Assembly were however, by no means re
stricted to recognizing it as the leading element in the
government of New York.

He recognized that Assemblymen,

like members of the House of Commons, in which he had
served,

12 8

regarded politics primarily as a source of in

come, and that political loyalty was, consequently, directly
related to the patronage distributed to supporters and their
families.

Although Montgomerie, like every other governor

of New York, had relatively little patronage at his disposal,
he utilized what little he possessed and secured the loyalty
of the leaders of the Assembly.

(When the death of James

Barbarie created a vacancy in the Council in the spring of
1728, the Governor nominated Mr. James DeLancey whose
"father is an Eminent Merchant, a member of the Assembly,
land] one of the richest men in the colony" to fill the
vacancy.

129

)

In June 1731, Montgomerie expressed gratitude

to Stephen DeLancey for his service to the administration

127

Me Anear, "Politics," I, 375-6.

^ 8Smith, History, I, 187.

129NYCD, V, 856-7.
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in the Assembly by nominating James (who had been confirmed
as a Councillor
Court.

130

) as second judge of the colony's Supreme

At the same time he rewarded Adolph Philipse for his

service in the Assembly by appointing his nephew Frederick
Philipse as the third judge of the Court.

It seems cer

tain tnat the two leaders of the Assembly could have felt
nothing but increased loyalty to Montgomerie for his
appointments.
Colonel John Montgomerie died at four in the morning
132
on July 1, 1731
after about thirty nine months in the
colony.

He had come to a province "...tired by the mutual

struggles of party rage," and, by the time of his death had
"extinguished the flames of contention," and insured that
New York's "public affairs flowed on in a peaceful, uninter133
rupted, stream.”
He had accomplished all this not by
overt political action, but by understanding, and adapting
himself to the complex nature of New York politics.
the appearance of being lazy,*34 even unprincipled*35

*3(*Bonomi, Factious People, p. 314.
131Varga, "Government and Politics," pp. 36-7.

132

Colden Papers. II, 23.

133
Smith, History. I, 187.
134
J Smith, History. I, 188.
135

Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," 22.

He gave

19 3
because he (or his principal advisor George Clarke) recog
nized that a governor of New York could not afford either
activity or principle.

Montgomerie apparently realized that

he had little actual power, and could hope to guide events
only by maintaining good relations with the Assembly leaders
who possessed real power; that he had to avoid taking stands
which might cost him their good will.
his efforts.

He was successful in

He retained the confidence of the colony's

political leaders, and his administration was one of the
few in the century which was spared the racking conflicts
between the Assembly and the governor which frequently
threatened to paralyze the government of New York.

Perhaps

the colony would have been better off if all its governors
had been cut from Montgomerie's quiet but effective mold.

CHAPTER SIX
COSBY AND CLARKE:

TWO TYPES OF MANAGEMENT

After the death of John Montgomerie on the night of
June 30, 1731 the government of New York devolved on Rip Van
Dam, the senior member of the provincial Council.^
York City merchant

A New

who had served on the Council since 1702,

Van Dam apparently regarded himself as a caretaker, for his
thirteen month administration was not marked by the quarrels
which almost inevitably developed when a governor attempted
to dominate the Assembly.^

The tranquillity of the admini

stration was the result of Van Dam's complete willingness
to accept the decisions of the Assembly, to use his influence
(such as it was) with the British government to promote

^ e w York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative
to the Colonial History of the State of New Y o r k , E.B,
6'Callaghan and &erthold Fewnow, editors (IS vols., Albany,
1861-1887), V, 921 (hereafter NYCD) .

2
Dixon Ryan Fox, Caleb Heathcote Gentleman Colonist
(New York, 1926) , p. 134.
^Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Eighteenth Century (4 vols,, Gloucester, Mass., 19b8, reprint
of 192 4-5 edition) , I I , 443 (hereafter Eighteenth) •
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policies which met the needs of the colony,4 and of his
unwillingness to offend colonial sensibilities.

The last

was best exemplified by his refusal to assume the Chancellor
ship, which effectively suspended the Court of Chancery
(made it impossible for Royal officials to sue for quitrents5) and undoubtedly gratified the people of New York
who were adamantly opposed to equity jurisdiction.
The quiescence of the Van Dam administration was dis
turbed by only one trifling dispute, and it was not related
to provincial politics.

The Instructions of the late gov

ernor had authorized the acting governor to collect half of
the salary and perquisites of the governor while the chief
executive was out of the colony.6
the acting governor.

Van Dam was certainly

Should he collect all the remuneration

of the governor, or restrict himself to half?^

He took the

problem to the Council; it advised him to collect the whole
Q

salary and all the perquisites of his post, and he did so.

4NYCD, V, 925-9, for example.
5N Y C D , V, 930-1.
6Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British
Colonial Governors 1670-1776 (2 vols.. New Vork,' IS67, reprint
ot 1935 edition) , pp. 282-3.
7

Joseph H. Smith and Leo Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity
in the Province of New York* The Cosby Controversy, 17321736," The American Journal of Legal History XVI, 1 (1972) ,
16-7 (hereatter "Courts of kquity*) .
g

William Smith Jr., The History of the Province of New
York, Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols•, Cambridge, Mass., 1572),
II, 5 (hereafter History).
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Such an idyll could not endure.

The British government

was continuously besieged by supplicants for office, and it
would not allow even a relatively unimportant post such as
the government of New York to remain vacant for long.

On

January 12, 1732, Colonel William Cosby was named Governor
9
of New York.
He assumed office in the Province in Early
August. 10
Cosby had been given the position for purely personal
reasons.

His wife was the Earl of Halifax's sister, and

the Duke of Newcastle's cousin.

Both men were not unnatur

ally interested in his career and used their influence to
keep him employed, despite his apparent lack of ability and
rumors that King George II disliked him intensely.

His

appointment was noteworthy only because Newcastle had never
before used "imperial" patronage for the benefit of his
family.

12

9NYCD. V, 930.
^Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (New York, Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1960), p. 38
(hereafter "New York Government").
**Stanley N. Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors,"
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, LI, 1 (January,
1967) , ll.
12

James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect" Colonial
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, New
Jersey, 1972) , p. 126 (hereafter ‘'Salutary Neglect").
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Although Cosby had never demonstrated any particular
political ability, he nonetheless had to make important
decisions soon after he arrived.

Like virtually every other

colonial governor, he possessed almost no information about
the land and people he was charged with governing.

If he

were to govern effectively, he would have to select an ad
visor, some one familiar with the personalities and issues
which were important in New York, some one to guide him
while he was engaged in the difficult task of organizing
his administration.
wise.

13

His choice of George Clarke was

Clarke apparently advised Cosby to follow

Montgomerie's example and to base his adminstration on co
operation with the leaders of the Assembly.

He quickly

established good relations with the leaders of the lower
14
House, Adolph Phxlipse and Stephen DeLancey,
which were
to endure until death ended the administration.
The Governor's choice of advisor and allies was not
universally applauded of course.

Lewis Morris Sr., James

Alexander, Cadwallader Colden and William Smith had hoped
that they would fill the places in the administration now
occupied by Clarke, Philipse, and DeLancey respectively.

13NYCD, V, 936-7.
•'•^Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People? Politics
and Society in Colonial New* Vork (hew York, i.9l7i) , p. T07
(hereafter Factious People).

19 8
Their hopes were born of a common connection with exgovernor Robert Hunter, and nurtured by a pressing need.
They had supported Hunter when he was in New York, and
apparently had expected Cosby to associate himself with
supporters of the former governor.

Their desires for office

were also fueled by their need for a powerful friend to sup
port their retaining title to "The Oblong," a tract of more
than 60,000 acres located in the northeastern corner of
m o d e m Dutchess County, New York which had been ceded to
New York by Connecticut at the end of a long border dispute.
The land was exceptionally valuable because it was near
populated parts of the colony.
developed.

Almost inevitably, a dispute

Francis Harison, a member of the Council, con

vinced the Duke of Chandos and other British investors to
seek a Royal patent for the land at the very same time that
the New Yorkers were attempting to obtain it by provincial
deed.

The English patent was issued in May, 1731, a month

before Montgomerie was to give Morris, Alexander, Colden,
and Smith title.

The value of the land made litigation

almost certain, and the likelihood of litigation made influ
ence important.

The New Yorkers had counted upon Cosby to

support their c a s e . ^

When they learned that Cosby had

accepted stock in the English Oblong company sponsored by

^Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), pp. 80-1.
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Harison,^ their disappointment was turned to anger by what
they viewed as a betrayal, and they begem opposing the
Governor in every way they could.
The intensity of their feelings was perhaps best illus
trated by the behavior of Cadwallader Colden.

Colden had

arrived in New York in 1718, had been named Surveyor General
because of Hunter's influence in L o n d o n a n d had become a
18
member of the Council during Burnet's administration.
He
had built a reputation as a strong, almost unyielding support19
er of the prerogative,
but he nonetheless now opposed Cosby
to protect his interests in the "Oblong."

Colden supported

his partners' attempts to embarrass the administration in
the Council and the Assembly,

20

and he attempted to undermine

the standing of the Governor in the capitol.

He not only

complained to Allured Popple, the Secretary of the Board of

^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 109.
17
Alice Mapelsden Keys, Cadwallader Colden, A Repre
sentative Eighteenth Century Official (New York, l9d6) ,
pp. 3,27.
18

x°Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix D, p. 314.
19Siegfried B. Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden Colonial
Politician and Imperial Statesman, 1718-1760" (Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1952),
pp. 50-5.
20

NYCD, VI, 26-7, New-York Historical Society, The
Cadwallader Colden Papers, New-York Historical Society
£ol lection s**i m - l ^ Y 'T O T - l T O * '(
ol s*.TTJew *YoirF , 191819ii3, lsJT) , II, 80-2 (hereafter Colden Papers).
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Trade, about Clinton's behavior, but even challenged the
propriety of hearing the dispute over the Oblong in the
21
Chancery Court in New York.
If Colden, the arch-defender
of the prerogative, was willing to attack a prerogative
Court to protect his interests, then the other partners,
who were much less firmly committed to supporting the author
ity of the Crown, must have been willing to go to almost any
lengths to protect their investment.

This vehemence may

explain why the opposition to Cosby was so bitter after it
became clear, in January 1732, that he would not support the
claims of the New York patentees.

22

Morris, Alexander, Colden, and Smith soon had an oppor
tunity to demonstrate their opposition to the Governor.
The Instructions which Cosby had brought to New York
included an article which authorized him to collect half of
the profits of the government from the date of his appointment,

23

and on November 14, 1732 he asked Van Dam, who as

we have seen, had collected the governor's full salary and
perquisites for his share.

24

At first, Van Dam flatly

refused to consider the request.

He then moderated his

2^Colden Papers, II, 114-5, 128-31.
22Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 109-11.
^Smith, History, II, 5.

24

Osgood, Eighteenth, II, 446.
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position and agreed to give Cosby half of the

£ 1,9 75 he

had collected after Cosby had been appointed, if the
Governor would divide the

£ 8,383 Van Dam claimed he had
25
collected in the same period.
Naturally the Governor
would not accept a "compromise" which would cost him over
£3,000.

He had to find some means of compelling Van Dam

to surrender the funds.
The obvious solution, a lawsuit, was fraught with dif
ficulties.

Van Dam was well known and popular.

If the

Governor brought his claims before a jury, it was possible
that the panel would rule for Van Dam.

Cosby therefore

could not use the civil courts to recover his claim.

Nor

could he avoid facing a jury by taking his case before an
equity court.

The only equity court in New York was the

Court of Chancery, and it was obviously impossible for Cosby
to bring his case to a court in which he was the judge.
Governor faced

The

a paradox, but he resolved it imaginatively.

He constituted the Supreme Court as a Court of
Exchequer which could hear the case without a jury.

More

over two of the judges of the "new" court, James DeLancey
and Frederick Philipse, were related to supporters of the
administration.

26

25

Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," p. 18
Smith, History reports the figures as fe 1,975 7 s 10 d,
and 4. 6,467 18 s 10 d respectively.

26Smith, History, II, 5-6.
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The solution played into the hands of the opposition.
The suit against Van Dam was not popular with New Yorkers
and when the Governor created a special, and seemingly prej
udiced court, the opposition was able to present Van Dam as
an innocent victim of arbitrary and tyrannical government.

27

The success of Morris and his associates in convincing
the populace that the Governor was wrong to press his case
against Van Dam did not, however, deter Cosby, and the case
came to trial in March, 1733.

Van Dam's defense, which was

conducted by James Alexander and William Smith Sr., who
were partners in the "Oblong," rested on the contention
that the court had no jurisdiction because it had been cre
ated improperly.

The court, as might have been expected,

ruled against the defense,

28

with Chief Justice Morris, who

had prepared his opinion before hearing the argument, dissenting.

29

The case was not heard, however.

Apparently,

Cosby decided that the outcry being generated by the case3**
outweighed the b 8,383 he hoped to recover.

He instructed

the Attorney General to drop the matter.3*

27

Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 110-11.

28
Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," pp. 21-7.

29

Bonomi, Factious People, p. 110.

^^Smith, History, II, 6-7.
O 1

Smith and Hershkowitz, "Courts of Equity," p. 31.
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But the end of litigation was by no means the end of
the dispute.

In May, 1733 Cosby removed Morris from the

bench on grounds that he had shown partiality, oppressed the
people, delayed justice, and attacked the prerogative by
32
opposing Cosby's decision to create an Exchequer Court.
Lewis Morris Sr. thus became the second "martyr" to the
Governor's tyranny.
Passive martyrdom was not, however, Morris's metier.
He was not content with presenting himself as another inno
cent victim of despotism.

The Chief Justiceship, the sec-

ond most powerful office in the colony,

33

and the last

vestige of his vanished political hegemony, was simply too
important to be surrendered.

He therefore responded to his

removal by redoubling his efforts to drive Cosby from the
colony, and to preserve his office and his remaining
34
influence.
He soon had an opportunity to strike back.
In October, 1733 Morris presented himself as a candi
date in the by-election held to fill a vacant Westchester
35
County Assembly seat.
The only issue was Morris's charge

32NYCD, V, 942-50.
33Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 144-5.
34Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 73.
35

B o n o m i, F a c t io u s P e o p l e , p .

114.
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of tyranny against the Governor.

Despite the efforts of the

Sheriff (a Cosby appointee) to influence the election by ex36
eluding Quaker voters who refused to qualify by oath,
Morris's "plight” had produced so much sympathy among the
37
voters that he was elected by a margin of 231 to 151.
His election embarrassed Cosby, and gave him an excellent
platform for further attacks on the administration.

38

The election had occurred at an opportune time.

Morris

and his friends had decided to found a newspaper to present
their views to the people, and, hopefully, speed the day
when popular opposition would force Governor Cosby either
to leave New York or to turn to them for support.

The first

edition of "their" newspaper, the New-York Weekly Journal,
was issued from the shop of John Peter Zenger, an obscure
printer, on November 5, 1733, just in time to report
Morris's triumphant arrival in New York City after his
election.

39

The Journal was eminently successful in fanning

the flames of opposition which had first been kindled by the

^^Smith, History, II, 7-8.
■*7Bonomi, Factious People, p. 115.
38

Beverly McAnear, "Politics in Provincial New York,
1689-1761" (2 vols., Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation Stanford
University, January, 1935), I, 410-2 (hereafter "Politics").

39
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Van Dam affair.

By the middle of December, the wife of one

of the leading Jewish merchants of the city (who was not
tied to either faction) commented that the Governor was so
disliked that it would be impossible for him to regain the
40
affection of the populace.
Cosby, however, seemed completely undisturbed by his
unpopularity; on occasion he even seemed to court it.

A

good example of his apparent disdain for public opinion had
been his handling of the dispute involving the Albany
"flatts".

The Mohawk Indians had deeded a 1,200 acre tract

of land to the city in 1730 to be held in trust for them.
In the summer of 1734, the tribe complained that the city
had violated the terms of its gift.
marily.

Cosby responded sum

He recovered the deed and burned it, angering the

Albany merchants who were encouraged to join the opposition.
Similarly, the Governor's decision late in the year to de
prive an Assemblyman and his supporters of office, because
the Assemblyman had criticized Cosby's favorite also
encouraged the growth of the opposition.

41

Such actions had served to heighten distrust of the
administration in all parts of the colony and, in all

Abigail Franks, The Lee Max Friedman Collection of
American Jewish Colonial Correspondence: Letters o£ the
Franks Family (1733-1748) , !Leo Hershkowitz and Isidor S.
Meyer, eds., Studies m American Jewish History, 5
(Waltham, Mass., 19B B) , pp. J.7-B (hereafter Letters).
4 *B o n o m i, F a c t io u s P e o p le , pp.
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likelihood, contributed to the victory of Morris and his
allies in the New York City elections of October, 1734*
There had been no specific issue in the municipal election.
The Morris group simply utilized the general distrust of the
administration by charging the Governor and his cronies with
42
dishonesty and corruption.
The ploy was successful. Hie
supporters of Morris swept all but one of the Governor's
43
allies from office.
Hie campaign was also the immediate
cause of one of the most publicized trials of the colonial
period.
Since the New-York Weekly Journal had been founded to
bedevil Governor Cosby, it had vigorously attacked the
Governor and his friends from its very first edition.

Nat

urally Cosby was disturbed, and in January, 1734 unsuccess
fully attempted to secure an indictment against Zenger from
the New York County Grand Jury.

The election campaign later

in the year encouraged the Journal to attack the Governor
even more harshly, and those attacks led the Governor to
return again to the Grand Jury in October.

It again re

fused to act, so Cosby took his grievance to the Assembly.
It too refused to act.

The Governor then turned to the

Council which did indict Zenger for publishing seditious

42M c Anear, "Politics," I, 423-5.
43

B o n o m i, F a c t io u s P e o p le , p .

121.
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libels in three editions of the Journal, and in two separ
ately published ballads.

Zenger was arrested on

November 17, and languished in jail until the case came to
44
trial in August, 1734.
The principals in the case (with the obvious exception
of Zenger himself) were not interested in his fate, nor in
"constitutional principals."

They were practicing, prag

matic politicians with a direct, immediate interest.

If

Zenger were convicted, his newspaper would, perforce, cease
publication, and the opposition would be deprived of its
most effective propaganda organ; without a means of commun
icating with the people, Cosby's opponents would find their
45
political effectiveness greatly reduced.
If, on the
other hand, Zenger was acquitted, the "voice" of the oppo
sition would be safe.

Zenger was freed, and his acquittal

was the issue which enabled the Morris group to carry the
1735 New York City election,*®
Success in municipal elections, however gratifying,
did not affect the balance of power in the colony, or bring
the opposition appreciably closer to its goal of forcing
Cosby either to leave or to come to terms.

Morris and his

44
New-York Weekly Journal, November 25, 1734, Bonomi,
Factious People, pp. 116-7.
45
Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 77.
46

V a r g a , "New Y o rk G o v e rn m e n t,"

p.

43
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friends therefore decided to carry their fight against Cosby
to London where it might be more successful.

47

Their first effort to undermine the standing of the ad
ministration failed.

They had encouraged Rip Van Dam, when

in December, he filed a complaint which charged the Governor
with thirty-four separate counts of maladministration and
A

misadministration,

Q

but James Alexander was the only

Councillor who supported the charges

49

and the Board of

Trade took no action on Van Dam's complaints.
This failure, and the inability of Morris's "friends"
in London to secure the removal of the Governor,5** apparently
convinced the New Yorkers that their only hope was in making
a direct presentation of their grievances to the Privy
Council.

As Lewis Morris was the most directly aggrieved of

the Oblong patentees, he was selected to go to London, and
on Saturday, November 23, 1735 he left for England accompan
ied by his son, Robert Hunter Morris.5^-

47Smith, History, II, 17.
48NYCD, V, 979-85.
NYCD, VI, 6, Colden was not, at that time, actively
participating in the business of the Council.
50Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 96-8.
^ ^ N e w -Y o rk W e e k ly J o u r n a l , N o v .

25,

1735.
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Although the ostensible goal of Morris's voyage was his
reinstatement as Chief Justice of New York, it certainly was
not the only (or perhaps even the primary) goal of the trip.
Morris and his allies wanted the British government to in
struct Cosby to call Assembly elections, to remove Francis
Harison (the partner of the Governor in the English Oblong
company), and Daniel Horsmanden from office, to appoint oppo
sition leaders William Smith and Peter Schuyler to the
Council, and to refrain from attempting to influence colon
ial politics.

The New Yorkers hoped that the Board of

Trade would reduce the authority of the Governor by order
ing him to accept all colonial legislation regarding the es
tablishment of courts, the procedures of the Assembly and
Council, and to issue the cities of Albany and New York new
charters to replace the extant system of appointment of mun
icipal officials by the Governor with an elective system, and
to refrain from sitting with the Council when it was acting
in a legislative capacity.

They even wanted the Privy

Council to order Cosby to appear in court to answer the
counter-suit Van Dam had initiated in their salary dispute.
The opposition realized that it could not hope to suc
ceed if it could not demonstrate considerable popular
53
support;
therefore it organized a petition drive and

52
New-York Historical Society, The Rutherford
Collection, vol. II, p. 75.
53
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secured the pledge of about 300 New Yorkers to support its
demands.

54

Unfortunately for the New Yorkers a petition did

not carry much weight in London.

Colonial policy was form

ulated to meet the needs of the complex network of personal
and political relationships which dominated the English
political system, and influencing it required powerful
friends.
in-law.

Morris's only connections in London were his sonsHis eldest daughter, Mary, had married Vincent

Pease, whose brother, Thomas, was connected to the ambitious,
but ineffectual, George Bubb Doddington.

(Thomas was, how

ever, probably also a minor protege of Robert Walpole, and
he may have been able to introduce Morris to some of the
more powerful figures in the government.)

Matthew Norris,

the husband of Morris's second daughter, Eupemia, was some
what better connected.

His father, Sir John Norris, was

Admiral of the White and the Commander in Chief of the Navy,
and although Sir John had little real influence, having
quarreled with Walpole, he enabled Morris to contact members
of the aristocracy who would otherwise have been inaccess... 55
xb le.
Access was, however, not influence, and at the beginning
of his stay in London, Morris was depressed by the lack of

^Rutherford Collection, vol. II, p. 75.
55Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 102-3.
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concern shown for his mission.

He wrote his friend and ally,

James Alexander:
...We have a parliament and ministry, some
of whom I am apt to believe, know there are
plantations and governors — but not quite so
well as we do; like the frogs in the fable,
the mad pranks of a plantation governor is
sport to them, though death to us, and seem
less concerned in our contests them we are at
those between crows and kingbirds.5®
Eventually, access did lead to sane influence.

Morris

became acquainted with Sir Charles Wager, a naval officer
who had abandoned the sea for politics, and, for reasons
which remain rather obscure, Wager supported Morris's com
plaint when it came before the Privy Council in November,

Despite his distance from London, Cosby, who (unlike
some other governors) had the good fortune to be closely
tied to men who were willing to support him, was in a much
stronger position.

He and his American allies were well

represented by powerful men in the capitol.

In addition to

the Dukes of Newcastle and Halifax, there was another power
ful figure supporting the administration.

Stephen

DeLancey's son, James, had married Anne Heathcote whose

Lewis Morris, The Papers of Lewis Morris Governor of
the Province of New Jersey from 1^36 to 1746. Wew Jersey
Historical Society Collections IV, 1852 (Newark, New Jersey,
1852) , p. 23 (hereafter korrls Papers).
57
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cousin, Sir John Heathcote, Baronet, was one of Walpole's
managers for the County of Rutland, a figure of some impor
tance in the ministry.

Although Heathcote did not partici

pate actively in the dispute, he apparently did watch devel
opments, and presumably would have intervened if Newcastle
Cp
and Halifax required assistance.
Intervention was unnecessary as Newcastle was able to
protect the administration.

The Duke began by attempting

to convince Morris to abandon his complaint.

On November 4,

1735, he offered Morris the government of New Jersey, Which
had recently been separated from New York, as compensation
for the Chief Justiceship of New York.
offer,

59

Morris refused this

perhaps because he expected to triumph in the

Privy Council, perhaps because he doubted Newcastle's will
ingness to keep the bargain, or perhaps because he felt
that such a blatant surrender of principle would prejudice
his political position at home.
before the Privy Council.

60

The case then went

On November 8, 1735, after con

sidering Morris's complaints at two m e e t i n g s , t h e Council

^®Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 111-3.
59

Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 131-2.

®°Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 129-31, Bonomi,
Factious People, pp. 1^1-2.
61K a t z , N e w c a s t le 's New Y o r k , p p .

1 1 0 , 1 1 3 -9 .

213
ruled that Cosby had, indeed, dismissed Morris improperly,

62

but it said nothing else; it did not even recommend rein
statement.

Morris had won a moral victory, and the justice

of his position had been officially recognized, but Newcastle
and Cosby had won a practical victory.

The position of the

Governor was secured, and his power undiminished.

The Privy

Council had ignored all of the reforms which Morris had re
quested.

Morris had seemingly gained nothing from his trip.

Wager was able to salvage something from the situation.
Newcastle was interested in preserving the status quo in
New York, and Morris had demonstrated an ability to make a
nuisance of himself, so Morris still had a bargaining point.
In January, 1736, Newcastle and Wager and Morris reopened
negotiations, and in February, Newcastle again offered to
secure the government of New Jersey for Morris if he would
drop all his charges against Cosby.

The New Yorker now

accepted his offer, but Newcastle promptly forgot the mat
ter, and made no effort to bring the nomination before the
63
Board of Trade.
The apparent disinclination of the Duke to redeem his
promise did not stymy Wager.

He turned from Newcastle to

Horace Walpole (also an important figure in the ministry)

62NYCD, VI, 36-7.

®2Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 129-31.
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to secure the New Jersey governorship for Morris.

Walpole

intervened because he hoped to reduce Newcastle's power by
64
depriving him of some colonial patronage.
Walpole and
Wager were able to bring the nomination before the Privy
Council in March, 1738, and their combined influence was
sufficient to secure the New Jersey government for Morris
without Newcastle's consent.6^
So the Morris mission to London now had limited suc
cess.

Morris had indeed been given a promotion, but he

could not accept it without abandoning New York and the
struggle against Cosby.

Nor had the opposition's hopes that

Morris's activities would encourage resistance to the Govern
or been realized.

Although the New Yorkers who were involved

in politics considered every development in the unfolding
drama significant,^ other people seem to have considered
the whole matter somewhat tedious, and the opponents of the
Governor self-centered.

Abigail Franks commented that

"...party rage has been Carryed on with Such Violence that
for my part I hate to hear it mentioned[,] if the Governor
had had his fault the other side have not bin without their
* •,•
»67
failings."

®*Henretta, "Salutary Neglect," chapter 4, part 2.
65Henretta, "Salutary Neglect." pp. 190-1.
^ Colden Papers, II, 119-20, Rutgers University Library,
Morris thoberi) Papers, Box 3, Elizabeth Morris to Robert
Hunter Morris, Oct. 25, 1735, for example.

67
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The opponents of the Governor had done their best; they
had carried their case to London and won some concessions;
but despite their best efforts, William Cosby was still gov
erning New York, and still supporting the Oblong company
sponsored by the Duke of Chandos.
failure was apparent.

The reason for their

The colonists could effectively em

barrass a governor only if they could disrupt the function
ing of his government.

This required control of the Assembly,

where Cosby was always careful never to allow the opposition
to develop influence.

Despite his apparent unconcern with

colonial opinion, he was always careful to maintain the most
cordial relations with the leaders of the Assembly.

He was

also sagacious enough to avoid dissolving that body, thereby
avoiding elections which might have cost his friends control
of the House.

He preserved his good relations with the mem

bers of the Assembly by rewarding their loyalty with the
offices he had at his disposal.
Governor Cosby was equally punctilious in his dealings
with the Council, appointing only his friends to that body,
and rewarding their loyalty.

68

He never gave his opponents

an opportunity to seize the power needed to make his admin
istration

uncomfortable.

Cosby may have realized the importance of the Assembly
to his administration while he was still in England, for he
joined the agents of the Assembly in lobbying against the

68

Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 79, 87-9.
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Sugar Act,

69 thereby establishing a claim upon the good-will

of the New York Assembly.

He reinforced that good-will soon

after arriving in the colony, by establishing cordial rela
tions with DeLancey and Philipse, the leaders of the House.
His efforts were rewarded amply.

The Assembly was almost

fulsome in its praise of the new Governor in its address of
welcome,70 and generous in its support.
year revenue, a salary of

£1,560,

It gave him a five

£400 for fuel and can

dles for the fort, £ 150 for the expenses attendant on his
voyages to Albany, and a gift of
opposing the Sugar Act.

£750 for his efforts in

When he complained that

£750 was

an insufficient reward for his services as lobbyist, the
Assembly, guided by DeLancey and Philipse, obligingly raised
the gratuity to

£ 1,000.7*

The Governor had certainly made

good friends.
Their importance is well illustrated by the frustrating
experiences of Lewis Morris and his son.

Returned to the

Assembly by the electors of Westchester, they had hoped to
use their seats as a rallying point for opposition to the
Governor.

69

They introduced many bills intended to embarrass

Smith, History, II, 3.

70Jo u m a l of the Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the dolony o£ Sew Vork, 1691 - 1 5
vols.,
New York, 1904, reprint of 1764-1766'edition)',
634-6,
August 12, 1732 (hereafter Ass. Journal).

71Smith, History, II, 3,6.
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the administration, but only one, an act condemning the
Chancery Court (introduced by Lewis Morris Jr. in 1735, while
his father was in London) had become law.

The friends of the
72
Governor loyally defeated all the other opposition bills.
Cosby, DeLancey, and Philipse did not, however, allow

their control of the legislature to lull them into compla
cency or into neglecting the needs of the colony.

The

Assembly devoted itself to "bread and butter" issues, and the
Governor regularly approved its decisions.

For example, when

the Assembly met in April, 1734, the economy was stagnant,
and trade declining. 73
ing speech to the House.

Cosby faced the problem in his open
He proposed legislation creating

jobs for the unemployed by embarking on a program of improv
ing the colony's fortifications, and for encouraging the
flour trade and shipping. The Assembly thanked the Governor
74
75
for his suggestions,
and enacted them into law.
This
responsiveness was politically advantageous.

The opposition

could not gain popular sympathy by emphasizing the adminis
tration's neglect of the needs of the people.

72
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Nor did the Governor and his allies permit their oppon
ents to benefit from "popular issues."

DeLancey and Philipse

did not follow their personal inclination to oppose bills
which embodied issues the opposition had popularized; they
took the lead in passing them.

They gained status by sup-

porting a triennial act, a bill to regulate lawyers, and a
bill to select jurors by ballot in the April, 1734
Assembly,^® and resolutions demanding dissolution in later
meetings.

77

The Governor, for his part, did not treat these

bills as attacks on his authority or as reasons to disasso
ciate himself from DeLancey and Philipse.

He apparently

recognized that they had to support such legislation if they
were to maintain control of their followers, and that con
tinued discipline was essential to the long term interests
of the administration.

He, therefore, simply killed these,
78
and other bills which were unacceptable.
Such refusal to
accept popular legislation may have contributed to a certain

unpopularity, but as long as his allies controlled the
Assembly, the Governor had no need for the affection of the
people.
These actions also disturbed some Assemblymen, and as
this was to be avoided at all costs, Cosby followed George

76

Ass. Jour., I, 660.

77
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Clarke's advice and adopted a more conciliatory attitude 79
and embarked on an "image building" program.

He had the

justices of the Supreme Court (who were closely related to
the leaders of the Assembly) seek support for the Governor
as they traveled the judicial circuit, and he personally
solicited the backing of the Assemblymen from the districts
he passed through on his way to an Indian meeting at
80
Albany.
His efforts must have been successful, for the
Assembly remained cooperative until the end of the admini81
stratxon in 1736.
The willingness of Governor Cosby to accept the
Assembly's occasional refusal to support him is a further
indication that he recognized that the maintenance of the
DeLancey-Philipse coalition was more important than any
other single issue.

When the Assembly refused to act on his

request that it indict Zenger,

82

who had been such a painful

thorn in the side of the administration, Cosby did not at
tempt to coerce the Assembly, or to engage in recrimination.
He accepted its decision, and went on to other matters.

79
80
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Cosby was also enough of a politician to recognize that
the judicious control of public funds and offices could bol
ster the administration, and so he cooperated when the
Assembly proposed legislation directed at that end.

In

November, 1734, for example, he signed an act extending the
militia bill which continued his control over the appointment of militia officers,
h

12,000

83

and a bill which emitted

in paper currency to be spent on improving the
OA

defenses of Albany.

Approving the paper currency was a

violation of his instructions, but he apparently considered
the creation of a large fund which could be used to purchase
the political support of the working-men of Albany suffiDC

cient cause for ignoring the wishes of the home government.
The Governor had arrived in New York a political novice, but
he had learned his lessons well.
Thus, despite all of the furor created by opponents,
William Cosby's administration was unusually successful.

He

had established good relations with the Assembly at the be
ginning of his term, and he maintained them until his death.
There was never a crisis; the government of New York func
tioned smoothly, and responded to the needs of the colony.

88New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision,
The Colonial Laws of New York from 1664 to the Revolution
(S voIs., Albany, N.Y., l6£4) , i t , 856 (hereafter NYCL)T~~
84 NYCL,

II, 892-902.

85Smith, History, II, 16-7.
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Few other administrations could make the same claim.
Of course the Governor's success with the Assembly did
not lead to complete serenity.

At the end of his adminis

tration he removed Rip Van Dam, the senior Councillor
86
(and an initial oppenent) from office,
but he had not re
ceived confirmation of his action from London when he became
terminally ill in December, 1735.

87

When Governor William Cosby died on March 10, 1736, the
expected dispute between the suspended senior Councillor,
Van Dam, and his successor George Clarke as to who would
serve as "acting governor" until the arrival of Cosby's successor developed almost immediately.

88

.

Clarke took the ini

tiative and, as eldest Councillor, called a meeting of that
body.

After being assured that Van Dam had been properly

suspended by Cosby, the Council (with James Alexander dis
senting) authorized Clarke to take the oaths of office as
89
President of the Council and acting governor.
Who was this Councillor George Clarke who had so art
fully taken control of the government of the colony?

86 NYCD,

87
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88 NYCD,

89
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Osgood, Eighteenth, III, 465.
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had lived in New York since 1702, and had held public office
throughout his mature life.

He had never become involved in

colonial politics, but had secured office through the inter
vention of English patrons, and so could not be removed by
90
colonial action.
Nor would the English government decide
to replace him; his patrons were too powerful.

He had re

ceived his first appointments through the influence of am
uncle. William Blathwayt, who was Secretary of the Board of
Trade.

When Blathwayt died in 1717. Clarke had the good

fortune to come under the protection of Horatio Walpole.
Walpole had succeeded Blathwayt as Auditor General, and. as
Clarke was deputy Auditor General in New York, a connection
developed between the two men.

His ties to Horatio Walpole

brought Clarke to the attention of Sir Robert Walpole who
also took him under his wing.

This association with Sir

Robert in its turn brought Clarke into the orbit of the Duke
of Newcastle, and Clarke astutely cultivated his connection
with Newcastle by means of a steady stream of correspond91
ence.
Since his position was independent of the colonial
political system, and strongly defended in Britain. Clarke
was in the enviable position of being able to pursue his
goals without interference.

90

His objectives, like those of

Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 141.

^^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 142.
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many of his contemporaries, was to build as large a personal
fortune as possible, and the death of Governor Cosby gave
92
him his opportunity.
Van Dam, and his allies, the men who had opposed Cosby,
were, however, not satisfied with the decision of the
Council, and they attempted to take control of the govern
ment from Clarke.

They began their efforts in the Assembly

when it returned, in April, from the adjournment engendered
by the death of the Governor.

Lewis Morris Jr. read a

speech protesting Van Dam's suspension from the Council to
the House, and he urged the members to subscribe to a peti
tion supporting the ousted Councillor.

Although none of

the Assemblymen signed Morris's petition,

93

it did create so

much confusion in the House that Clarke decided an adjoumment was advisable.

q

4

Apparently the actmg-governor did

not want to give Morris theopportunity

to continue present

ing his ideas to his colleagues; therewas

thepossibility

that Morris could convince them that Van Dam was the legit
imate head of the government, and that would have created a
serious challenge to Clarke's authority.

The adjournment

was, however, advantageous to Clarke only when contrasted
with the grave risks he ran by continuing the session.

9 2 Smith,

9 3 NYCD,

History, II, 28-30.
VI,

52-3.
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The prorogation of the Assembly prevented any action on the
revenue and payment of the debts of the colony and so it
created almost as many problems for the Council President as
95
the sessxon might have.
When the New York Assembly gathered on September 14,
1736 the members who supported Van Dam, although still in a
minority, were able to dominate the meeting, and refused to
allow Speaker Adolph Philipse to take the chair.

Lewis

Morris Jr. took advantage of the situation to raise again
the question of Van Dara!s suspension.

Although the pro-

Clarke majority was able to assert itself after a few days,
matters were so confused that the House asked to be adjourned
96
to the middle of October. Clarke granted their request.
The decision to adjourn the Assembly was undoubtedly a
wise one, for the month to follow was one of the most con
fused in the history of the province of New York.
On the very day of the adjournment, word of Lewis
Morris Sr.'s arrival in Boston from England reached New York,
and his followers reported that he carried word of Van Dam's
reinstatement.

Naturally this news led to a rapid upsurge

in Van Dam's popularity, and consequently a pro-Van Dam
slate carried the New York City elections held on September
29.

The Aldermen and magistrates of the City now recognized

9 5 NYCD,

VI, 62-3.

9 6 NYCD,

VI, 74.
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Van Dam as the legal head of the government, and Van Dam
responded by exercising his newly recognized authority to
appoint the mayor and other municipal officials of New York,
On October 1, Clarke responded by issuing a proclama
tion forbidding Van Dam's nominees to take office.
colony seemed on the verge of civil war.

The

The Council, which

supported Clarke, was preparing for the worst.

On October 5,

it authorized the strengthening of the garrison of Fort
George and the purchase of additional gunpowder.

Clarke

apparently agreed that violence was likely, for he moved his
family to the relative security of the fort.
On October 9, Lewis Morris Sr. arrived in the city.

He

received a tumultuous welcome from his supporters, but he
said nothing about Van Dam's status.

Three days later, the

Assembly reconvened and addressed itself to the pressing
issue.

Morris was generally assumed to have relevant infor

mation, and he played a key role in the discussion.
words were, however, curiously anti-climactic.

His

He claimed

to have no knowledge of the disposition of Van Dam's case,
or of Clarke's status with the British government.

The

debate then moved to the general question of the legality
of Clarke's government, and the "acting-governor" adjourned
the Assembly for a day.

The expectations of a resolution

of the conflict raised by Morris's arrival had been dashed,
and the colony seemed closer than ever to civil conflict.
Then, on October 13, almost at the last minute, the
Brig Endeavour arrived in New York with mail from London.

I
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Among the letters was an Instruction from the Board of Trade
addressed to "George Clarke, Esq., President of the Council
and Commander in Chief in New York," informing him of modi
fications in the prayer for the Royal family.

The will of

the British government was thus made known, the danger of
civil war was averted, Clarke's position was secured, and
97
the opposition was completely demoralized.
When the Assembly met on October 14, the situation was
radically changed.

Clarke no longer faced the threat of

internal warfare; his only problem now was the establish
ment of good relations with the Assembly in the hope that it
would extend the revenue and provide funds to pay the debts
of the colony.

98

He adopted the methods Cosby had successfully used in
dealing with the House.

He demonstrated his willingness to

agree to the reasonable demands of the House by promising
not to sit with the Council when it was acting as a legisla
tive body, and showed his grasp of the political needs of
the Assemblymen by suggesting the construction of a fort on
the Mohawk River.

The fort improved the defenses of the

colony, provided jobs for mechanics, and created a pool of
patronage which could be distributed by the administration.
Unfortunately, despite Clarke's willingness to cooperate,

97NYCD, VI, 82-8, Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 136
8, Smith, History, II, 27.
9^NYCD. VI, 65-6.
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and the improvement in his status caused by the receipt of
his commission as Lieutenant Governor, the Assembly would
not give him what he most wanted, an extension of the revenue.

The session ended m

November, 1736.

99

Since Clarke could not hope to realize his own basic
objective, profit, if the revenue was not extended, he de
voted considerable attention and all his political sophis
tication to the matter of convincing the Assembly to do as
he wished.

Good will had not been successful, so he decided

to attempt "political blackmail."

In 1714 and 1717, the

Assembly had issued large quantities of paper money, and
instituted an excise tax to sink the bills.

The revenue

from the excise had, however, been lower than expected, and
so, although the tax was scheduled to expire in 1739, there
was still about £ 20,000 in bills in circulation.

If the

excise was not extended, the people would find themselves
burdened with a hugh amount of worthless paper, and the
Assemblymen responsible for the loss would have to bear the
brunt of their constituents' anger.
Clarke now decided to play on the Assemblymen's fear
of the electorate by announcing that he would refuse to
approve an extension of the excise until the Assembly passed
the revenue act he desired. ^ 00

Yet he was no more success

ful at coercing the House than his predecessors had been.

"Smith, History, II, 28, NYCD, VI, 84-5
100NYCD, VI, 94-5.
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When it reassembled in April, 1737,^°^ it continued to re
fuse to pass the revenue, which left the government without
funds^02 and so on May 2, Clarke dissolved it.*0^
As Clarke was politically calculating, and politically
unprincipled,^-0^ it seems reasonably clear that he had de
cided to dissolve the Assembly because he felt that an elec
tion would improve his position.

Although the DeLancey-

Philipse group had controlled the Assembly for over ten
years, the disruptions of the Cosby administration had re
sulted in the rapid growth of the opposition group headed
by Lewis Morris Sr., and Clarke apparently felt he could
benefit by giving the Morrisites (who had long been crying
for an election) an opportunity to test their political
,
muscle.

105

If the Morrisites won, as everyone expected, they would
be grateful to Clarke for giving them the opportunity to ob
tain power, and so would be more likely to give the
Lieutenant Governor the revenue he desired than would the
DeLancey-Philipse group, which was unbeholden to him.

*°^Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix C [p. 304}.
^■0 2 Katz, Newcastle’s New York, pp. .5.-2.
1 0 3 nycd,

VI, 94-5.

1 0 4 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, pp. 147-8.

1 0 5 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, pp. 151-2.

The

229
results of the election met Clarke's expectations.

Both

Stephen DeLancey and Adolph Philipse were defeated in the
Morrisites' sweep to power.*®^ and in 1737 the Lieutenant
Governor was confident that he had obtained an Assembly
which would be cooperative. * ® 7
He did not, however, take its good will for granted.
He devoted considerable effort to winning over the new
10 8
majority party in the Assembly.
Adhering to custom,
Clarke gave the leaders of the Assembly control of the pa
tronage in their districts, and reduced the bitterness left
over from the Zenger trial by securing the readmission of
Zenger's attorneys, James Alexander and William Smith Sr.
(who were also leaders of the Morris group) to the bar.

109

Clarke was also willing to accept legislation which
reflected the Morrisites' priorities.**®

During the years

they had been out of power, Morris's supporters had contin
ually demanded frequent Assembly elections, and so it was
natural for them to pass legislation limiting the duration

*®6Bonomi, Factious People, Appendix C [p. 304].
*®7NYCD, VI, 96.
*®®Morris Papers, pp. 67-9.
109

Varga, "New York Government," p. 48.

**®Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 153.
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of the Assembly once they came to power.***

In the fall,

1737 session, the Assembly passed and Lieutenant Governor
Clarke signed, An Act for the frequent election of repre
sentatives to serve in General Assembly and for the fre
quent calling and meeting of the General Assembly so
elected.

The law, generally known as the Triennial Act,

required the Assembly to meet annually, limited the Assembly
to a three year term, and required the election of a new
Assembly within six months of the dissolution of its prede112
cessor.
The decision of the Privy Council, in September,
1738, to disallow the law because it challenged "...the
undoubted Right that the Crown has always exercised of call
ing and continuing the Assembly..."**^ did not mitigate the
good will Clarke had garnered by signing it, and urging the
. .
. 114
British government to accept it.
The good feeling which Clarke had so assiduously built
up with the members of the Assembly was partially regarded
in December, 1737, when the House passed a revenue act. * * 5

***Bonomi, Factious People, p. 135.
1 1 2 NYCL,

ch. 650.

**^Great Britain, Public Record Office, Acts of the
Privy Council-Colonial Series, W.L. Grant and James Munro,
eds. ((> vols. , Hereford and London, 190 8-1912) , III, 617
1 1 4 NYCD,

VI, 112-3.

115NYCD, VI, 110-1.
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The bill, which granted the Lieutenant Governor's salary
for only one year, reflected the distrust of the Executive
which the legislature had developed during the Cosby admin
istration, and although Clarke undoubtedly would have pre
ferred a revenue which ran for more than a year, he accepted
the innovation (which made him more dependent on the legis
lature)^-*6 because he believed cooperation between the exec
utive and the Assembly was the best way to erase the scars
which the Van Dam dispute had left on the body politic.

He

did, however, feel obliged to protest the adverse effect of
the one-year revenue on the prerogative. * * 7
What success Clarke had had in establishing good rela
tions with the Assembly did not, however, result in the
creation of complete harmony within the government.

Although

the Morris faction had obtained control of the Assembly, the
Council was still dominated by friends of DeLancey and
Philipse, and, as the cooperation of both Houses of the leg
islature was necessary for the operation of the government,
Clarke faced the delicate task of preventing their differ
ences from flaring into open conflict, which would immobi
lize the government and keep him from reaping the full
advantage of his position.

Fortunately, the politically

versatile Lieutenant Governor had the confidence of the

**6 NYCD, VI, 117.

**7NYCD, VI, 111.
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leaders of both factions, and so he was able to moderate
passions on both sides, and thereby keep the government
operating smoothly.
In June, 1737, the British government made a decision
which must have been extremely gratifying to Clarke.

It

named John West, seventh baron De La Warr as governor of
New York.

119

A confidant of the King,

120

and an important

figure in the ministry, De La Warr had solicited the appointment as a reward for his services,

121

but he would not

abandon his position in English politics to take up the du
ties of his relatively unimportant new post.

Consequently,

Clarke learned that he was to be left in charge of the government for an indefinite period.

122

The additional security provided by De La Warr's
appointment did not enable Clarke to ignore provincial poli
tics, for he found himself facing yet another problem.

The

Morris faction which had just gained control of the Assembly
was beginning to crumble.
group had two victories.

1 1 8 Smith,
1 1 9 NYCD,

In September, 1737, the DeLancey
A pro-DeLancey slate carried the

History, II, 30-1

VI, 96.

^2 8 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect," p. 175.

121Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors," pp. 11-2.
^22Colden Papers, II, 179.
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.
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New York City elections,
and Adolph Philipse defeated a
Morrisite m

a New York City by-election.

12 4

Such develop

ments warned the Lieutenant Governor that the pendulum of
popular opinion was again swinging toward DeLancey and
Philipse, and so as to insure that he would be on the win
ning side, Clarke began working to destroy the power of his
putative allies, the Morrisites.
His approach was indirect.

The Morris party had long

been critical of political jobbery, and had even introduced
a bill forbidding it in the Assembly.

125

If Clarke could

reveal the Morrisite leaders as hypocrites by involving them
in situations which smacked of the corruption they had long
attacked, it would discredit and gravely weaken them.

For

example, the Lieutenant Governor offered Simon Johnson, a
leading supporter of Morris, a post in the New York City
government.

Johnson accepted the offer, and the Council,

which was apparently in league with Clarke, refused to con
firm the appointment.

Johnson was left with out office,
126
and with fewer supporters.
Even Lewis Morris Sr.'s

George W. Edwards, "New York City Politics Before
the American Revolution," Political Science Quarterly,
XXXVI, 4 (December, 1921), 5^6.
^■^Katz, Newcastle’s New York, p. 153.
*^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 152.

126

Varga, "New York Government," p. 48
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decision to accept control of the patronage for Westchester
County (which had helped Clarke to influence the Assembly)
was presented to the electorate as evidence of a cynical
willingness to abandon principle for gain.

By the fall of

1738, Clarke had destroyed the popular following Morris had
127
spent years building,
and rather than attempt to rebuild
it, Morris abandoned New York.

He produced the commission

Wager had secured for him and took office as the Governor of
New Jersey.

12 8

Having eliminated the Morris group as a viable political
force, Clarke had to turn to the DeLancey-Philipse faction.
The Lieutenant Governor opened the way to rapprochement, new
elections, and a return to power by DeLancey and Philipse
when, on October 20, 1738, he dissolved the Assembly, claiming that it had refused to pass an acceptable revenue.

129

The "hatchet job" which Clarke had done on the Morris
faction made the results of the election of early 1739 inev
itable.

The DeLancey-Phi lipse group swept to victory,

although Stephen DeLancey himself did not return to power.
His son James, the Chief Justice, assumed his mantle as the

127
Smith, History, II, 38-40.
1 2 8 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, PP. 15304.

1 2 9 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, P. 152, NYCD, VI, 135.

1 3 0 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, P. 154.
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leader of the Assembly

131

when it met in March, 1739,

132

and

began to develop those skills in managing the Assembly which
were to make him one of the most effective politicians in
all of New York's co-lonial history.

The triumph of his

perty was so overwhelming that the remaining leaders of the
Morris group simply gave up.

They either withdrew from

politics, or joined the DeLancey-Philipse group.

134

Clarke insured that he would have good relations with
the new Assembly by demonstrating a complete willingness to
allow the House to dominate the government.

His only demand

was a salary appropriation,33"* and as long as that was forth
coming, he approved every bill passed by the Assembly.

His

letters to London, protesting that some of the very bills he
had willingly signed into law were "unconstitutional" because
they did not conform to the Instructions, were apparently
136
efforts to protect his standing with the Board of Trade.

1 3 1 Katz,

Newcastle's New York, pp. 175-8.

1 3 2 Bonomi,

Factious People. Appendix C [p. 305],

3 3 3 Bonomi,

Factious People, p. 143.

33*Mc Anear, "Politics," II, 653, Smith and Alexander
chose to withdraw, while Lewis Morris Jr. allied himself
with his former bitter foes.
1 3 5 Smith,

History, II, 42, 45-8, 55, 58-9.

136NYCD, VI, 141-2, 149-52, 184-6, 206.
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Fortunately for him, the Board of Trade was almost complete
ly unconcerned about the state of the prerogative in New
York.

In its response to one of Clarke's lamentations on

the refusal of the Assembly to grant a "proper" revenue, the
Board ignored the Lieutenant Governor's complaints and con
gratulated him for achieving "...tranquillity and universal
harmony...," and expressed the hope it would continue. 137
From March, 1739, to September, 1743, the political life of
New York was unusually quiet; there was nothing to dispute
and no one to raise new issues.
When George Clinton, successor to the absentee De La
Warr, arrived in New York to take over the government in
138
June, 1743,
George Clarke withdrew to the country where
he was to live in semi-retirement until he left for England
139
in June, 1745,
His sojourn in New York had been extroardinarily successful; he had come to the New World to make his
fortune, and by carefully exploiting all of the perquisites
of his offices, he returned to the Old World with about
140
£100,000.
Unfortunately, his successor had neither his
political nor his fiscal success.

1 3 7 NYCD,

VI, 169.

1 3 8NYCD,

VI, 247.

1 3 9 NYCD,

VT, 278.

140

Smith, History, II, 60.

CHAPTER SEVEN
GEORGE CLINTON:

OVERCONFIDENCE,

CHAOS, AND ACCOMMODATION

The Board of Trade, which was nominally responsible for
colonial administration, was informed of the decision to
appoint George Clinton as governor of New York on April 30,
1741.^

His nomination was the product of the family loyalty

and political self interest of the Duke of Newcastle.
(Clinton was the younger brother of the influential seventh
earl of Lincoln, and, as Lincoln had married Newcastle's
sister, Lucy, Clinton had a strong claim on the ministry.
Even after the death of the seventh earl in 1728, the dow
ager countess kept pressing her brother-in-law's suit.

In

itially, she had sought to advance Clinton's naval career,
but when it became apparent that there were few opportunit
ies in the peacetime navy for a mediocre officer, she began
to solicit civilian offices.)

By 1739, George Clinton was

New York State, Secretary of State, Documents Relative
to the Colonial History of the State of New York, fe.B.
O'Callaghan and feerthold Fernow, eels. (13 vols. , Albany,
1861-1887, VI, 187 (hereafter NYCD).
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on the verge of bankruptcy,

2

and Newcastle, who wanted

to retain the good will and parliamentary influence of
Clinton's nephew the ninth earl of Lincoln"* dispatched the
nearly destitute officer to New York

4

to recoup his

fortune.^
He arrived in New York on September 20, 1743,® but
apparently did not make an overwhelming impression on the
people he was to rule.
wrote:

A local resident, Abigail Pranks,

"...our New Gov[emo]r Seems to be a good sort of a

Gentleman but by what I find his Chief Delight is in Drink
ing & if he Ke[e]ps on as he has hereto done he will dispatch him Self...."

7

Clinton did, however, seem to be

7

Stanley N. Katz, "Newcastle's New York Governors,"
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, LI, 1 (January,
1957};' 12-3.---- ------ --------•*The eighth earl had died in 1729, and the title passed
to his younger brother.
4James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect: Colonial
Administration Under the Duke o £ Newcastle (Princeton,
Mew Jersey, 19 72), 216-7 (hereafter "Salutary Neglect").
5William Smith Jr., The History of the Province of New
York, Michael Kammen, ed. (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1972),
II, 61 (hereafter History).
6NYCD,

VI, 247.

^Abigail Franks, The Lee Max Friedmann Collection of
American Jewish Colonial Correspondence: Letters of the
Franks Family (1733- 1746) , Leo Hershkowitz and Isidor S.
Meyer, e d s . , Studies in American Jewish History, 5
(Waltham, Mass., i960) , p. 125 (hereafter Letilers) .
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handling his duties competently.

He avoided administrative

confusion by announcing that he would not displace office
holders, and only a week after he had arrived pleased those
of his subjects who believed that elections were the neces
sary prerequisite to a tranquil administration by dissolving
g

the Assembly.
Having dispatched the more pressing issues, Clinton
turned his attention to a problem which would profoundly
affect the course of his administration:

the selection of

a local politician to guide and advise him while he famil
iarized himself with colonial politics.

There were only

two men in the province worthy of consideration, former
acting Governor George Clarke, and James DeLancey.
Clarke's ambitions disqualified him.

He had offered Clinton

$> 500 per annum to remain in England, so it was obvious that
he wanted to remain in control of the government.

It was

even possible that Clarke might offer the Governor poor ad
vice in an effort to drive him from the colony.

DeLancey,

on the other hand, was personally attractive, had no overt
ambitions which would conflict with the interests of the
Governor, had been recommended by Newcastle, and could use
his influence in the Assembly to make the administration

O
Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and
Society in Colonial New York (New York,
, App. C
rp. 365] (hereafter Factious People), Smith, History, II,
62, NYCD, VI, 248.
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profitable for Clinton.

Predictably, he became "prime

minister."^
The Assembly election, held in October, 1743,^ demon
strated the wisdom of Clinton's decision.

The election

confirmed the dominant position of the DeLancey-Philipse
faction in the Assembly, and Clinton exhibited his faith in
his allies by giving them control of patronage. 11
When the Assembly met, the behavior of the Governor
clearly indicated that he was following DeLancey's advice.
Like all the other governors who had established a modus
vivendi with the leaders of the Assembly, he allowed the
House, to conduct the affairs of the colony virtually without interference.

12

He signed the Septennial Act, which

limited his formerly complete control over the duration of
an Assembly by establishing seven years as the maximum term
of a House, and an act which reduced the business of the
Court of Chancery by establishing remedies for the recovery

Q
Nicholas Varga, "New York Government and Politics
During the Mid-Eighteenth Century" (New York, Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1960) , p. 61
(hereafter "New York Government").
1 0 Bonomi,

Factious People, App. C [p. 305J.

11Beverly McAnear, "Politics in Provincial New York,
1689-1761" (2 vols., Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Stanford University, January, 1935), II, 580 (herafter
"Politics").

12
Varga, "New York Government," p. 61.
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of legacies in the common law.

13

In addition, he strength

ened DeLancey's political influence by consenting to in
creases in the salaries of two allies of the Chief Justice,
the puisne justices of the Supreme Court, and by approving
the creation of "expense accounts" for the members of the
14
Council, who were also allies of DeLancey.
Clinton was
rewarded for his passivity with a salary of £ 1,560, £ 100
for house rent, b 400 for firewood and candles, b 150 for
his trips to Albany to meet with the Five Nations, and b 400
for gifts for the Indians.^

He did not object to the deci

sion of the Assembly to grant the revenue for only one year.
The next Assembly session began in a spirit of coopera
tion, but ended in acrimony which presaged the disputes which
were to characterize so much of the administration.

The

House convened in April, 1744 in response to the (incorrect)
rumors of an uprising in Scotland, and promptly passed a
resolution which expressed its abhorrence at the supposed

^^New York State, Commissioners of Statutory Revision,
The Colonial Laws of New York from 166 4 to the Revolution
TT voTs': , A lb a n y , t
i.T.T
7 T O V ' » g '," ? 0 9= T i -----(hereafter NYCL) .
^Smith, History, II, 61. The salary of the second
justice was increased to £ 1 00 per year, and that of the
third to £ 50. The Councillors were given £ 60, later
raised to £ 1 0 0 .
15

Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the Colony of New York,
(2 vols.,
New York, 1/5 4-1766, reprinted 1^54) , II, 6 - 6 (hereafter
Ass. Jour.), Smith, History, II, 61.
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r e v o l u t i o n . I t then turned its attention to more immed
iate matters.
of active

The ministry, which was expecting a renewal

hostilities with France and Spain, had ordered

Clinton to prepare the defenses of the colony, and the gov17
ernor transmitted the demand to the Assembly,
Although
the Assembly pledged itself to making the improvements in
the defenses of New York City, Oswego, and Saratoga which
the Governor had requested, it refused to make appropria
tions for the projects before it was given specific inform
ation about them.

Clinton (who seems to have been disturbed

by the failure of the Assembly to follow his orders with the
alacrity of the sailors he had commanded) ignored its pledge
of support, and, on May 19, berated the members for failing
to follow his instructions, warning that "...if therefore
any ill consequences should happen in the Interim, they will
18
be justly imputed to you...," and prorogued the meeting.
When the House reassembled in July,
its attention to the problem of defense.

19

it again turned
It examined the

suggested repairs and improvements in detail, carefully

1 6 Smith,

17

History, II, 62.

Varga, "New York Government," p.

68.

^ Ass. Jour., II, 21-2.

19
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considered financing,

20

and then passed the defense bill

which the Governor had requested.

Its decision did not,

however, indicate that the Assembly had decided to follow
meekly the Governor's program.

It demonstrated its contin

ued independence by refusing to accede to a request of the
British government, relayed by Clinton, for the appointment
of commissioners to negotiate a common offensive policy
with representatives from Massachusetts.

21

The unwilling

ness of the Assembly to surrender its hard won control over
policy, not unnaturally convinced the Governor that the
House intended to usurp his authority, but unlike his pre
decessors, who had been willing to sacrifice principle to
practicality, Clinton clearly indicated he would not stand
idly by while the Assembly usurped his role in the government. 22
Governor Clinton apparently did not hold James DeLancey,
the leader of the Assembly, responsible for his difficulties
with the House, for, in September, 1744, he gave DeLancey a
new commission as Chief Justice which gave him tenure during
23
"good behavior" instead of at pleasure.
This generous

20

Smith, History, II, 62-3.

21 Varga,

2 2 NYCD,

23Varga

"New York Government," pp. 71-3.
VI, 260.

,"New York Government,"

p. 73.
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gesture weakened the authority of the Governor, however, for
it guaranteed that DeLancey could retain control of the sec
ond most powerful post in the colony under almost all condi
tions.

It made him virtually independent of Clinton.

If Clinton had given DeLancey the new commission in the
hope that it would lead to better relations with the Assembly,
he was grievously disappointed.

Tensions with the House,

which had been increasing, erupted during the session in
March, 1745.

The opening speech was concerned with the war

against French Canada.

The Governor requested a contribution

toward the expenses of the expedition that the British gov
ernment was organizing against Louisburg, support for the
garrison at Oswego, the construction of two forts to protect
the Indians, and (again) the appointment of commissioners to
negotiate with Massachusetts.
was not encouraging.

24

The response of the Assembly

It voted less than the Governor had

requested (only b 3,000, for the expedition against
Louisburg), considered reducing the Oswego garrison, refused
to appoint the Commissioners, and ignored the Governor's
25
requests for constructing forts.
The House was still adam
antly refusing to surrender any of its prerogatives.
In April, the Assembly begem to consider two bills which
clearly demonstrated how the House and the Governor

2 4 Ass.

Jour., II, 46-7.

25
Smith, History, II, 64-6.
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fundamentally disagreed.

The first was am act which author

ized the Assembly to appoint commissioners to supervise the
distribution of gun powder purchased with funds raised in
New York.

(As gun powder was essential for the conduct of

military operations, the Assembly was, in effect, giving
itself the authority to veto any venture it disapproved of,
and thereby considerably reducing Clinton's authority as
commander-in-chief.)

The second was a measure for improving

the defenses of New York City.

The Assembly agreed with

Clinton's assertion, that they should be strengthened, but
it insisted on determining what the specific modifications
were to be.

This too was a direct challenge to the

Governor's authority as Captain General and Commander-inChief, and must have been all the more galling because col
onial civilians were presuming to dictate military policy
to a senior officer of the Royal Navy.

Clinton seemed un

willing to accept any limitation of his authority, for, on
May 14, after charging the Assembly with disrespect for
both his and the Crown's authority, and with unwillingness
26
to contribute to the war against France, he dissolved it.
The Governor's decision may not have been motivated
entirely by pique.

According to Cadwallader Colden, Clinton

believed that the intransigence of the Assembly was the
result of the inability of the nominal head of the House,
Speaker Adolph Philipse, to lead effectively, and of his

26Ass. Jour., II, 61-2.
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unwillingness to surrender control to James DeLancey, and
that Clinton had dissolved the Assembly primarily to elimin
ate Philipse, who was eighty years old, and thereby estab27
lish DeLancey as its leader.
The new election was held in May, and Philipse was
eliminated.

He was succeeded in the Speakership by David

Jones of Queens County, a man thought considerably more
willing to accept DeLancey's leadership than Philipse had,

28

and relations between the Governor and the Assembly now
improved dramatically.

The House demonstrated its willing

ness to cooperate by providing the funds for improving the
defenses of New York City which Clinton had requested at the
previous session, and by voting an additional h 5,000 for
the Louisburg expedition.

Governor Clinton showed his good

will by allowing the Assembly to control the distribution
of powder purchased by the colony. J

DeLancey's rise to

unquestioned preeminence in the Assembly had certainly
calmed the political atmosphere, but Clinton must have mis
understood the situation, for, in the very next Assembly,
the Governor began to disregard DeLancey.

27
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The session, which met in August, was short but signif
icant.

Clinton opened the meeting by requesting the House

for the establishment of a perpetual revenue and tonnage
duty.

The Assembly voted down Clinton's request."*0

It is

inconceivable that DeLancey, who was a master of the deli
cate task of guiding the Assembly, would have countenanced
the decision of the Governor to make such a request, and
the Governor's action strongly suggests that Clinton was
already pulling away from DeLancey's guidance.

Develop

ments in the next session of the Assembly probably encour
aged Clinton to pursue his assertive policy.
When this session opened late in October, the Governor
again requested funds for the construction of forts on the
northern frontier, and the Assembly again ignored his call.

31

It seemed that Clinton would have no success in bending the
House to his will.

Then, on November 20, news of the mass

acre of the population of Saratoga by Indians on November 17
reached New York City.

The defenses of the Hudson River

Valley had been breached, and Albany and the rest of the
colony were opened to raids.

Inspired by fear, the Assembly

became quite concerned with the defensive measures it had
previously ignored, and provided the moneys for frontier

30Varga, "New York Government," pp. 71-2, 80-1.
31A s s . Jour., II, 77.
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defenses previously requested.

32

The report of the presence

of a French raiding force ninety miles below Albany further
fueled the House's martial ardor, and it voted to support
any "well concerted" plan for attacking the French strong33
hold, Canada.
The willingness of the apparently panic stricken
Assembly to support defensive proposals which the Governor
had advocated certainly did not indicate that it had aband
oned its traditional claims to authority in the government,
but it convinced Clinton (who had never understood the oppo
sition to his proposals) that the Assembly was finally will
ing to "do its duty" and to accept his leadership.

The

brief "success" may have convinced the Governor that he
could manage the House perfectly without DeLancey's assis
tance, and that his problems had been the product of taking
DeLancey's advice.
took on a new tone.

Certainly his letters to London now
Clinton had previously either praised

the Assembly for its willingness to cooperate with the
administration,^* or claimed that he would be able to bring
a recalcitrant House to heel with little difficulty.^

32
33

Ass. Jour., II, 86.
Ass. Jour., II, 89.

~**NYCD, VI, 281-2 for example.

•*5NYCD, VI, 274-6 for example.
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Now he became even less tolerant.

He began to ascribe his

previous difficulties to the unwillingness of the Assembly
to recognize, and submit to, the authority of the Crown,
and to express his determination to bring it back to a
proper state of obedience.

36

This domineering attitude became apparent in December.
Clinton was so insistent on his right to control the govern
ment that he refused to grant the customary request of the
Assembly for an adjournment to January, until it provided
37
an additional h 150 for the fort at Oswego.
He seemed
unwilling to accept anything less than exact, prompt obed
ience from the Assembly.

Since his attitude was completely

incompatible with the views of his "Prime Minister," a split
with DeLancey was inevitable.
It took place in January, 1746.

Clinton asked DeLancey

to support amendments to the militia act which would have
increased the authority of the governor over the forces by
increasing the penalties for desertion.

DeLancey refused,

and Clinton, no longer willing to permit the Chief Justice
to dictate policy, set about securing passage of the act
despite the objections of his advisor.

He enlisted the

support of Speaker David Jones, who was able to convince
rural Assemblymen to cooperate with the administration, and,

36NYCD, VI, 2 84-6, 305-7.
37

Smith, History, II, 68.
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on February 13, 1746, the militia act amendments passed. 3 R
Clinton also convinced the Assembly to pass legislation
authorizing additional defense expenditures and the long
delayed conference with Massachusetts. 39
During the following week, Clinton and DeLancey attend
ed a dinner party and both apparently became somewhat intox
icated.

DeLancey made some uncomplimentary remarks about

the Assemblymen who had supported the amendments to the
militia act, and Clinton responded by defending his allies,
and by attacking DeLancey's supporters as obstructionists.
The "discussion" continued to degenerate until DeLancey
stalked out threatening to make the remainder of Clinton's
40
administration uncomfortable.

He kept his promise.

The dispute between the Governor and the Chief Justice
embodied a basic paradox in British colonial administration.
Clinton adopted the position that the colony was a subord
inate part of the empire, and that the duty of its Assembly
was loyally to implement the policies suggested by the
British government.

DeLancey, on the other hand, took the

colonial position that the colony was virtually selfgoverning, and that its Assembly had the right and duty to
control public policy.

The specific area of disagreement

38
Varga, "New York Government," pp. 88-92.
^9Smith, History, II, 6 8-9.

*°Varga, "New York Government," pp. 88-90.
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between the two men was military policy.

Clinton and the

British government favored a strong offensive policy, while
DeLancey and the colonists advocated a passive, inexpensive,
defensive posture.
any case.

41

But the conflict was inevitable, m

Clinton simply would not abandon his views, and

the colonists would not abandon theirs.
The stage was set for conflict at the February Assembly
meeting.

A0

James DeLancey had vowed to make Clinton's ad

ministration difficult, and, despite the Governor's success
es in the preceding session of the Assembly, had the
strength in the House to do so.

He was influential in New

York City, and in Albany his uncle, Henry Beekman was a
potent force among the Assemblymen.

43

This was politically

most advantageous since it was customary to give Assemblymen
control of local patronage,

44

and that, in turn, enabled

DeLancey's allies to recruit more support.

Clinton had him

self also contributed to the power of the Chief Justice.
All the available seats on the Council had been given to
supporters of DeLancey.

Clinton was the governor, but much

41
Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 150-1
A0

Varga, "New York Government," p. 89.

^Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), pp. 174-5.

4*Varga, "New York Government," p. 274.
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of the government was under DeLancey's control.4^
Nor was there any way for Clinton to destroy the influ
ence of the Chief Justice.

Clinton had given him a commis

sion which was tantamount to life tenure, and DeLancey's
connections in London (which included Sir John Heathcote,
M.P., Admiral Sir Peter Warren, M.P., and "the hero of
Louisburg," Thomas Herring, who was to become Archbishop of
Canterbury in 1747, and the influential mercantile firm of
Baker and Baker) were so powerful that the Governor could
not hope to secure action against him there.

46

Despite the portents, the February meeting of the
Assembly provided a rather quiet beginning for a conflict
which was to dominate New York politics for years.
opposing forces were-evenly balanced.

The

Clinton's allies

appropriated h 10,000 to continue the war, and assigned most
of the burden of raising the money to the cities of New York
and Albany4^ (the centers of DeLancey's strength).

When the

tax law came before the Council, the supporters of the Chief
48
Justice insisted on amending it,
and the Assembly,

45Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 174-5.
46
Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 146-8.
47
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predictably, denied the authority of the Council to do so,
claiming, as it long had, that the upper House had no right
AQ

to amend money bills. 3

As neither House would give way,

convention compelled the Governor to prorogue the Assembly
in the hope that tempers would cool.^

The delay caused by

the suspension of the session benefited DeLancey and his
allies, for it gave them the opportunity to reorganize their
forces.
When the Assembly reconvened in March, the DeLancey
forces were able to recoup much lost ground.

But the prov

ince was deeply involved in a war, and complete refusal to
cooperate with the Governor would have reduced the defenses
of the colony, and endangered their families and property.
Consequently, the Assembly agreed to improve the fortifica
tions on the northern frontier, to provide gifts for the
Indians, and to appoint commissioners to plan a joint offen51
sive with the New Englanders.
The Assembly was not by any means, however, prepared
to surrender its authority to the Governor.

It examined his

proposal for erecting blockhouses on the frontier at length,
and did not approve the project until it limited the

49A s s . Jour., II, 99.
Varga, "New York Government," p. 89.

51A s s . Jour., II, 102.
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garrison of each fort to twenty men.

52

The DeLancey domin

ated Assembly was even more cavalier in its treatment of the
tax quotas imposed in the previous session.

It abandoned

them completely, and adopted a more equitable system.

It

demonstrated its unwillingness to trust the Governor by
requiring that the Council approve his warrants for the expenditure of public funds.

53

Clinton was as limited by the

exigencies of war as the Assembly and had to accept the deci
sions of the House.

In June, 17 46, just as the next session

of the Assembly was beginning, he wrote the Duke of Newcastle
to request permission to return to England, suggesting that,
if at all possible, a military command be found for him.

54

When the Assembly met again in June, it was asked to
contribute to an expedition against Canada.

Clinton had

learned of the project in a letter from the Duke of Newcastle
m

April,

55

and the House, now introduced to the realities of

war, endorsed it enthusiastically.

It contributed fc 40,000,

and authorized the recruitment of troops, and their dispatch

52A s s . Jour., II, 105, April 9, 1747.
53As s . Jour., II, 109-10.
54NYCD, VI, 309-10.

53Smith, History, II, 89.
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to the rendezvous which had been established north of
Albany.

56

It did not, however, forget its self-imposed obli

gation to control government policy, and to protect the peo
ples' money.

It named commissioners to supervise the expend

iture of the money it had provided, named the militia compan
ies which were to be assigned to the expedition,^ refused to
assume the cost of transporting men and supplies to the gath
ering place, and would not provide a subsidy for the Indians
58
recruited to join the campaign.
The DeLancey Assembly was
willing to fight, but only on its own terms.
59
forced to accept them.
He was not, however, completely passive.

Clinton was

He apparently

realized that the insistence of the Assembly on minutely
supervising the colony's contribution to the expedition
against Canada was the product of James DeLancey's unwilling
ness to cooperate, and he therefore concluded that if
DeLancey could be convinced to endorse the attack, the
Assembly would become more cooperative.

In what was probably

the most subtle and sophisticated political maneuver of his
administration, Clinton attempted to secure the support of

56A s s . Jour., II, 112, 115.
~*^Ass. Jour., II, 115.
CO

Varga, "New York Government," p. 9 4.
59
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the Chief Justice in August by offering him command of the
province's contingent.

DeLancey presumably realized what

Clinton was attempting to do, and politely declined the
offer,60 thereby preserving his freedom to oppose the gov
ernor.
Clinton's lack of success in courting DeLancey made it
clear that a reconciliation was impossible.

This securely

established Cadwallader Colden, who had been advising the
Governor since July, 1746, as the new "prime minister."61
Colden had associated himself with Clinton primarily
because the Governor had offered to "provide" for him and
for his family, a promise which the Governor's relations
62
with DeLancey had demonstrated he would keep.
Colden was
the only colonist who was strongly (or for that matter to
any extent) committed to maintaining t;he prerogatives of the
Crown.

Unfortunately, Colden's main qualification, his

60Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 167, Varga, "New York
Government," p. 100.
6^Siegfried B. Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden Colonial
Politician and Imperial Statesman, 1718-1760" (Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1952),
p. 289 (hereafter "Cadwallader Colden") .
®^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 17 8, New-York Histor
ical Society, frhe Cadwallader Cofden Papers, New-York
Historical Society Collections, lSi^-lsSj, 1934-1955
T9' vols., New York, 19'18"-T9'21, 1937), IV, 31-4, 94-5, 108-9
for example (hereafter Colden Papers).

®^Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 178.
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zeal for the rights of the Crown, had led him to take stands
which made him unpopular with most segments of the New York
political community,

64

which preferred to ignore the preroga

tive when it conflicted with colonial interests.

It was

impossible for him to create an effective coalition in the
Assembly.
His unpopularity did not disturb Colden in the least.
He brushed it off as the result of slanders aimed at him by
/T C

the leaders of the Assembly 3 in retaliation for his opposi
tion to their efforts at securing complete domination of the
government.®®

His approach to governing New York, by forc

ing the Assembly into unswerving, unquestioning obedience to
the will of the Governor,

67

would not be popular with the

Assemblymen, or their leader, James DeLancey.
The conflict was not apparent when Clinton met the
Assembly in October, however.

The opening speech reminded

the House of the ways in which it had failed to show "due
obedience."

Clinton charged the Assembly with attempting

to engross all governmental authority, and with failure to
pursue actively the war against France.

64

He demanded that

Bonomi, Factious People, p. 15 3.

®®Colden Papers, III, 337-8.
®®Colden Papers, IV, 160.

®7Rolland, "Cadwallader Colden," p. 297.
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it provide camp for the men who had been assigned to the
expedition against Canada (which had been delayed), that it
provide funds for the construction of small forts on the
frontier, and that it provide more presents for the Indians
who were not enthusiastic participants in the war.

68

The reaction of the Assembly to Clinton's tirade was
surprisingly measured.

It may have convinced the Governor

that Colden was correct in arguing that the Assembly had to
be taken firmly in hand.

The House denied that it was

attempting to subvert the government, and explained that the
conflicts which had developed were the result of the bad
advice received by the Governor.

Their failure to provide

the funds Clinton had requested was not the result of their
unwillingness to support the government properly, but, they
said, of the inability of the colony to bear the expense.**9
The placating tone of the Assembly's response was reinforced
on October 17 when it voted t> 6,500 to satisfy the request
of the Governor for funds for the winter encampment.

The

House did, however, continue to refuse to transport the sup70
plies beyond Albany.

68Ass. Jour., II, 124.
89Smith, History, II, 75-8.
70Ass. Jour., II, 124.
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Governor Clinton had already taken steps which would
confirm the Assembly's resistance.

He had issued warrants

for the delivery of supplies to the force encamped above
Albany before the Assembly acted on his request.

When the

commissioners in charge of the supplies stockpiled at Albany
refused to deliver them on Clinton's warrant, the officers
of the expedition took matters into their own hands.
On October 16, Colonel John Roberts, the commander of
the force, ordered Henry Holland, the sheriff of Albany
County, to seize the supplies at Albany.

Holland did so.

71

News of the sheriff's action reached New York City on
October 27, but the Assembly did not react precipitously.
It waited until November 8, after it received a complete
report on the incident, but then moved forcefully.

It

indicted Colden (who had reportedly authorized Roberts to
seize the supplies

72

), Roberts, and Holland for "high mis

demeanors,” and refused to provide additional supplies for
the expeditionary force until it received assurances from
71
Clinton that the incident would not reoccur.
Clinton
defended his agents, but as he had to obtain supplies for

Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Eighteenth Century, (4 vols. / Gloucester, Mass., i^58,
reprint of 1924-5 edition), IV, 178 (hereafter Eighteenth).
730sgood, Eighteenth, IV, 178.
73A s s . Jour., II, 134. As in England, the term a
"high misdemeanor" was not restricted to indictable
offenses.
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the men encamped above Albany, was forced to agree to the
demands of the Assembly, which he did on November 28.
But the harm had already been done.

74

The Assembly demon

strated its increased distrust of the governor by specify
ing in detail how the money it provided for supplies was to
be spent,

75

and showed its disdain for his authority by
76
adjourning without his permission.
Clinton's first attempt at applying Colden's overween
ing approach to the Assembly had ended in failure.

When the

Assembly reconvened at the beginning of December, 1746, it
was still extremely resistant to the Governor's proposals.
Clinton blamed its refusal to pass the military legislation
he had requested on the influence of the DeLancey faction
which (he apparently sincerely believed) had diverted the
House from its original willingness to support the war.

77

Refusal to cooperate with the Governor's legislative program
was, however, to be the least of its offenses.

Under

DeLancey's direction, the Assembly now attempted to force
Colden to resign (thereby depriving Clinton of his key
advisor) by charging that Colden's publication of material

7^Ass. Jour., II, 137-8.
75Ass. Jour., II, 139.
7^Smith, History, II, 78.

77NYCD, VI, 312-4.
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relating to the Indian conference held in September, 1746
was a "...Misrepresentation of Facts, and an invidious
Reflection upon... [some] of the members of his Majesty's
78
Council...."
Although the attempt failed, because Colden
was not the sort to bend to pressure, it did, nonetheless,
have political consequences.

Clinton was so disturbed by

the Assembly's actions that his antipathy towards DeLancey,
which was already immense, increased, 79 and consequently
relations between the executive and legislature deteriorated
further.
The March, 1747 session of the Assembly reflected the
increased bitterness.

The House again limited its support

of the war to maintaining the defenses of the province, and
to provisioning the force committed to the attack on
Canada. 80

It again refused to provide funds for offensive
operations, 81 and it again attempted to make the position
of the Governor untenable.

The financing of the expedition

against Canada provided the necessary issue.
After Clinton learned of the proposed campaign, he
began issuing warrants on the British Treasury to meet the

78NYCD, VI, 330-1, 32 8-9.
79 Mc Anear, "Politics," II, 641-9.

80Ass. Jour.. II, 143.
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expenses the British government had agreed to assume.

In

May, 1747 the garrison protecting Albany (and therefore the
whole Hudson Valley) mutinied and threatened to loot Albany
and desert, unless it received its back pay in full.
As the Albany garrison was an important element of the
colony's defensive system, the Governor had to meet the
mutineers' demands, and he issued additional Treasury bills
to pay the soldiers.

The colony's merchants were, however,

unsure that the British government would redeem any of the
bills, and refused to accept them until Clinton backed them
with his personal credit.
port the notes.

He had to pledge h 6,000 to sup

He could not view his increased liability

with equanimity, and so, on June 2, asked the Assembly to
underwrite the personal notes he had issued to support the
Treasury warrants.

The Assembly refused, 82
* citing its con

cern for the prerogative as justification.

If it agreed to

guarantee his notes (the Assembly explained), it would be
"insulting" the prerogative by implying that it was unsure of
the Crown's willingness to repay its debts, and it had no
desire to make such a "disloyal" suggestion.

83

The Governor had been neatly hoisted by his own petard,
but he saw no humor in the situation.

He angrily informed

82
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the Board of Trade that:
...the publick affairs of this province
committed to my care are now reduced to such
a State, by the violent opposition of an inso
lent faction that his Maj[es]ty's Authority
is openly dispised, and the Administration so
far wrested out of the hands of his Gov[erno]rf
that I can now answer for the safety of this
Province against the intrigues of that Faction
within, or the open attacks of Enemies abroad...,
and then went on to detail the ways in which the Assembly,
under DeLancey's leadership, had attacked his authority.

He

concluded with a strong plea, which again reflected the atti
tude of his advisor Colden, against the evils of popular
government.84
Clinton did not, however, content himself with letters
of complaint.

With the assistance of Colden, he tried to

find a way to turn the tables on the Assembly.

On August 31,

17 47, he announced that he would stop issuing warrants for
provisions for the militia, thereby placing the entire bur
den of local defense on the Assembly.

The colonists, how

ever, felt adequately defended by the Royal troops in New
York, and consequently the Assembly ignored the responsibil
ity the Governor had attempted to thrust upon it.
The events of early October, however, allowed Clinton
to take the initiative.

The colonies had learned that the

British government was suspending offensive operations
against the French, and withdrawing the forces it had

84NYCD, VI, 352
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stationed in New York.

85

The colonists were thrown back on

their own resources, and the Assembly on October 8 agreed to
assume the costs of defending the frontier, to provide b 800
for gifts to the Indians, and even funds for the fort at
Saratoga which Clinton had planned to abandon.

But the

Governor (who apparently intended to use the advantage the
threat had given him to regain all his lost influence) refused to accept the appropriation!

86

He informed the Assembly that he would not permit it to
make any changes in his defense program.
be defended his way or not at all.

The colony was to

The Governor was appar

ently determined to force the House into the subordinate,
money raising position which British colonial theory (and
Cadwallader Colden) had assigned to it.
The Assembly refused to submit to such blackmail.

On

October 9, 1747, it passed a resolution which claimed that
it had willingly supported the war until Clinton's misman
agement had convinced them they were dissipating public mon
ey uselessly, detailing their grievances against Clinton and
Colden, and alleging that Clinton's claim to absolute auth
ority was an innovation which would destroy the "constitution"
of the colony, and the "liberties" of its people.®7

85
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Clinton refused to accept the petition.

He informed

the Assembly that all its powers were derived from, and
subordinate to, the Crown, and then informed the House that
he would withdraw the four companies assigned to the defense
of Albany unless it agreed to his demand that it relieve the
Crown of the cost of their support.

He admitted that he

might be endangering lives, but he made it clear that he
would continue to do so until the Assembly submitted to his
claims to dominance in the colonial political system.
On the twenty-fourth, Clinton went even further.

88

He

ordered the public not to publish the Assembly's remonstrance
of October 9, and although the Assembly countermanded his or
der, it was forced to yield.

On October 26, the day it or

dered publication of the October 9 petition, the Assembly
passed a bill for supplying Albany, a bill providing

£28,000

for frontier defense, and a message which "...implored...”
the Governor to accept the proffered funds before winter
weather made it impossible to transport the supplies to the
89
frontier.
On November 25, Clinton deigned to accept the
bills, which, he made clear, did not meet his standards of
respect for the prerogative.
which he had brought to heel.

He then dissolved
90

88Ass. Jour., II, 185.
89ASS. Jour., II, 193.

98Smith, History, II, 89-101.
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There was no clear reason for the decision to dissolve.
Perhaps Clinton, who firmly believed that the faction gained
g]
and held power only by chicanery,
warnted to give the
"good people" of the colony am opportunity to endorse his
policy of subordinating the Assembly.

If that was his ob

jective, he must have been sorely disappointed.

Despite

Colden's efforts to build a viable party, the composition of
the new Assembly was not markedly different from its predeQ2
cessor's.
Colden was so discouraged by his failure to
rally popular support that he retired to his country seat,
but Clinton was made of sterner stuff.

He concluded that

the deciding factor in the campaign had been the arrival of
James DeLancey's commission as Lieutenant Governor. 9 3
Because the winding down of the w a r ^ had eliminated
the possibility of invasion, Clinton was deprived of his
most effective weapon, and so could not treat the new
Assembly as peremptorialy as its predecessor.

When he met

the House in February, 1748, Clinton abandoned the aggressive
tone he had assumed under Colden*s tutelage, and attempted to

91NYCD, VI, 312-4, 316-7, 328-9, 350-7.
92M c Anear, "Politics," II, 659-61
93NYCD, VI, 416-8.
94
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proceed in a rational, business-like manner.

95

Unfortunate

ly, the Assembly was unwilling to forget the past, and it
would not cooperate.

It refused his request for additional
funds for frontier defense, 96 appointed its own agent m

London, 9 7 and condemned the Governor's decision not to allow
discharged soldiers to sue for back pay.

98

The House continued to remain unmanageable when it met
in June.

It would provide funds for defense, and for a

prisoner exchange, but little else.

99

The government was

effectively immobilized, and Clinton was forced to turn to
the British government for assistance.

Although his initial

attempts to convince the Board of Trade to intervene had
failed,100 he convinced Governor William Shirley of
Massachusetts Bay to write a report describing the sorry
state of the province, and the necessity of English support
for Clinton in his struggle with the Assembly.101

'Ass. Jour., II# 222
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Regrettably, Shirley's report met the same fate as Clinton's
complaints, and the Governor had to turn again to colonial
politics.
He prepared for the October, 1748 Assembly session by
convincing Colden to come out of retirement,^-®2 and by en
couraging colonists who were not tied
his cirle.

to

DeLanceytojoin

His new advisors included James Alexander,

William Smith Jr., and Robert Hunter Morris.^®^ They had,
however, little apparent influence on the Governor, for when
Clinton met the Assembly he took the belligerent tone favored
by Colden.

He asked the House to ignore recent precedents

and grant a five year revenue, to abandon the practice of
appropriating salaries to individual officials, and to pay
the salary arrears due to the militia and to Colonel
Johnson.^®^

The House, not unexpectedly, refused to surren

der its financial authority,^05 and the bills for salary
arrears and current salaries were lost in the ensuing
imbroglio.*®6

102NYCD, VI, 458-60
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On October 19, the Assembly sent Clinton a message
detailing its reasons for refusing to grant a five year rev
enue, or to abandon the practice of granting salaries to
specific officials.

The Governor refused it, claiming that

he was entitled to prior knowledge of the contents of all
petitions.10^

After considering these novel claims for a

week, the Assembly responded by denouncing Clinton and
Colden for denying their right of access.

io p

Another crisis

was developing.
In November the Assembly demonstrated its resentment
against the Governor's demands for prior knowledge of the
contents of petitions by informing him that it would not
appropriate funds for frontier d e f e n s e . C l i n t o n respond
ed by denying colonial officials their salaries.

He an

nounced that he would not sign the salary bill (which named
the officials to be paid) until he received permission to
do so from London.

He was, however, willing to sign the act

which established local customs duties,*-*® the last piece of
legislation to be enacted in New York for two years.

*ASS. Jour.,
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Clinton could not convince the Assembly to accept his
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leadership, and he proceeded to immobilize the government.***
He prorogued the Assembly.

112

The breakdown in relations with the House had no real
effect on the situation.

The British government had still

not acted on Clinton's complaints, and as no assistance was
forthcoming the Governor again attempted to build a "party"
to support him.
Clinton's new approach to this old problem was ambiv
alent.

On one hand he was pragmatic, appointing county

officers —

judges, clerks, and sheriffs ~

hold his interest at election time.

who would up

On the other hand, he

alienated the Livingstons, the only family in the province
which might have been able to challenge DeLancey's control
of the Assembly.

When Philip Livingston died in February,

1749,**^ Clinton successfully opposed the attempts of the
family to keep his office, Secretary of Indiem Affairs, in
the family, and thereby drove them all into DeLancey's
arms.***

Thus the balance of political power seemed un

changed.

**1Varga, "New York Government," pp. 140-1.
332Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [p. 306],
113NYCD, VI, 60.
***Katz, Newcastle's New York, pp. 181-2.
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The Privy Council order of February 2, 1749, which
instructed the Board of Trade to investigate conditions in
115
New York,
weakened Clinton. To profit from the invest
igation, he would have to convince the British government
to remove DeLancey from the Lieutenant Governorship, and
he was not in a position to exert much influence.

His men

tor, the Duke of Newcastle, having become Secretary of State
for the Northern Department in February, 1748*^6 had lost
interest in colonial matters,^7 and could not be counted
on to support Clinton's case.

Nor could the Governor turn

to the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department
for assistance.

John, fourth Duke of Bedford, had suggested

that Clinton resolve his quarrel with the Assembly by accepting its decisions.

118

Bedford's willingness to advise

Clinton was, however, an innovation.

His predecessors had

scrupulously avoided involvement in colonial politics.
DeLancey's position was in fact much strengthened.
Inaction by the British government would be a victory for
him, and the

British administration was predisposed to

inaction in colonial affairs.

Furthermore, his allies in

115NYCD, VI, 544.
H^Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 472.
*^7Katz, Newcastle's New York, p. 201.

118Varga, "New York Government," p. 151.
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London (Warren, Herring, and Robert Charles, the profession119
al agent who represented the Assembly
) were still avail
able to give support.*20
Clinton therefore exerted all his energies to overcom
ing his opponent's advantages.

He enlisted Lewis Morris

Jr., who was traveling to London to discuss the boundaries
of New Jersey, as a spokesman, and flooded Bedford, and the
Board of Trade, and John Catherwood, his agent in London,
with examples of James DeLancey's pernicious influence on
the political life of New York, and of his brother Oliver's
121
disdain for the law.
The investigation did not affect the ordinary political
process and Clinton had to meet the Assembly while it was in
progress.

The meeting was delayed (it had been scheduled

for March but was not convened until June 28, 1749

122

), and

the delay did not serve to improve relations between the
Governor and the House.

The session was an almost exact

recapitulation of the disasterous October-November, 1749
123
session. Clinton again requested a five year revenue.

119
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The Assembly again refused his request.

It again sent the

Governor a message detailing the reasons for its decision.
Clinton again refused to accept it because he had not been
informed of its contents.

The Assembly again condemned the

Governor for violating its privileges, and the Governor
again responded by claiming that he was not bound to respect
the rules of the Assembly.

The pattern of "agains" was fin

ally broken only when Clinton agreed to accept the petition,
explaining that he had learned of

its contents inform

ally.124
This did not end the paralysis of the government.

125

Clinton's failure to secure any action from the Assembly
indicated that the impasse would not be resolved in New
York, and so he redoubled his efforts at convincing the
British government to act.

His letters to London emphasized

that the opposition controlled the House, and was able,
therefore, to impede even the ordinary business of the gov
ernment.

The letters strongly implied that Clinton would

regard the abolition of the Assembly as the ideal solution
126
to his difficulties.

124A s s . Jour., II, 261-2.
125NYCL, III, 744-5.
126NYCD. VI, 522-4, 524-5, 533-4, 550-2, 552-4,
554-6, 556-8.
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Despite Clinton's inclinations, the Assembly was still
a very real part of the provincial government, and, in July,
1750, the need for money forced the Governor to act.
options were limited.

His

He could either meet the House

(which had twice failed to enact legislation), or he could
call for new elections.

As there was little prospect of

obtaining cooperation from the extant House, Clinton opted
for new elections,

12 7

and ordered a dissolution on July 21,

1750.128
Although the attitude of the Assembly had made his ac
tion almost inevitable, Clinton was not in a strong position
to contest the election; his allies were in disarray.
William Smith Sr. would not participate in politics openly
until he was named Attorney General.

William Johnson re

fused to involve himself in the campaign until he received
his salary arrears; and Edward Holland, the mayor of New
York, was so fearful of Oliver DeLancey that he contemplated
leaving the province.
were roundly defeated.

Consequently, the Governor's allies
DeLancey again dominated the

House.129

12 7

Varga, "New York Government," p. 160.

^■28Bonomi, Factious People, App. C. [pp. 306-7],
120

Varga, "New York Government," pp. 156-7, 160-1.
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Yet the Assembly session which began in September^3®
was not as unprofitable as its immediate predecessors.

The

disputants had learned that after soliciting information
from all interested parties, the Board of Trade was prepar
ing its long awaited report on conditions in New York, and
neither wanted to prejudice its case by taking an extreme
p o s i t i o n . C l i n t o n also had replaced Cadwallader Colden
as advisor with the infinitely more moderate James
Alexander, had abandoned his insistence on a five

year

revenue (which had generatedmuch of the friction

with the

Assembly), and even informedthe Speaker that, like
Lieutenant Governor Clarke, he would accept a one year rev132
enue, and all other legislation submitted to him.
The
Assembly responded by funding the government fully.

133

Such temporary success with the Assembly did not, how
ever, reconcile Clinton to the overall situation in the
province, and he repeated his request for permission to
return to England.

His only doubts were about his request

for a one-year leave.

1

A

His departure would leave the

*30Bonomi, Factious People, App. C [pp. 306-7),
^■33Smith, History, II, 116-7.
132NYCD, VI, 598-9.

133Varga, "New York Government," pp. 161-3.
134NYCD, VI, 606.
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government in the hands of Lieutenant Governor DeLancey,
and, in an effort to avoid that unpleasant prospect, Clinton
asked Bedford to secure the removal of the Lieutenant
Governor. ■*'33

Nothing was done about either request, however.

The ministrv had long ago decided to refrain from interfer
ing in New York until the Board of Trade completed its re
port.
The Board finally delivered its verdict in April, 1751.
Its long report examined the political history of the prov
ince, and the dispute between Governor Clinton and the
Assembly in minute detail.

After reviewing all the data,

it concluded that the Governor's attempts at dominating the
government had generated animosities which could be salved
only by the dispatch of a new governor,136 but it did not
act against.him.

(Neither the Board, nor any other agent

of the British government appears to have suggested Clinton's
removal.)

Some new Instructions were prepared and dis-

patched, 137 and the Board thereupon seemed to forget the
situation completely.
Since news of the report of the Board had not reached
New York when the Assembly met in May, 1751, the session,
like its predecessor, was influenced by the fear that

135NYCD, VI, 612.
136NYCD, VI, 614-39.

137NYCD, VI, 754, 755-6, 757-8.
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intemperate action would prejudice the Board's evaluation
of events in New York, and so it, too, proceeded smoothly.

138

The only conflict (over the amount to be provided for pres
ents to the

Indians) was resolved by the Speaker, who in

structed the provincial treasurer to deliver

£ 200 which the

Governor had requested, but which the House had not seen fit
139
to provide.
The moderating influence supplied by anxiety over the
Board of Trade's report had been eliminated when the House
reassembled

in October.

The conclusions of the report were

public, and

the Assembly apparently felt it could resume the

quarrel without consequence.

At the beginning of the ses

sion, several Assemblymen complained that they had not re
ceived proper notification.

It then proceeded to insult

the Governor, who was already sensitive about his dignity,
by failing to notify him officially of its actions.

Instead

of presenting the resolution formally, it sent a copy by
messenger.

But Clinton did not react to the taunt.

The Governor had apparently learned moderation, and he
played no role in the dispute which ended the session.
Colonel William Johnson had been attempting to secure reim
bursement for monies he had advanced for presents to the
Indians since 1748 but the Assembly had not acted.

138smith, History, II, 120-1.

139NYCD, VI, 703-4.
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therefore turned to the Council for redress, and on
November 18 he presented the Assembly with a Council order
which required it to appropriate h 500 to settle Johnson's
account in part.

The Council's action was unprecedented

since the upper house had never claimed the right to ini
tiate money bills, and, not unexpectedly, a deadlock devel
oped.

The Assembly would not act on the bill from the

Council, and the Council refused to deal with legislation
sent from the Assembly until it did so.
the whole matter.

Clintc.i shunned

He signed the bills which had been

passed (fortunately including a revenue bill), and, on
140
November 25, dissolved the Assembly.
There was no clear reason for Clinton's decision to
terminate the Assembly at that time for he could have ended
the dispute between the houses just as effectively by an
adjournment.

Perhaps he still had hopes of securing the

election of an Assembly which would do his will, for he
again devoted himself to politics.

He took steps to bring
141
the Livingston family into his alliance,
and his friends
did their best to generate support.

142

Unfortunately this

venture was no more successful than its predecessors,
Clinton's allies were again roundly defeated when the

140Smith, History, II, 121-2.
l^Bonomi, Factious People, p. 163.
1 AO

Varga, "New York Government," pp. 179-82.
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election was held in February, 1752.
Although Clinton was apparently not deeply disturbed
by the rebuff, he was not anxious to meet yet another
Assembly dominated by DeLancey, and so delayed meeting the
House until October, 1752, when the expiration of the rev
enue made it necessary.
the meeting was tranquil,

Despite the Governor's misgivings,
144

and this may have contributed

to Clinton's unwillingness to call the Assembly into session
to deal with Indian affairs on May 30, 1753.*4^

The May

meeting, Clinton's last with a New York Assembly, was also
extraordinarily peaceful.

He recognized the power of the

House by asking its advice on the management of Indian rela
tions, and it reciprocated by quickly providing the neces146
sary funds.
Although Clinton had received permission to leave New
York in the summer of 1752,147

administration did not

actually end until October 10, 1753, when Danvers Osborne
arrived to assume the government.148

Clinton had remained

143Bonomi, Factious People, p. 163.
144Smith, History, II, 123.
145Varga, "New York Government," p. 190.
146Ass. Jour., II, 334, 336, 348-9.
147NYCD, VI, 762-3.

148NYCD, VI, 803.
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in New York until then because the British government had
refused his oft-repeated request for permission to suspend
James D e L a n c e y ; h e had no intention of leaving the gov
ernment to his rival.
Osborne's suicide on October 12 must have been a bitter
pill for Clinton to swallow.

In spite of everything James

DeLancey had become the acting governor.
DeLancey*s accession to the government marked the end
of an era.

A colonial who had built his political power by

championing the rights of the Assembly, he based his admin
istration on cooperation with the House, and so the disputes
which had marked Clinton's administration became memories.
His successor, Sir Charles Hardy, was too preoccupied with
the French and Indian War to involve himself in disputes with
the colonists, and Hardy's successors faced the problem of
growing resistance to British rule.

149NYCD, VI, 761-2.
150NYCD, VI, 803.

^■5^Bonomi, Factious People, pp. 171-4.

CONCLUSION

The significant role of the governors of colonial New
York in the provincial political system has generally been
ignored in the political histories of mid-eighteenth century
New York.

The traditional practice has been to treat the

Governors merely as obstacles for the Assemblies to overcome,
and to suggest that their concessions to the Assemblies were
their only contributions to the evolution of the province's
political life.

Recently, American historians have begun to

investigate the role that the governorship of New York
played in the British system of political patronage, but,
these authors too have neglected the role the governors had
to play in the everyday operations of the colonial govern
ment.
Both approaches fail to appreciate the delicacy of the
situation.

Appointed by Royal Commission, with Instructions

supplied by the British government, and responsible only to
London, the Governors may have been British officials, but
they were much more than that.

As they had sought appoint

ment to improve their fortunes, they were always hostages
to their subjects' good will.

They faced the unenviable

task of having to serve two masters.
The dilemma would have been insoluable if both masters
were demanding.

Fortunately, the British government was
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almost totally disinterested, and it gave the governors of
the Province of New-York almost total freedom of action.
The Assembly was, however, not as unconcerned, and satisfy
ing its demands was a difficult task, but one which had to
be faced by every governor, for it was the only way to sur
vive and profit from an administration.

The essential ele

ment in this situation was adaptability.

A governor had to

be flexible enough to recognize the situation he faced, and
to meet it.

Unless he could maintain the good will of

British government while coming to a modus vivendi with the
Assembly (which dominated the political life of the colony)
no governor could succeed.
Four of the six governors of provincial New York in
the mid-eighteenth century —
and Clarke —

Montgomerie, Van Dam, Cosby,

reached an understanding with the leaders of

their Assemblies, and supported the colonists' political
programs in exchange for financial support for their admin
istrations.

Even Burnet and Clinton, who became involved

in ongoing disputes with their Assemblies, recognized the
importance of the House.

They understood the political

realities they faced, but were unable to find a practical
means of reaching an accommodation.
In general, the men who governed New York between
1717 and 1753 were more perceptive than has been generally
assumed, although they were, of course, not equally capa
ble.

As all occupied political posts, their success should

be measured by their political acumen, their ability to
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achieve their goals.
failure.

One, George Clinton, was an abysmal

He was completely unwilling to subordinate his

antipathy towards James DeLancey, and consequently he
brought the government of New York to the edge of collapse.
Another, William Burnet, was a failure because he would not
compromise.

He stubbornly insisted on pursuing his Indiem

Trade policy in the face of growing colonial opposition,
and his intransigence cost him control of the government.
Four governors of provincial New York, however, were
eminently successful.

John Montgomerie, Rip Van Dam,

William Cosby, and George Clinton all established and main
tained good relations with their Assemblies, and avoided
British intervention in colonial affairs.

Perhaps their

methods did not conform to the niceties of contemporary
mercantile and political theories, but they resulted in
practical triumphs, and clearly demonstrate that success in
governing New York required the ability to simultaneously
serve two masters.

APPENDIX

The 126 instructions which defined the administrative
structure and practices of the colony of New York are re
corded in Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to
British Colonial Governors. 16 70-1776, 2 vols. (New York,
i£(>7, reprint of 1935 edition) , as sections:
21, 35
36, 62, 69
102 , 111 112 , 114, 127
218, 219 2 2 2 , 223, 227
381, 382 404, 411, 414
459, 460 512, 516, 521
563, 565 566, 571, 572
641, 642 647, 649, 657
711, 714 719, 728, 731
906, 931 954, 9 85, 987
1,028,
1,029 <
1 ,031
1,050,
1,051,
1 ,052
1,060,
1 ,062
1,061,

73, 81,
132, 202,
265, 269,
416, 420,
530,
--11 531,
588, 616,
69 4, 697,
736,
... 737,
988, 992,
1,036,
1,054,
1,063,

83, 86
88 , 92, 98,
203, 205 , 208,
Of 215 , 217,
273, 304 , 324, 325, 347,
421, 423 , 448, 449, 458,
537, 544 , 552, 553, 561,
629,, 634 , 636, 637, 639,
698, 700 , 701, 702, 708,
738, 761 , 820, 822, 878,
1,017,
1,018,
1 ,021,
,049,
1,038,
1,047,
1,056,
1,057,
,059,
1,072,
1,073.

The 25 instructions which defined trade policy are re
ported as sections:
537,
908,
1,045,
1,071.

538, 539,
666,
845,
848,
852,
853,
910, 912,
920,
929, 1,035, 1,040, 1,043,
1,046, 1,058, 1,065, 1,066, 1,067, 1,068, 1,070,

The 18 instructions which gave the governors specific
instructions are reported as sections:
134 ;
229,
435
4 35,
436,
1,053, 1,055

236,
468,

318,
598,

321,
617,
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345,
729,

346,
733,

419,
939 ,
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